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The Problems of Community 
 
 “Prologue”, the first poem in George Mackay Brown’s first collection, sets the 
tone for all of his work to come.  One of his most anthologised and analysed works, it 
places his writing in a context, not of modern thought, but of a wilful nostalgia and 
parochialism: 
For the islands I sing 
   and for a few friends; 
not to foster means 
   or be a midwife to ends. 
 
Not for old Marx 
   and his moon-cold logic – 
anthill dialectics, 
   neither gay nor tragic. 
 
Not that extravagance 
   Lawrence understood –  
golden phoenix  
   flowering from blood.1 
 
As the poem continues, Brown details those for whom he does “sing”: workers, tinkers 
and saints.  In naming Marx and Lawrence as representatives of that writing to which he 
is opposed, Brown situates himself outside of both modern politics and literature: his 
writing is not end- or theory-driven, but observational, a writing of and for the land and 
people he knows best.  He is concerned, in the words of Jean-Luc Nancy, with: “the 
spacing of a bountiful community, whose history does not consist in accomplishing an 
end, but in letting new names, and new songs, arise unendingly”.2  Community and 
poetry in Brown’s work are united in that they are not teleologically determined, but 
instead give birth to an untimely “song” in its purest form.3  This song does not have a 
political or historical end, but instead exists only, in Friedrich Nietzsche’s terminology, to 
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serve life.4  In this sense he can be contrasted with a poet like Hugh MacDiarmid, who in 
his “Second Hymn to Lenin” questions the validity of Scottish poetry insofar as it fails to 
capture a people or their history:  
Are my poems spoken in the factories and fields, 
In the streets o’ the toon? 
Gin they’re no’, then I’m failin’ to dae 
What I ocht to ha’ dune.5 
 
MacDiarmid’s confrontational work stipulates a poetry that exists in a necessary relation 
to the people it depicts and their history: his poetry works towards political and aesthetic 
ends in order to engage and enrage the contemporary reader.  If MacDiarmid, perhaps the 
dominant voice of poetry in twentieth-century Scotland, writes in order to engage the 
reader with questions of historical and political identity, Brown instead works within 
myth and history in order to establish a resonant depiction of a community and a people 
that lies outside of time: 
 Tinker themes cry through 
 The closes of my breath –  
  Straw and tapestry shaken 
  With keenings of love and birth; 
 Odyssean corn returning 
 Across furrows of death; 
  Women scanning the sea; 
  Ploughmen wounding the earth.6 
 
Even with the dark undertones of a poem such as “Themes”, Brown retains a vision of 
the Orkneys and his own work which is essentially mythic and timeless.  This perspective 
allows a reading of Brown, still dominant, in which he is seen as resolutely anti-modern, 
even primitive. 
 Indeed, Brown’s self-conception seems most closely related not to the work of 
other twentieth-century poets, but to Walter Scott’s idea of Orcadian and Shetland poets.7  
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In The Pirate, Scott writes of “legends [which] are, indeed, everywhere current amongst 
the vulgar; but the imagination is far more powerfully affected by them on the deep and 
dangerous seas of the north”.8  This gullible, superstitious imagination is given a full 
illustration in Scott’s depiction of the mediocre poet Halcro; Scott writes of a party 
where: 
Halcro, now completely in his element, had assembled around him an audience, to 
whom he was declaiming his poetry with all the enthusiasm of glorious John 
himself, and receiving in return the usual degree of applause allowed to minstrels 
who recite their own rhymes – so long as the author is within hearing of the 
criticism.  Halcro’s poetry might indeed have interested the antiquary as well as 
the admirer of the Muses, for several of his pieces were translations or imitations 
from the Scaldic sagas, which continued to be sung by the fishermen of these 
islands even until a very late period.9 
 
The combination of mockery and nostalgic respect for such a poet echoes both Brown’s 
depiction of his own work and many of his critics.  Here is a poet whose primary value is 
his appeal to his neighbours, a poet whose work is constructed from the familiar and 
echoes the Scandinavian sagas which the whole community knows.  Halcro is a poet who 
resists politics and style in favour of a fidelity to older myths and stories: his poetry is 
purely parochial, and while Scott intimates that it would not even be suitable for his 
urban readers, any value it has is located in its reflection of, and appeal to, the place and 
community from which it comes.  Forty years after “Prologue”, Brown’s poetry continues 
to place what he called “the lesser mysteries of art” within an anti-historic paradigm: 
I know this about time, 
It has set me on a distant shore. 
     It has given us history, 
Not the circles of ceremony all men ought to rejoice in.10 
 
There are injunctions to poets throughout his work: the poet must “Carve the runes / Then 
be content with silence”,11 the call of the poet is: “‘Harp of whalebone, shake / Golden 
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words from my mouth’”.12  Brown’s self-representation is always that of the unschooled 
observer, a man who recounts the natural world and the communal legends around him 
for the benefit of those who know these things as well as he, but who is uninvolved in 
larger questions of being. 
 Brown’s view of his work as depicted in this early poetry has been taken for 
granted by the majority of his critical commentators.  Archie Bevan and Brian Murray 
hail his “island agenda”,13 while Francis Russell Hart summarises his themes as the belief 
that “time will outlast history”,14 and indeed Cairns Craig places Brown within the 
context of “historylessness”.15  In a brief analysis of the novel Greenvoe, Craig condemns 
Brown’s use of “mythic content [that] emphasises the cyclic return that denies the 
forward trajectory of history”.16  The more sympathetic criticism of Berthold Schoene 
argues that Brown’s aim is: “to bring forth a narrative that would be at one with his 
vision of Orkney as a unique place and community with a singular, self-constant identity.  
He is striving for the creation of a historical myth.”17  In all of these studies, and in many 
more,18 critics bring forth Brown’s continual themes of history and community in order to 
illustrate that he is, in accordance with his own statements, fundamentally concerned not 
with the modern world, but with the formation and continuance of a mythic perspective 
on Orcadian life.  As this thesis will attempt to show, however, the lasting value of 
Brown’s work is almost completely opposed to this reading.  Throughout his work, 
especially in his novels, Brown engages with the questions of community and history, not 
to celebrate them blindly, but to problematise them.   
 The ways in which Brown engages with the problems of community are best seen 
in his prose works, especially in his novels.  As much as his poetry remains the work for 
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which he is best known, it is in his novels that Brown engages most closely with the 
modern world; the longer prose form allows him not only to state an artistic or 
philosophical position, but to question it as well.  A close reading of each of his novels 
reveals that he continually undermines his own stated positions and that he emphasises 
themes of community, history and myth not in order to accept and validate them, but to 
question what use these ideas may still have for the modern world.  In this respect, his 
work is best understood with reference to contemporary thinkers of community such as 
Nancy, who is discussed in significant detail in the fourth and fifth chapters.  Earlier 
chapters also discuss the relation of his work to thinkers as diverse as G.W.F. Hegel and 
Theodor Adorno, Martin Heidegger and Maurice Blanchot.  While many, if not all, of 
these thinkers were unknown to Brown, an examination of their work in relation to 
Brown is crucial because they respond to the same problems.  Rather than applying 
philosophy to literature, an integrated exploration of these philosophers in the context of 
Brown’s work permits an approach to problems of community which require both 
conceptual and mythic thought.  Like all of these thinkers, Brown’s fundamental mission 
within his writings is to examine the foundationless world of modernity, and to see, in the 
wake of the loss of metaphysics and faith, what organising principles may remain.  As a 
religious – Catholic – writer, Brown often extols a familiar Judeo-Christian foundational 
paradigm within his work: “a shaping divinity [that] takes over from our rough-
hewings”.19  It is simultaneously clear, however, that within his work this foundation is 
more desired than successfully implemented.  Brown’s novels speak to a desire for 
instantiated, constant history and myth, as well as the desire for a fully integrated 
community united by common work and faith, just as they recognise that such things are 
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now impossible.  The tension between the world as it is desired and the world as it is 
forms the core of his works, and in that light Brown must be seen as a fully modern 
writer, one who engages with both the themes and aesthetic possibilities of contemporary 
fiction in order to document the failings and difficulties of the modern world. 
 Although this thesis will cover multiple facets of Brown’s prose, it centres on the 
theme of community.  I will argue that community is a primary theme throughout his 
work.20  However, it is only recently that critics have come to understand that within 
Brown’s writings it is “the destruction of a community […] that is required for life to 
continue”.21  It is not only, as Bevan and Murray write, that Brown “had a deep and 
abiding sense of community”,22 but also that within his work this sense of what a 
community is, how it is established, what it demands and how it can be said to be 
meaningful in contemporary life, is continually questioned.  As such, the question of 
community is a central point for any new reading of Brown which wishes to overturn the 
received reading of Brown as nothing more (or less) than a parochial writer of myth and 
fable.  Brown’s theme throughout his work is not only how a community is built, but also 
how it is destroyed, and what life may remain when the community, central to the 
individual’s thinking of life itself, has been made obsolete.  The community is, then, 
Brown’s symbol of the foundation of being, and it is the chief signpost of his value as a 
modern writer that he refuses to take it for granted, but instead continually problematises 
it.  Brown’s writings of Orkney should not be read as anthro- or mytho-historic 
observation, but must be understood as attempts, coming from within a limited lexicon 
and narrative framework but no less significant for that, to understand the chief problems 
of modernity. 
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A. The Centrality of Community in Scottish Fiction 
Brown is not, of course, the first Scottish writer of the twentieth century to 
question the value and formation of community.  Indeed, both glib and profound studies 
of the nature of community can be said to be a central facet of Scottish writing over the 
past century.  The community is approached both as a way of (historical or actual) being, 
and as a metonymic representation of Scottish society as a whole, whatever that might be.  
For Craig, this preoccupation with community is a way in which the Scottish novelist is 
able to address “the confrontation between what is outside history and unamenable to it, 
and what believes itself to be inside history”.23  This confrontation surfaces not only in 
the twentieth-century novels discussed below, but also in the kailyard tradition 
inaugurated by J.M. Barrie.  As Craig argues: 
the narrator, as superior, educated, worldly commentator, submits the community 
to our scrutiny as an object of mockery for its narrow-minded parochialism, for its 
strange rituals and its unrelieved backwardsness; at the same time, however, in 
reaction against the harshness of the immediate environment – more spiritual now 
than economic […] – the narrator becomes the voice of a lingering nostalgia for a 
lost sense of community based on religious commitments that have ceased to have 
any validity to Barrie’s audience.24 
 
Thus as far back as Barrie, and even as Scott, the community is used within Scottish 
fiction to illustrate both that which is outside history, insofar as it is parochial or even 
mythic, and that which is itself historical.  Any depiction of community thus, in Craig’s 
view, automatically engages with the questions of history; the community comes to 
symbolise that element in Scottish history which constrains individual possibility, even 
when, as in Barrie, it also celebrates that very constraint.  The myth of community arises 
“when the logic of history fails”;25 community is both an idea located in particular history 
and the replacement of that history.  
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 For Hart, the centrality of community in Scottish fiction comes about as a way of 
representing the “dominant myth” of “the wholeness of Scotland”.26  Faced with a very 
real possibility of exodus, the “remnant that stays home, feeling inferior and defensive, 
makes compensatory myths”.27  The myth of the historically-thriving and the 
ideologically-united community is necessitated by the very impossibility of such a 
community in a time of emigration and cultural change.  In order to understand the place 
of Scots and Scottishness within history, it is necessary to create an historical myth, one 
which provides a foundation for all that follows.  In terminology borrowed from Alan 
Riach, the community is one of “Scotland’s masks”,28 a possibility for self-representation 
that allows a grounded whole where one might not in fact be possible.  The community is 
thus constitutive of the popular iconography of Scotland, an iconography which “has 
been unmistakeable, internationally bankable and unusually stable for a long time.  
Through major changes in social economy, iconic images of Scottishness have been 
persistently and widely maintained.”29  For Riach, the iconography of Scotland is not 
only externally imposed by the international media, but also constructed internally: it 
allows Scots to imagine themselves as part of an unchanging whole.30  The oft-derided 
“tartanalia” that lays claim to much of Scotland’s place in the international imagination is 
thus seen by Riach not to be a symbol of external imagination, but also a dominant myth 
within the culture itself that allows a grounded self-representation.  As in Craig’s 
analyses, community is used within Scottish culture, specifically in the arts, in order to 
create a foundational myth, a myth that permits resistance to the actual demands of 
history and modernity.  The community can thus be perceived within Scottish culture as a 
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repository of, and a symbol for, the ahistoric: it is that which resists change and provides 
a foundation for all thought. 
Within Scots-generated fiction, the twentieth century brought about a more 
critical view of community which, while challenging the nostalgic view found in the 
work of Barrie and Scott, still kept the community at the centre of Scottish life.  George 
Douglas Brown,31 whose The House with the Green Shutters Brown hailed as: “The best 
Scottish novel of the twentieth century” (FI 20), began to question the value of 
community over sixty years before Brown’s Greenvoe made the community itself the 
inescapable focal point of his fiction.  Douglas Brown’s vision of community is just as 
foundational as that of Scott or Barrie, but far more vitriolic; his aim in The House with 
the Green Shutters is to illustrate the ways in which community functions as a hindrance 
to individual thought and expression.  For Douglas Brown, the emergence of community 
in rural Scotland comes not from mythic sources, but from boredom: “In a dull little 
country town the passing of a single cart is an event, and a gig is followed with the eyes 
until it disappears”.32  The gossip and public interference which lead to the downfall and 
death of the novel’s protagonists are often no more than a way to pass the time.  The 
influence of the townspeople in the lives of these individuals is a central concern, but not 
truly explained: gossip and interference happen because the community allows them.  
Indeed, gossip and interference are themselves constitutive of the community.  Mixed in 
with an early description of the town’s physical construction is an account of the 
centrality of gossip within the community: 
In every little Scotch  community there is a distinct type known as ‘the bodie’.  
‘What does he do, that man?’ you may ask, and the answer will be, ‘Really, I 
could hardly tell ye what he does – he’s juist a bodie!’. […] The chief occupation 
of his idle hours (and his hours are chiefly idle) is the discussion of his 
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neighbour’s affairs. […] It is in a small place like Barbie that such malignity is 
most virulent, because in a small place like Barbie every man knows everything to 
his neighbour’s detriment.33 
 
A “small place like Barbie” breeds a petty and malignant community; the community 
does not function as a unified whole, but as a grouping of individuals whose primary aim 
is the undercutting of other individuals.  Whatever beneficial wholeness is sought in the 
vision of the community is lost: that very wholeness of public opinion is presented as a 
damaging force beyond the control of those whom it involves.34  The spirit of community 
is central to the novel, not in a spirit of either praise or nostalgia, but one of despair.  For 
Douglas Brown, the idea of a community that forms the basis of small-town life is 
detrimental to all the individuals who dwell within the town. 
 In Craig’s analysis, the community within the novel is predicated on fear: “The 
fear in which the community lies prostrate before a hostile environment is not an isolated 
moment in its existence but the very essence of the whole pattern of its life. […] The 
morality by which the community operates is a morality of mutual fear and mistrust.”35  
The primacy of fear and competition is indeed foregrounded throughout the novel; what 
is less explored, both in Craig’s analysis and in the novel itself, is how this situation came 
to be realised.  Craig argues that Douglas Brown’s depiction of the Scottish community is 
essentially external: “The community presented in Barbie is irredeemable, but the values 
by which it is judged so are values which have – and can have – no existence in the 
community itself: they have to be continually brought in from outside.”36  The authorial 
voice in the novel certainly bears out this reading:  
It was strange that a thing so impalpable as gossip should influence so strong a 
man as John Gourlay to his ruin.  But it did.  The bodies of Barbie became not 
only the chorus to Gourlay’s tragedy, buzzing it abroad and discussing his 
 11 
downfall; they became also, merely by their maddening tattle, a villain of the 
piece and an active cause of the catastrophe.37 
 
The community is here viewed from the outside; its mechanisms are strange and even 
unthinkable, and can only be recounted.  Yet one of the most striking aspects of Douglas 
Brown’s depiction of community remains unaccounted for in Craig’s reading: the 
parochial community of Barbie is mirrored by the academic community of Edinburgh in 
order to demonstrate that such a community is not limited to a particular place, but that 
community itself is, by its very nature, a force that harms the individual. 
 John Gourlay finds a makeshift community in the bars of Edinburgh; as his 
alcoholism develops, so does his need for community itself:   
Young Gourlay spent that winter in Edinburgh pretty much as he had spent the 
last.  Last winter, however, it was simply a weak need for companionship that 
drew him to the Howff.  This winter it was more, it was the need of a formed 
habit that must have its wonted satisfaction.  He had a further impulse to 
conviviality now.  It had become a habit that compelled him.38 
 
Community, whether rural or urban, is thus presented as a habit and a need.  Of all the 
characters in the novel, John Gourlay is the most likely, through his outside education, to 
perceive the damaging power of the community, but he too falls into the trap of such a 
community.  His downfall, which leads to his father’s death, comes not from his own 
desires but from his need to answer to the community at large.  In Douglas Brown’s 
vision, then, the community is something inescapable.  It is not limited to the “little 
Scotch community”, but is instead an inherent part of life itself.  Craig writes that “The 
narrative voice continually establishes patterns of comparison which will assure us that 
this is not the world”,39 but the Edinburgh scenes serve to point out quite the contrary: 
this is the world.  Community, even when despised as strongly as in The House with the 
Green Shutters, is inescapable: it is the primary path for human function.  Thus, as much 
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as Douglas Brown despairs of community and uses it as a focal point for his anger, it is 
not less foundational to his writing than it is in earlier, more idyllic or nostalgic works.  
The community is ultimately that which denies an external perspective, because it is the 
grounding of human interaction itself.  As much as one can rail against its damaging 
power, it is impossible to conceive of a world that does not put community in a central 
position. 
 Douglas Brown’s greatest contribution to Scottish literature, then, is a redefinition 
of community that allows it to be used as a foundational term.  The community is not 
necessarily specific to a given location, although the idea of a place is usually central.  
While critics speaking of “community” in Scottish fiction tend to use the term to refer to 
any literature that examines the life of a town as a whole, Douglas Brown, in his 
depiction of multiple communities in various places, opens it up.  The community is also 
not entirely ephemeral in its reference to collective thought or gossip, although that too is 
a dominant aspect.  Rather, community is the way in which a group of people, selected 
either by place or culture, come to think of themselves.  The gossip of Barbie is the way 
in which its inhabitants come to know themselves; community is central to the novel 
because it forms the basis of both physical and ideological gathering.  Community is thus, 
in Heideggerian terms (which will be explored throughout this thesis), both logos – “the 
originally gathering gatheredness that constantly holds sway in itself”40 – and Mitsein, or 
‘being-with’.  Community, after Douglas Brown, becomes a term that applies to the 
individual’s understanding of herself in relation to the world around her: it is the 
foundation that one opposes or embraces, but is always there. 
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A somewhat less dismissive, if similarly foundational, view of community is 
found at the centre of another key text of twentieth-century Scottish fiction, Lewis 
Grassic Gibbon’s A Scots Quair.  Gibbon’s trilogy routinely tops “Best Scottish Novel” 
popular contests and is given a central position in most critical surveys of Scottish fiction; 
its views of community and Scottish life are difficult to ignore.  The trilogy depicts the 
life of Chris Guthrie in three successive communities: the rural (Kinraddie, Sunset Song), 
the town (Segget, Cloud Howe) and the city (Duncairn, Grey Granite).  This shift of 
physical communities is paralleled by a simultaneous shift in ideological communities. 
Kinraddie is a version of the nostalgic, unified yet individualistic, community of Scottish 
writing past: “So that was Kinraddie that bleak winter of nineteen eleven and the new 
minister, him they chose early next year, he was to say it was the Scots countryside itself, 
fathered between a kailyard and a bonny brier bush in the lee of a house with green 
shutters.”41  The references to John Watson (whose 1896 Beside the Bonnie Brier Bush is 
often seen as an exemplar of kailyard fiction) and Douglas Brown here foreground the 
way in which Gibbon is using Scottish literary tradition to inform a view of community 
in which place, especially uncultivated land, is of primary value:  
Sea and sky and the folk who wrote and fought and were learned, teaching and 
saying and praying, they lasted but as a breath, a mist of fog in the hills, but the 
land was forever, it moved and changed below you, but was forever, you were 
close to it and it to you, not at a bleak remove it held you and hurted you.42 
 
When Guthrie moves to Segget, she is forced to interact with a more humanly 
constituted community, one not dissimilar from that of Douglas Brown.  The townsfolk 
of Segget are closely related to those of Barbie, bored, quarrelsome and interfering: “The 
folk of the Mills would hang round the room where their dole was paid by a little clerk, 
they’d laze there and snicker at the women that passed, and yawn, with weariness 
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stamped on each face; and smoke, and whistle, and yawn some more”.43  The sense of a 
judgemental community is aided by Gibbon’s occasional use of the second-person (a 
trope which appears throughout his writing): 
Segget crowded the kirk the first Sunday in May after the General Strike 
collapsed, to hear what that cocky billy Colquohoun would say of his tink-like 
socialists now.  But he never mentioned the creatures at all, he preached a sermon 
that maddened you, just, he said there was nothing new under the sun: and that 
showed you the kind of twister he was.44 
 
If Kinraddie is the Scottish past and Segget is the present, then the ideological 
community that forms among the communists in Duncairn is the future.  Although the 
town-centred community is equally harsh as in Segget, Ewan finds a possibility of a 
greater community in political thought: 
he lay still with a strange mist boiling, blinding his eyes, not Ewan Tavendale at 
all any more but lost and be-bloodied in a hundred broken and tortured bodies all 
over the world, in Scotland, in England, in the torture-dens of the Nazis in 
Germany, in the torment-pits of the Polish Ukraine, a livid, twisted thing in the 
prisons where they tortured the Nanking Communists, a Negro boy in an Alabama 
cell while they thrust the razors into his flesh, castrating with a lingering cruelty 
and care.  He was one with them all. […] And a kind of stinging bliss came upon 
him, knowledge that he was that army itself.45 
 
While Ewan eventually loses his political passion, this ideological community which 
exists both through and in counterpart to the physical community of Duncairn is perhaps 
Gibbon’s presentation of a community which does not reject its physical and social 
foundation, but rises above it.  
 What unites these three disparate communities, besides the ability of the 
individual to thrive in and despite them all, is the community’s ability to comment on 
itself.  As Craig argues:  
the author’s alienation is not the basis for a disenchanted and literary framing of 
the community’s life, but for a narrative structure in which the community, 
through its gossip and its reminiscence, becomes the organiser of the narration, 
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inserting into the body of Grassic Gibbon’s fiction the fictions with which it 
embroiders its own life and through which it expresses its own imaginative 
vitality.46 
 
The blend of narrative voices, including the second-person addressed above, produces an 
idea of the community as that which recognises itself.  Community is thus foundational 
not because of historic or social factors, although these cannot be discounted, but because 
existence in community is itself the way through which the community comes to know 
and understand itself.  Community is not a term that labels something that already exists; 
instead, it is through thinking of themselves as a community that community comes into 
being.  Community, as a concept and as a reality, is central to both the novel and to the 
lives it depicts because it allows for a degree of self-representation which cannot be 
achieved in any other way.  Thus Chris Guthrie’s struggle for individual determination is 
not counter to the will of the community (as such struggles are in Douglas Brown), but a 
part of the community itself.  As argued by Craig, such a struggle “is not the gateway to a 
hubris brought about by stepping beyond the community’s boundaries: it is a fulfilment 
of one set of values which the community has helped to breed in her; through her, as a 
result, the community itself will be enlarged and made more significant”.47  The 
community is the vehicle through which both individuals and the community emerge as 
themselves. 
 The voice of the community, at once unified and diffuse, is thus the central aspect 
of the trilogy.  Craig’s earlier reservations about Gibbon’s work – his claims that it 
illustrates the “terrible and destructive”48 power of an engagement with history – may 
thus be seen to be less central to a reading of the novels than a focus on the way in which 
Gibbon uses the novels to illustrate the constructive power of community.  For Craig: 
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“Where Ewan confronts history as remembrance, but remembrance only of violence and 
death, Chris confronts life as amnesia, cyclic and without progression; a world where 
history has no meaning”.49  Such claims ignore that these confrontations with history and 
life take place within (and against) the foundation of community itself, and that for 
Gibbon the individual’s ability to confront history at all is only made possible by her 
engagement with the surrounding community.  The community may be ahistorical, as in 
Sunset Song, but it remains that which allows an engagement with history.  The 
development of a communal voice is best illustrated in Gibbon’s late, unfinished novel 
Speak of the Mearns.  The novel’s early narration alternates between third-person 
observation and a first- and second-person voice tied to Keith, the youngest son of the 
central family.  As a young child, Keith uses the first-person:  “It was late in the jog of an 
April day when our flitting of Montrose came through the Howe, over the hill of 
Auchindreich and into the crinkly cup of the village. […] I couldn’t see it [a rainbow] 
though Alick held me up and pointed it out from the back box-cart.”50  As the child 
becomes aware of his place in the world and begins to describe not only his own 
observations but the life of the people around him, he begins to employ a second-person 
narration: “Father said ‘Ay we’ll be at it all day.  Can you send out the dinner at twelve, 
would you say?’ and Mother said couldn’t he come home for it, like a decent man, he’d 
be tired enough, her eyes upon him in that way that she sometimes had, it made you 
ashamed that anybody should look at father, like that”.51  Finally, when Keith grows too 
ill to narrate, the voice of the novel shifts to a third-person “folk”, who narrate sundry 
events collectively:  
As the new year came blustering into the Howe, folk took the news of the parish 
through hand, standing up douce and snug in the bar and watching the whirl and 
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break of the flakes that the wind drove down from the hills to the sea like an old 
wife shake the chaff from a bed.  Ay, God, there hadn’t been a winter like this, 
said Gunn of Lamahip, since ‘yt, he minded it well, he as fee’d at that time up in 
place in Aberdeen, called Monymusk, one morning he woke and looked out of the 
bothy window, b’god, the farm place had vanished entire, nothing about but the 
shroud of snow.52 
 
The voicing in this passage shifts, at times unnoticed and unsignified, from person to 
person; even as individuals contribute their own stories, what emerges is a communal 
narration. 
 What Gibbon thus reveals in this progression of voices is the way in which the 
community itself becomes both the dominant theme of the novel and also permits a self-
reflexivity from the characters.  The communal voice is the way in which the community 
knows itself to be what it is.  The community is thus formed not only, as in Craig’s 
analysis, a response to, or more often against, history, but it is the way in which history 
itself can be perceived.  Even those individuals who live in defiance of the community, 
like Chris Guthrie herself, are only able to do so by using the foundational characteristics 
of the community as something against which to define oneself.  Rather than questioning 
the validity of the community, as Douglas Brown attempts to do, Gibbon finally cements 
its foundational character: the community is ultimately that through which all life must be 
considered. 
 The influence of Douglas Brown and Gibbon has been unsurpassed in twentieth-
century Scottish literature.  Novels as diverse as William McIlvanney’s Docherty and 
Robin Jenkins’s Fergus Lamont chart the individual’s attempt to overcome the 
constraints of community in a manner often reminiscent of Douglas Brown, while novels 
from Willa Muir’s Imagined Corners to Irvine Welsh’s Trainspotting have followed 
Gibbon’s portrayal of a community that is constitutive of the very idea of self, even when 
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that self is engaged in trying to escape the community.   Yet relatively few novels have 
clearly engaged with the fundamental question of how it is that community has been 
instituted as the foundation of Scottish thought; while the role of the community has 
continually been placed under examination, its very existence has often been taken for 
granted.  The following chapters will attempt to show that, contrary to dominant critical 
belief, the novels of George Mackay Brown fill that very necessary role: by placing not 
only actual communities, but the idea of community itself, at their centre, they allow a 
wide-ranging critique of the value of community and the possibility of foundational 
thinking.    Brown is of course not alone in this mission: his novels are closely paralleled 
by those of Iain Crichton Smith, whose work similarly engages with the construction and 
ideology of the community. 
 Smith himself claims that his first novel, Consider the Lilies, is not an historical 
study, but rather “a fictional study of one person. […] It is only the story of one old 
woman confronted by eviction.”53  Contemporary with Greenvoe, Smith’s novel engages 
in a similar exploration of the ways in which the individual not only defines herself 
according to the surrounding community, but also attempts to understand why that 
community should itself form a foundation for her way of life.  Mrs Scott considers 
herself to be a member of two communities, that of the church and that of the familial 
dead:  
She remembered her own father dying, with his long white beard.  He was a good 
age when he died, yet was as frightened as a child in the silent house.  Her father 
and mother remained as presences in the house.  So did her husband, even though 
he had died in another country.  She remembered his small alert moustached face 
emerging dripping out of the basin of water.54 
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When these two communities fall into discord – that is, when Mrs Scott is required by the 
church to leave her home, with its presences of the dead – she is forced to reconsider her 
role as an individual.  She turns for help to Donald MacLeod, a staunch individualist and 
atheist, presented in the first part of the novel as her ideological opposite.  MacLeod is 
opposed to the founding institutions of the community, but yet becomes the defender of 
the community itself: “‘You know, Mrs Scott, living in a small village can be difficult.  
And yet whenever I go to Edinburgh I want back to this village.  You wouldn’t think that, 
would you?  For people talk.  They talk all the time.  You’d think that was all they had to 
do.  What was it like, those years when you looked after your mother?’”55  Thus while 
MacLeod is as suspicious of his neighbour’s gossip as Gourlay in The House with the 
Green Shutters, he is also able to use the “talk” of the community to engage fully with 
another person.  Even this is insufficient; MacLeod is shortly thereafter shown looking 
for the word “which would bring him closer to her”:  
Obscurely he felt that it was important to him to find the word and to be able to 
say it, so that he would be united with her and what she was.  Perhaps only the 
poets would be able to find that word.  Or perhaps it didn’t exist.  But it must 
exist.  Somewhere it lay concealed under lies and differences, like the soot in a 
black house which could be used to fertilise the land.  Somewhere, if he could tear 
the beams apart, the dry old beams, he would find it and build a new kind of 
house.56 
 
What Smith is documenting here is the need for community: for a community of 
individual engagement that continues to appear even when the traditional forms and 
institutions of community have failed.57  Smith thus focuses his novel not on the 
community as it appears in history, but on the need for community as that which would 
allow one individual to engage with another.  Community becomes foundational not only 
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because it allows self-referentiality, but because it forms the ground for basic human 
interaction. 
 This intertwined theme of the impossibility of communal continuance, of the 
necessary failure of all that which constitutes community, and the continuing need for 
communal foundations, drives and grounds the work of both Brown and Smith.  In a late 
essay, “Real People in a Real Place”, Smith explicitly argues for the centrality of 
community in the work of the Scottish island writer.  The community, although not 
idealised, is itself the symbol of how the rural or island life differs from the life of the 
exile or the city: 
It is this sense of a community that one thinks of most when one compares the 
island with the city.  It was because of the community that the fact of exile 
became so desolating and frightening. […] The positive side [of the community] 
is the sense of warmth, settledness, that it gives, the feeling that one has a place, a 
name, that one will not be consigned to the chilly air of pure individuality.  It is 
the sense that what one belongs to is a sustaining force [… although] it is nearly 
always conservative and hostile to change.58 
 
The community thus represents a reality in which the individual is grounded: it is a 
reality which is now fleeting and oft-abandoned, but nevertheless central to the depiction 
of a certain manner of being.  As Smith writes: “This is a real society in a real world and 
it will therefore be characterised by the particular reality to which it belongs”.59  Smith 
thus follows the writers mentioned above in his depiction of a community which is not 
naïve but instead very real: to write about the community is not an attempt to escape from 
history, but rather an attempt to depict the lives of people as they are actually lived.  The 
community in his work thus refers both to a basic way of being and to a particular 
lifestyle distinct to the Scottish islands.  Community is thus at once universal and 
particular, historical and eternal: it is the foundation on which all understanding of the 
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way in which people live is based.  The interrelation of these senses of community drives 
much of Smith’s work and, as will be revealed below, that of Brown himself.  
  
B. Community and the Crisis of Foundationalism 
Brown’s foregrounding of the nature and constitution of community is not only 
the way in which he approaches and even redefines the Scottish literary tradition, but also 
the primary way in which he can be seen to engage with modernity itself.  The 
interrelation of community and being, community and meaning, is one of the dominant 
themes of contemporary thought; indeed, any careful thinking of community must take 
into account the way in which it provides or determines that system of relations which is 
necessary to the very concept of being itself.60  As Howard Caygill has argued, the 
“‘making and unmaking’ of philosophy [in the twentieth century] increasingly entailed 
the deconstruction of the writing of community”.61 Writers such as Jean-Luc Nancy, who 
work from what might be called an anti-foundational perspective, argue that: “There is no 
meaning if meaning is not shared [partagé], and not because there would be an ultimate 
or first signification that all beings have in common, but because meaning is itself the 
sharing of Being”.62  Again, drawing out the meaning of partager: “The unity of the 
world is not one: it is made of a diversity, and even disparity and opposition”.63  For 
Simon Malpas, modernity must respond to this idea of diversity and difference: “art 
responds to the fragmentation of the contemporary with a presentation of the difference at 
the heart of being-in-common. […] Art […] activates the sense that difference is. [… It] 
is what touches upon the differences between us that form the basis of community, and 
reminds us of the necessity of being in common.”64  This use of art to comment on both 
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difference and community is paramount in Brown’s writing, as will be shown throughout 
the following chapters.  While Nancy’s writings on community and being will be central 
to the following interpretation of Brown, however, it is first necessary to place these ideas 
within a larger reference of post-enlightenment metaphysical thought. 
In the wake of David Hume and Immanuel Kant, a foundational metaphysics 
grounded on God or first principles has been made impossible, but the place of 
metaphysics in philosophy has remained central; as Kant writes: “What has hitherto been 
called metaphysics cannot satisfy any critical mind, but to forego it entirely is 
impossible”.65  While Kant has been criticised by some anti-foundationalist philosophers 
for continuing to privilege the idea of God – and his metaphysics indeed is structured to 
make room for God – sympathetic critics such as Henry Allison make it clear that this is 
not arbitrary: “Kant is not attempting to provide an exhaustive inventory of all 
metaphysical positions, actual or possible.  His concern is rather with a certain kind of 
metaphysical reasoning, namely, one that leads to the positing of transcendent entities.”66  
The fundamental metaphysical shift found in Kant is thus not one of result, but of 
grounding; Kant shows that the error of previous metaphysics is in external grounding, 
and that any future metaphysics must be founded on (human) knowledge itself.67  
Metaphysics thus becomes not a system based on faith, but on reason: metaphysics is the 
name “given to the whole system of pure philosophy, critical philosophy included, and 
may designate the investigation into the sources of possibility of a priori cognition, as 
well as the presentation of the a priori cognitions which form a system of pure 
philosophy”.68  For the purposes of this introduction, this point cannot be over-
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elaborated, but what is necessarily retained from Kant is the transition from external 
foundations to a metaphysics based on reason. 
I am very far from holding these concepts [of the community of things] to be 
derived merely from experience, and the necessity represented in them to be 
fictitious and a mere illusion produced in us by long habit.  On the contrary, I 
have amply shown that they and the principles derived from them are firmly 
established a priori before all experience and have their undoubted objective 
rightness, though only with regard to experience.69 
 
Kant thus rejects the traditional foundations of metaphysics in order to replace them with 
new foundations; yet his questioning of foundations influences all future metaphysical 
thinking. 
 For Heidegger, it is this very question of foundationalism which defines 
metaphysics: “Ground-laying is now elucidation of the essence of a comporting towards 
beings in which this essence shows itself in itself so that all assertions about it become 
provable on the basis of it”.70  After Kant, metaphysics is the question of its foundation, 
or what he calls in the Davos lectures the “metaphysics of metaphysics”.71  In his reading 
of Kant, metaphysics is grounded on finite human knowledge (and, later, on 
imagination); at the same time, however, Heidegger expands upon Kant to demonstrate 
that metaphysics takes in part a communal view of being: that is, that its focus must 
always remain beings in the form of being-together.  Even as “the true is always only 
what the individual human being thinks”72 – that is, the communal sense of being does 
not directly correlate with truth itself – the interplay between Being and beings remains at 
the centre of metaphysical inquiry.  The roots of modern analyses of community from 
Blanchot onward are revealed in Heidegger’s comment on Kant: “For a finite creature, 
beings are accessible only on the grounds of a preliminary letting-stand-against which 
turns-our-attention-toward.  In advance, this takes the beings which can possibly be 
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encountered into the unified horizon of a possible belonging-together.  In the face of what 
is encountered, this a priori unifying unity must grasp in advance.”73  Heidegger locates 
this advance (foundational) grasping in time and intuition.  More importantly for this 
project, however, he reveals that any understanding of the foundations of metaphysics 
also necessitates an understanding of the way in which community can itself function as 
foundation. 
 At the same time, however, the question of foundations always opens itself to the 
opposite: “because we are questioning, it remains an open question whether the ground is 
a truly grounding, foundation-effecting, originary ground; whether the ground refuses to 
provide a foundation, and so is an abyss; or whether the ground is neither the one nor the 
other, but merely offers the perhaps necessary illusion of a foundation and is thus an un-
ground”.74  Thus for Heidegger, and indeed for virtually all post-Kantian thinkers, the 
problem of foundations is that, once having been questioned, the way in which they can 
continue to function becomes itself a question.  For Heidegger, the solution is to move 
from “asking about beings as such (metaphysics)” to “asking about Being as such”.75  
How Heidegger approaches this shift from beings to Being, and the way in which such a 
shift influences his thinking on being-together, will be addressed at greater length in 
chapters two and five.  For those thinkers who do not make such a shift – that is, for those 
who continue to focus on metaphysics’ questioning of beings – a nonfoundational 
metaphysics, or even postmetaphysics, has emerged.  Yet in all discussions of 
contemporary attempts to formulate a nonmetaphysics or postmetaphysics, the charge 
Heidegger used against Jean-Paul Sartre, and which Adorno in turn brought against 
Heidegger himself, remains: “a philosophy’s denial that it is metaphysics does not settle 
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the question whether it is or not, but it does justify the suspicion that untruth may hide in 
the refusal to admit its metaphysical content”.76  Adorno’s critique of Heidegger and 
metaphysics will be explored at length in the first chapter; before that, however, it is 
necessary to examine other attempts to move past metaphysics in contemporary thought.  
One of the most prominent examples of this move is best seen in the work of Jürgen 
Habermas, which is itself in part a rethinking of the Hegelian project. 
 Hegel takes up the nonfoundational concerns of Kant in order to demonstrate 
further that metaphysics cannot rely on an external foundation, but that it must be seen as 
“the science of things set and held in thoughts”.77  As he writes: “The real nature of the 
object is brought to light in reflection; but it is no less true that this exertion of thought is 
my act”.78  The problem of pre-Kantian metaphysics for Hegel is not only that it “took the 
laws and forms of thought to be the fundamental laws and forms of things”,79 but also 
that it took the totalities of God, the Soul and the World “as subjects made and ready, to 
form the basis for an application of the categories of the understanding”.80  Traditional 
metaphysics must thus be discarded because it both misunderstands thought and naively 
postulates totalities in accordance with “popular conception”.  Yet as Habermas argues, 
early critics of Hegel (in this case Feuerbach, Marx and Kierkegaard) found within his 
idealism “a secret preponderance of what is universal, supratemporal, and necessary over 
what is particular, variable, and accidental, and thus the idealistic casting given to the 
concept of reason”.81  Habermas finds within the first line of post-Kantian metaphysical 
thinking running from Hegel to Heidegger an inability to work fully outside of 
foundationalism and transcendentalism: “All these attempts to detranscendentalize reason 
get entangled in the prior conceptual decisions of transcendental philosophy, decisions in 
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which they remain trapped”.82  Habermas’s project thus develops a philosophical 
approach that is unhindered by prior transcendental philosophy; he attempts to 
accomplish this through the formation of understanding of the “lifeworld”83 determined 
not by an instantiated, subject-driven community, but by a linguistic community.  This 
linguistic community, conceptualised as the public sphere, offers a non-systemic 
approach to rationality, an approach that retains some of the explanatory benefits of 
metaphysics without being encumbered by metaphysics’ transcendental past. 
 Summarising the impact of Kant on modernity, Habermas postulates that his 
nonfoundational, postmetaphysical view of the public sphere supplies the necessary break 
with traditional metaphysics that Kant and Hegel were ultimately unable to provide.  
Habermas argues that such a reconceptualisation of metaphysics is made necessary by 
modernity itself: 
Only up to the threshold of modernity are a culture’s accomplishments of 
reaching self-understanding joined together in interpretive systems that preserve a 
structure homologous to the lifeworld’s entire structure of horizons.  Until that 
point, the unity, unavoidably supposed, of a lifeworld constructed concentrically 
around “me” and “us,” here and now, had been reflected in the totalizing unity of 
mythological narratives, religious doctrines, and metaphysical explanations.  With 
modernity, however, a devaluing shift befell those forms of explanation that had 
allowed these very theories to retain a remnant of the unifying force possessed by 
myths of origin.84 
 
Habermas stipulates a “postmetaphysical thinking” which follows Hegel’s intent if not 
his apparent failings.  This postmetaphysics does not offer a total worldview, but, 
according to Peter Dews’s defence, “accommodate[s] the powerful arguments of the anti-
foundationalists, while nevertheless avoiding the slide into relativism”.85  Habermas 
attempts, after what he perceives as the destructive arguments of Heidegger and Adorno, 
to reassert a metaphysics that remains free of foundationalism but yet, through a focus on 
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experience and communicative practice, retains some of the explanatory power and 
rationality of metaphysics.  As he writes: “what has, following the disintegration of 
metaphysical and religious worldviews, been divided up on the level of cultural systems 
under various aspects of validity, can now be put together – and also put right – only in 
the experiential context of lifeworld practices”.86  Philosophy can thus only be fully 
realised in modernity when it adopts a pragmatic approach.  More specifically, Habermas 
engages with the use of language itself in his exploration of the lifeworld:  
the linguistically disclosed and structured lifeworld finds its footing only in the 
practices of reaching understanding within a linguistic community.  In this way, 
the linguistic formation of consensus, by means of which interactions link up in 
space and time, remains dependent upon the autonomous “yes” and “no” positions 
that communication participants take toward criticisable validity claims.87 
 
The lifeworld is made up of no more or less than the linguistic community, and the 
existence of that community comes about through its ability to validate statements.  
Habermas refrains from making truth-claims in this theory of validation, but is instead 
interested in public understandability: “anyone acting communicatively must, in 
performing any speech action, raise universal validity claims and suppose that they can 
be vindicated”.88  What his pragmatic approach illustrates is how it is possible for a 
speech act, once performed, to be understood; for Habermas, this can only be 
accomplished within the realm of the public sphere.  Habermas thus postulates a 
collective identity, in the form of the linguistic community, which is nonfoundational, yet 
nevertheless “secures continuity and recognizability, […] determines how a society 
demarcates itself from its natural and social environments [… and] regulates the 
membership of individuals in society”.89  The linguistic community, predicated on 
‘communicative action’, thus provides a nontranscendental, pragmatic, inter-subjective 
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approach to philosophy that allows a full engagement with modernity’s predication on 
relation.  This postmetaphysical thought thus overturns any need within philosophy for a 
reliance on the subject or a claim to the essential nature of the world. 
 Habermas most clearly approaches the value of a postmetaphysical approach 
when he uses George Herbert Mead’s theory of subjectivity to explain the dangers of the 
inherent universalism in metaphysical thought.  For Habermas, “as long as idealist modes 
of thought remain in use, the universal will triumph over the individual, which is 
banished to ineffability”.90   Within the communicative lifeworld, however, once these 
idealist modes are banished intersubjectivity itself can give rise to individuation.  Self-
consciousness “possesses an intersubjective core”;91 as both an autonomous and an 
individuated being, “the self of the practical relation-to-self cannot reassure itself about 
itself through direct relation but only via the perspective of others”.92  What Habermas is 
here attempting to demonstrate is that the self, which in Hegel and Kant is posited as 
central to the determination of reason, is itself formed in relation to the linguistic 
community.  Such a community is thus nonfoundational but nevertheless formative: in 
this understanding of the function and necessity of the communicative lifeworld, reason 
itself can only be approached or determined through the linguistic community.  The 
linguistic community thus provides an approach to those ideas, such as the self or the 
(instantiated) community, considered foundational by traditional metaphysics. 
 As complete as Habermas’s defence of the public sphere appears to be, however, 
it nevertheless opens itself to criticisms of idealism and even foundationalism.  In order 
for the linguistic community to function, an a priori understanding of the use of the 
speech act is presupposed.  Habermas argues that “In communicative action participants 
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presuppose that they know what mutual recognition of reciprocally raised validity claims 
mean.  [It is possible that] in addition they can rely on a shared definition of the situation 
and thereupon act consensually.”93  He does not, however, address how it is that this 
situation comes to be realised.  While in the previous quotation he suggests that 
participants may not rely on a shared definition of the situation, he fails to address how 
such circumstances may arise, or how they fit into the public sphere itself.  Habermas’s 
postmetaphysical thinking thus fails to provide a complete answer to the problems of 
foundation, because despite its pragmatic intent, it fails to take account of actual 
communicative forms fully, but instead offers ideal communication as a grounding in 
itself.  For Fredric Jameson, who postulates history as the ultimate (nontranscendental) 
ground of understanding, there is nothing “to be gained by opposing one reified theme – 
History – by another – Language – in a polemic debate as to ultimate priority of one over 
the other”.94  For Jameson, Habermas does not achieve a pure nonfoundationalism, but 
instead only places an idealised version of language as the grounds for his inquiry. 
 Jameson, in rejecting Habermas’s model, seeks instead to determine “how History 
as a ground and as an absent cause can be conceived in such a way as to resist such 
thematization or reification, such transformation back into one option code among 
others”.95  History itself, as textually revealed, is the way in which the question of beings 
can be approached.  It is not a foundation as such, but the way in which it is revealed 
reopens the question of beings, specifically the – for Jameson, explicitly political – 
question of how it is that beings are brought into relation.  He formulates the argument 
“that history is not a text, not a narrative, master or otherwise, but that, as an absent 
cause, it is inaccessible to us except in textual form, and that our approach to it and to the 
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Real itself necessarily passes through its prior textualization, its narrativization in the 
political unconscious”.96  Jameson’s approach is thus a polarisation of Habermas: while 
the latter posits a linguistic community which occasions a questioning of being, Jameson 
begins with the linguistic acts, memorialised as texts, which reveal the (absent) causality 
of history.  Both, however, locate their understanding of beings within a nonfoundational 
yet overarching framework, be it the linguistic community or history.  Jameson attempts 
to understand history without historicising it; indeed, a denunciation of periodisation is at 
the centre of his work:  
I want to argue that this operation [of periodising] is intolerable and unacceptable 
in its very nature, for it attempts to take a point of view on individual events 
which is well beyond the observational capacities of any individual, and to unify, 
both horizontally and vertically, hosts of realities whose interrelationships must 
remain inaccessible and unverifiable, to say the least.97 
 
Jameson thus attempts to define or discover the affects of history while refusing to place 
history in the position of a present cause, that is, a foundation. 
 Jameson most directly addresses the intertwining of community and 
foundationalism in his recent work on utopian fiction.  Writing earlier on Northrop Frye, 
he warily posits a social hermeneutic which focuses on the community; within such an 
hermeneutic: “Only the community, indeed, can dramatize that self-sufficient intelligible 
unity (or ‘structure’) of which the individual body, like the individual ‘subject,’ is a 
decentered ‘effect’”.98  Frye’s reading is thus a positive hermeneutic, one which identifies 
“mythic patterns in modern texts aim[ed] at reinforcing our sense of the affinity between 
the cultural present of capitalism and the distant mythical past of tribal societies, and at 
awakening a sense of the continuity between our psychic life and that of primitive 
peoples”.99  This positive hermeneutic, which attempts to filter out historical difference, 
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is matched by a negative one, which would “sharpen our sense of historical difference”.  
The utopian writers Jameson analyses are those who attempt to work within this negative 
hermeneutic when the very notion of historical difference has been lost within modernity: 
“Consumer society, media society, the ‘society of the spectacle’, late capitalism […] is 
striking in its loss of a sense of the historical past and of historical futures”.100  The 
utopian project is a “representational meditation on radical difference, radical otherness, 
and on the systemic nature of the social totality”.101  The value of utopian fiction is thus 
that it reposits historical difference in a social/temporal context which is itself predicated 
on an ignorance of that difference.  The utopian can be read as being focused on the 
quotidian: “a third way in which individual and collective time come to be identified with 
each other is in the very experience of everyday life, according to Roland Barthes the 
quintessential sign of utopian representation”.102  For a writer such as Thomas More, the 
very notion of historical difference emerges from a rejection of certain forms of history: 
in More, utopia must “implicitly or explicitly define history itself by way of a splitting or 
a reduction in which it is bad history – political history – which is […] neutralized […], 
while what remains – something like Utopian everyday life, perhaps – then emerges as 
truly utopian”.103  And yet, of course, the utopian fiction is always also political in intent 
as well as form; it is here, where political history is both disgarded and elevated, that the 
political unconscious most clearly reveals itself. 
 Jameson finds in utopian fiction a blend of the synchronic and diachronic which is 
explicated by Sartre, who “will both demonstrate that a non-centralized collective or 
group dynamic is possible, and show its historical transformation into a different 
form”.104  Diachronic causality is historically determined but also arbitrary; it “tends to 
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isolate a causal line which might have been different, […] which can very easily be 
replaced by an alternate hypothesis”.105  The synchronic, on the other hand, refers at least 
obliquely to a Hegelian ground, in which “all causes are already there”.  The utopian 
fictions Jameson examines fluctuate between the diachronic and synchronic, often 
embracing them simultaneously, in order to create a portrait of the world that is both 
historically-determined and nondifferentiated, a world which is both political and 
everyday.  History, then, in its political formulation, is thus both the way in which beings 
are approached and an absent cause; in a Heideggerian formulation, it is thus the ground 
and the unground at once. 
 
C. Brown, Community and Foundations 
 At this point, we can begin to return to the work of Brown himself.  Previous 
readings of Brown have tended towards the positive hermeneutic that Jameson finds in 
Frye; this discussion will attempt to show that, just as in the fictions on which Jameson 
focuses, there is a far more complex intertwining of the positive and negative, a 
simultaneous embrace and rejection of historical differentiation.  For those who have read 
Brown’s interviews and essays on his work, this may be a surprising leap, for it must be 
born in mind that Brown frequently argued for a pre-Kantian understanding of the world, 
focusing on the primacy of God and the unified, instantiated community.  Yet, as this 
thesis will show, Brown’s own work is far more complex than he himself admitted, and 
far more engaged with the problems of modernity and foundationalism than has yet been 
examined.  In order to address his work completely, a wide variety of thinkers from all 
sides of the foundational spectrum will be examined; while Heidegger and Nancy are the 
 33 
most constant referents throughout this thesis, a range of viewpoints will be addressed in 
order to explore the complexity of Brown’s thought.  The five chapters of this thesis are 
organised thematically, rather than chronologically, around his novels, as it is in the long 
prose form that Brown was best able to explore these themes. 
 The first chapter focuses on Brown’s final novel, Beside the Ocean of Time, and 
applies an Adorno-inspired reading attentive to its potential Romanticism.  The second 
examines Magnus, perhaps Brown’s central work, and the way in which Brown uses the 
novel to posit sacrifice as the centre of communal life.  In the third chapter, Brown’s two 
historical novels, Vinland and Time in a Red Coat are addressed; it is in these that Brown 
most explicitly engages with questions of historical difference.  Greenvoe, Brown’s first 
and most famous novel, is addressed in the fourth chapter, for it is only at this point that 
the complexity and contrariness of his views of community can be completely 
understood.  A final chapter turns towards Brown’s non-fiction prose, in order to examine 
how his own analyses of his fiction and life both differ from and confirm the previous 
findings.  Brown’s short stories, perhaps the form in which he best excelled, will be 
addressed throughout.  The range of Brown’s work examined and the variance of 
philosophical viewpoints to which these works are compared will demonstrate that 
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Chapter 1 
The Will to Primitivism: Beside the Ocean of Time 
 
As is shown in the preceding pages, Brown’s work can be profitably read as a 
response to enlightenment and post-Kantian metaphysics.  If his work is “highly 
sophisticated and at the same time deeply naïve”, as Tom Paulin claimed when judging 
Beside the Ocean of Time for the Booker Prize,1 this comes from his simultaneous 
distrust and acceptance of the process of enlightenment. In much of his fiction Brown 
frames his exploration of the dialectic of individualism and community in a discussion of 
the nature of enlightenment and myth.  Rather than advocating a pure return to myth, 
community or pre-enlightenment thought, Brown explores how these tropes can be made 
use of in the context of modernity.  In his recent work on utopian fiction, Phillip E. 
Wegner summarises Slavoj Žižek as arguing that the “deep contradiction between 
universalism and particularism is not the consequence of a conflict between the values of 
the past and those of the modern [… but] ‘constitutive’ of modernity itself”.2  For Brown, 
this contradiction is both the consequence and a constituent part of modernity.  What is at 
stake in his work is how, within modernity, it is possible to approach the divide between 
the individual and the communal, how it is possible to use the mythic past to explain the 
present and how one can retain useful aspects of metaphysical constructs in a 
contemporary paradigm.  At the same time that his work displays a certain primitivism 
and naivety, then, it is also deeply forward-thinking: this chapter will show that Brown’s 
response to enlightenment deserves careful consideration. 
Brown’s later work, especially Beside the Ocean of Time, displays many parallels 
with the writings of Alasdair MacIntyre. For MacIntyre, whose After Virtue is seen by 
Craig to be “among the most important interventions in our sense of Scottish culture in 
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the last quarter of the century”,3 one of the key effects of the enlightenment project has 
been the ongoing rise of the individual and the loss of community.  This loss of 
communal contextualisation and social identity makes it impossible for moral referents to 
have any basis; as MacIntyre writes: “This democratized self which has no necessary 
social content and no necessary social identity can then be anything, can assume any role 
or take any point of view, because it is in and for itself nothing”.4  It is only in the context 
of a communal identity that moral judgments can be made or assessed: the individual 
without a community has no basis for action.  In his argument for an Aristotelian moral 
scheme, MacIntyre advocates a return, insofar as one is possible, to a notion of political 
community as that which is necessary for any individual moral decision-making.  The 
moral individual can only be understood within the framework of the moral community; 
without community, the individual cannot fully be defined.  Tradition and community, in 
the form of “my family, my city, my tribe, my nation, a variety of debts, inheritances, 
rightful expectations and obligations” in themselves constitute “my moral starting 
point”.5  As Craig points out, the community, whether moral or practical, is thus 
inherently bound up with history and tradition; it is only in the exploration of these latter 
aspects that community can begin to be approached, and only in the approach to 
community that the individual life can be understood.  In many of his writings, Brown 
appears to follow MacIntyre’s schema: his writings present the life of the individual as 
facilitated and defined by the community, and the community as founded on history and 
tradition.  In his continual reassessment of and praise for a world-view predicated on 
local community, Brown’s work parallels MacIntyre’s call for “the construction of local 
forms of community within which civility and the intellectual and moral life can be 
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sustained through the new dark ages which are already upon us”.6  At the same time, 
however, Brown also examines the irrevocability of the enlightenment project and the 
impossibility of such a sustainable community: his work explores the tension between 
these two extremes, and at the same time that it displays an apparent pre-enlightenment 
thought also engages in the key questions of modernity. 
In his 1977 children’s collection Pictures in the Cave, Brown tells the story of the 
Orkneys from Viking settlement to the present day.7  The book is an amalgamation of 
history and legend that focuses on one specific, presumably imaginary, location, a cave 
on the northwest corner of an unnamed Orcadian island.   The cave is home to seals and 
beggars, Robert the Bruce and a German air-force pilot, but most of all it is a physical 
repository of the island’s stories, which Brown views as the core of the island’s culture. 
“‘When the stories are told no more, the island will be as lost as Atlantis’”, mourns one 
character.8  As in MacIntyre, narrative is the way in which both the individual and society 
are understood: “It is because we all live out narratives in our lives and because we 
understand our own lives in terms of the narratives that we live out that the form of 
narrative is appropriate for understanding the actions of others”.9 The stories of the 
community are integral to the community’s existence because stories themselves are the 
way in which lives are understood. As Páll Skúlason points out, the narrative dimension 
of thought cannot, after Hegel, be completely divided from a more philosophical 
approach: a human experience “is only to be understood as a segment of a saga”.10  
Stories, or the rephrasing of experience in the form of stories, are that which allows any 
understanding of human experience.  For Brown, these narratives are able to form the 
bridge between individual and communal life: while they may be about, and told by, 
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individuals, they have the power of integrating the individual within society.  Brown 
places these stories in direct opposition to the concerns of modern education, in which 
history can be reduced to a series of memorisable facts: they instead exist in nonlinear 
time, so that as long as the cave exists and the stories are told, all of the lives contained 
within them are remembered and made vital.   
Brown thus sets forth a divide between a view of history that is comprehensive 
and factual and one that is immanent, fragmented and experiential.  Within his work, the 
former view is linked to enlightenment, while the latter is both mythic and hoped for.  As 
in Walter Benjamin’s “Theses on the Philosophy of History”, the true articulation of the 
past in Brown’s writing is not predicated on historical reality, but is instead “seized only 
as an image which flashes up at the instant when it can be recognized”.11  Brown’s cave 
is home to these flashes; it is a venue for those narratives which reveal the truth about the 
individual and the community without necessary basis in historical fact.  In a collection 
such as Pictures in the Cave, the reader can easily access many of Brown’s key theses on 
the value of storytelling: true stories are not those most closely related to history, but 
those which are most interesting; the most salient aspects of individual life are reflected 
in, and formed by, the place in which that individual dwells; the price of modernity is the 
loss of immanent history.  The cave’s ultimate destruction, similar to the disasters at the 
ends of Greenvoe and Beside the Ocean of Time, signifies the way in which “progress” – 
Brown’s term for technology, enlightenment and modern life in general – attempts to 
destroy that which is of greatest value in the community, its defining narratives.12  Within 
Pictures in the Cave Brown sets forth a paradigm of contemporary life very similar to 
 43 
MacIntyre’s: the consequences of enlightenment are unavoidable, but it is still worth 
arguing for something else, a version of history and experience found in stories and myth. 
Alasdair Maclean dismisses the collection as “a constant rebuke to literary 
sophistication”; he argues that Brown writes with “the notion that one can will oneself 
into primitivism and that an abc sort of simplicity is the signature of it”.13  The simplicity 
Maclean disdains lies in Brown’s repetition of character and place, his one-sentence 
paragraphs and uncomplicated diction: the very properties, in short, which make him a 
popular writer.  There is indeed little stylistic difference between Pictures in the Cave 
and a collection such as Around the Orkney Peat-Fires, a popular series of articles from 
“The Orcadian” which was reprinted throughout the first half of the twentieth century.14  
Although, as will be shown below, both Brown’s prose and ideological stance are far less 
simplistic than they may appear in this volume, Maclean is correct in noting the 
appearance of an ideological agenda throughout Brown’s writing.  In Pictures in the 
Cave, as is more fully evidenced in a late work such as Beside the Ocean of Time, Brown 
is writing with the specific purpose of willing himself, and the reader, into an 
understanding of the value of primitivism; for Brown, the only way in which modernity 
can be understood is with respect to what came before.  The “primitive” in Brown’s 
fiction is connected to the mythic, the “rich squandered cargo” of time. To will oneself 
into the primitive is both to salvage the past and to use it to explain the present.15   
Brown’s work clearly invites a reading which focuses on this simplicity, a neo-Romantic 
reading in which Brown argues for a return to a Hegelian or metaphysical totality.  Yet, 
as Jerome McGann has influentially argued about the Romantics themselves, it is 
ultimately necessary to read the work both through and against the apparent ideologies of 
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its creator.  If Brown’s late writing shares the “grand illusion” of the Romantic poets that 
“poetry, or even consciousness, can set one free of the ruins of history and culture”,16 his 
underlying ideology must also be seen, following McGann’s reading of Romantic 
ideology, as “historically specific in a crucial and paradoxical sense”.17  Brown’s work 
must also be read as fully engaging with aspects of modernity not in order to displace 
them, but in order to examine the ways in which the past is entwined within the present.  
Brown is a far more modern writer than his works, and most of his critics, would lead the 
reader to believe, insofar as his very notion of time and culture is shaped by modernity. 
Brown’s perspective in these two late works is thus markedly different from that 
displayed in a novel such as Greenvoe. While Greenvoe, as will be shown in chapter four, 
demonstrates the revealing potential of the impossible community, Beside the Ocean of 
Time attempts to show what lies at the heart of the community.  The praise Brown gives 
to the primitive and the individual is not naïve, but is predicated on an understanding of 
the danger inherent in any simplistic view of the rural or local community.  Beside the 
Ocean of Time presents a utopian vision towards which all of Brown’s fiction has built: 
its focus on individual achievement and on the ties between past, present and myth 
embody all that his previous works have shown to be held within the framework of 
community. Within the larger body of his work the novel resonates with the heightened 
problematic nature of modernity he has previously foregrounded, but read alone it serves 
as an artistic credo.  Without being ignorant of the way the world is, Beside the Ocean of 
Time simultaneously points to the way the world should be, and thus forms a succinct 
summary of his project throughout his long fiction. 
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 The greatest value a foregrounded “primitivism” holds for Brown is the way in 
which it allows him to construct an omniscient perspective on the individual who is 
stranded in time.  In Brown’s later, more clearly utopian work, a given person can only 
see him- or herself in the moment, but storytelling, in the hands of an individual artist, 
allows a glimpse of how the world looks “through the eye of the guardian heaven-
appointed angel”.  Halfway through Beside the Ocean of Time, Brown clearly sets out his 
reasons for writing not just the story of Thorfinn Ragnarson, the novel’s putative hero, 
but fiction in general: 
The truth is, that while we are closed in by this muddy vesture of decay, the lives 
of many people, including ourselves, seem vain and futile and fleeting at last.  We 
cling avidly, and often with despair, to the dust that is ourselves, knowing how 
soon it is to scatter to the twelve winds. […] Every dance, every lifetime is 
unique, and that infinity of dances from every race and from every era, is of 
incalculable value, and comprehends the great ceremonial dance of mankind.18  
 
Brown engages with primitivism and myth in order to contextualise the effects and 
artefacts of progress within the greater framework of all human life itself. This move 
from the particular to the universal appears to follow Hegel’s call for a view of history 
which eliminates the contingent and the subjective in favour of the absolute: “In history, 
we must look for a general design, the ultimate end of the world”.19  Hegel, like 
Habermas after him, argues that even if one cannot write from a wholly abstract point of 
view, it is still necessary to write as if such an abstraction were possible, to the end of 
reaching a totality or a whole.  Indeed, for Habermas the notion of an ideal speech 
situation is predicated on the understanding that “convictions are formed and contested in 
a medium which is not ‘pure’ nor removed from the world of appearances in the manner 
of the platonic ideals”.20  The “everlasting impurity” of the world requires the 
establishment of a possible abstracted perspective: the very decentring effect of 
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enlightenment necessitates the proposal of an ideal centre.  Habermas goes on to argue 
that: “Even the decentered society cannot do without the reference point provided by the 
projected unity of an intersubjectively formed common will”.21   Even as he argues for a 
philosophy based in “the experiential context of lifeworld practices”,22 then, Habermas 
still insists on a “projected unity” in which human relations are automatically given.  
Brown employs such a perspective in his description of an angelic vision that sees life as 
“an immortal spirit that dances from birth to death, all the way, from before the beginning 
till after the end” (BOT 130).  Even as humans “creep, stumble, march, follow plough and 
scythe, linger, hirple on a stick”, it remains possible to posit still a unity between human 
lives that encompasses all life and time.   
Any engagement with the universal or whole remains predicated on the 
individual, however.  Sartre, for instance, finds such a Hegelian perspective regressive, 
arguing that: “if there is such a thing as the unity of History, the experimenter must see 
his own life as the Whole and the Part, as the bond between the Parts and the Whole, and 
as the relation between the Parts”.23  In Brown, for instance, the angelic perspective only 
arises as part of the story of Thorfinn Ragnarson: the proposed abstracted totality can 
only be accessed through the individual and the subjective.  The novel’s structure itself 
enforces this notion: whatever totality may be apparent, the reader is only given access to 
it through Thorfinn’s subjective experience.  It is thus impossible for Brown, like many 
twentieth-century thinkers, to write as if a totality or a complete system of relationality 
can just be given: he instead focuses on the individual and the individual’s conflicts with 
others.  As for Nancy, relationality itself, manifest as diversity, is the way in which 
totality can be approached: “The unity of a world is nothing other than its diversity”.24 
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The tension between a desire for an Hegelian recourse to the spiritual sphere and 
holistic perspective and the recognition of the impossibility of such a regression 
dominates utopian fiction. Beside the Ocean of Time can profitably be read as an example 
of Jameson’s understanding of the utopian “structural combination scheme” within which 
“we have the ultimate rebuke of the centered subject and the full deployment of the great 
maxim that ‘difference relates’ – one of the most vivid images of the collective in all its 
productive inner conflicts and compacts or conspiracies”.25  If, as Wegner argues, 
“narrative utopias serve as a way both of telling and of making modern history”,26 
Brown’s utopian vision allows a criticism of modernity and enlightenment that is 
nevertheless situated within a modern paradigm.  As Ernst Bloch writes, it is impossible 
to separate utopian thought from the concerns of the present: “great art or great 
philosophy is not only its time manifested in images and ideas, but it is also the journey 
of its time and the concerns of its time if it is anything at all, manifested in images and 
ideas”.27  Even as his work ranges across time, Brown uses his fiction to document the 
concerns of the contemporary age: far from being a retreat from contemporary concerns, 
his fiction represents a continual engagement with the present as well as the past. 
Brown’s fiction utilises a dialectic of individualism to both utopian and 
potentially community-centred ends.  While characters in his novels are often identified 
primarily by their trades, and are thus in a sense interchangeable, they are also portrayed 
as complex, distinct individuals whose lives achieve meaning both within and without the 
surrounding community.  A given croftsman, for instance, achieves wholeness not 
through his own working of the land, but as part of a familial line of men who have 
worked the same land: individual worth is not determined in isolation, but through the 
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ways in which that individual serves as part of a community.  Individuals are identified 
not just by name, but also by croft; Thorfinn’s mother is not just Liza Ragnarson, but also 
“the wife of Ingle” (BOT 146).  Identity, in Brown’s fiction, is formed from the tension 
between the dominance of an individual life and the value that life holds within the 
community. Here Brown approaches a view of identity similar to that of both Nancy and 
Jean-François Lyotard, a perspective from which “a self does not amount to much, but no 
self is an island; each exists in a fabric of relations that is now more complex and mobile 
than ever before”.28  In the chapter “A Man’s Life”, for instance, Thorfinn is surprised 
not at Jacob Olafson’s death, but rather that “this old man was not part of the island 
anymore” (BOT 50).  Individuals can be understood fully neither in isolation nor in a 
collective, but only in the tension between the two.  In order to understand the ways in 
which Brown works through this dialectic, however, it is necessary to engage the 
conceptualisation of modernity popularised by Theodor W. Adorno and Max 
Horkheimer.  In Dialectic of Enlightenment, Adorno and Horkheimer propose a 
perspective wherein enlightenment is not regarded as an historical phenomenon, but is 
instead that which displays the tension between utopian striving and individual centring 
or domination.  Adorno writes explicitly of the impossibility of a naïve return to a 
Hegelian totality in Negative Dialectics, where: “the matters of true philosophical interest 
at this point in history are those in which Hegel, agreeing with tradition, expressed his 
disinterest.  They are nonconceptuality, individuality and particularity.”29  Individuality, 
rather than communality, is one of the dominant themes in modern thought, and any 
perspective on the tension between the two must take into account the necessary loss of 
unity that is revealed in Adorno and Horkheimer’s account of enlightenment.  This focus 
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on the individual drives Brown’s work, and it is thus necessary to read a novel such as 
Beside the Ocean of Time not only through MacIntyre’s vision of enlightenment, but 
Adorno’s as well. 
 Adorno and Horkheimer argue that enlightenment has no beginning: there is 
nothing that comes before it, for even myth, the default primitive state, already realizes 
enlightenment, just as enlightenment continually reverts to myth.  Enlightenment 
“receives all its matter from the myths, in order to destroy them”.30   There is no 
possibility of enlightenment that completely supersedes or abolishes myth: such a view 
would only be possible if enlightenment could be viewed as an historical end in itself.  
Once enlightenment is seen as process and tension, myth must be seen not as an early 
stage in humanity which enlightenment can destroy, but the very core of that 
enlightenment.  Enlightenment thought, herein viewed as the defining feature of 
modernity, is a process of separation: it is “the disenchantment of the world; the 
dissolution of myths and the substitution of knowledge for fancy”.31  It is also necessarily 
a process of the rise and centring of the individual.  It is a self-defeating rise, however, 
for while the individual must combat external nature in order to preserve himself, he 
defeats inner nature in the process.   As Jay Bernstein summarises Adorno’s argument, in 
order to employ discursive reason, one must work towards “the inhibition and domination 
of drives and desires”.32  This drive against nature in all its forms in order to establish the 
dominance of individual reason is the basis of enlightenment.  Enlightenment is not only 
“the distinct representation of nature in its alienation”, but also the very process of that 
alienation: “the decline, the forfeiture, of nature consists in the subjugation of nature 
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without which spirit does not exist”.33  Enlightenment is thus a radical denaturing of the 
world and of the self.   
Critically, there is no prelapsarian ideal inherent in Adorno and Horkheimer’s 
schema, no Edenic vision of untouched nature to which humans can return. Like both 
Nancy and Jameson after him, Adorno argues that the utopian vision cannot be grounded 
in a Hegelian totality, but is instead “a togetherness of diversity”.34  Likewise, in the 
Dialectic of Enlightenment Adorno and Horkheimer argue that there is no natural or 
whole basis for society or culture, but rather that culture has always been thus: culture is 
itself the denaturing of nature. The very notion of an autonomous individual or an 
autonomous, pre-existing nature is impossible, for they are mutually defined.  For 
Adorno, there can be no return to a Hegelian totality or a Romantic envisioning of nature; 
it is not that the split between the human and the natural is irreparable so much as that our 
conception of the split is predicated on an impossibility, for the two are mutually defined.  
It is impossible to understand nature without first understanding society, for “nature is 
viewed by the mechanism of social domination as a healthy contrast to society, and is 
therefore denatured”.35 Adorno does not accuse civilisation, as Rousseau does, for an 
accusatory stance assumes that it is possible to argue from outside civilisation, and that 
there is a known (even if only hypothetical) alternative.  Instead, he attempts to 
understand society from within.  Modernity is necessarily all-encompassing, and it is no 
longer possible to conceive of a battle pitched between the primitive and the modern, for 




A. Progress and Modernity 
Brown, for all of his so-called primitivism, at times appears to accept the 
impossibility of such a divide.  In a passage such as the following, it initially appears that 
Brown views progress as a means of alienation, as a system of that which is foreign: 
Why should Orcadians not believe in Progress? – everything seems to insist on it.  
The stone cots of their grandfathers, where men and animals bedded down under 
the same roof, are strewn all about the parishes and islands, beside the smart 
modern houses of wood and concrete.  The horses are banished, but then tractors 
and lorries are much less trouble, much more efficient.  There is no real poverty 
any more; tramps and vagrants and tinkers are exiled with the horses.  (Only the 
very backward farmers nowadays don’t have a car.)  Progress is a goddess who, 
up to now, has looked after her children very well.36 
 
Here, as elsewhere in his writings, Brown is using a very specific definition of progress.  
Progress is the technological arm of modernity, just as enlightenment, in Adorno’s 
reading, is its intellectual arm.  For all of the irony in this passage, Brown is also sincere, 
and in his later works he comes closer to accepting this view of progress as an 
inevitability.  Progress cannot be countered. Neither progress nor enlightenment, then, 
can be viewed as relating specifically to a given historical period – and it is vitally 
important that the enlightenment discussed in Dialectic of Enlightenment does not refer to 
one specific intellectual movement, but to an ongoing development in human ideology – 
but are instead best understood as measures of change.  Brown’s focus on progress, rather 
than modernity, allows him to revile the technological changes seen in Orkney society 
without discarding the other varied profits of modernity.  As will be demonstrated below, 
Brown’s depiction as a Romantic, supported by passages such as the above, is necessarily 
false: his protestations against the modern are able to take shape only because of the 
modern.  Modernity, as viewed through the lens of progress, is not merely that which is 
opposed to nature; it is that which is inescapable.  Modernity is the great governing 
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principle under which everyone lives.  Even as Adorno and Brown in their disparate ways 
lament the passing of certain cultural institutions and ways of life, they both come to 
accept the relentlessness of modernity, whether in the form of enlightenment or progress.   
 In this respect they are out of step with what Marshall Berman regards as the 
“radical flattening of perspective” that takes place in the twentieth century, in which 
modernity is regarded as somehow distant from humanity, a force in itself.  “Modernity is 
either embraced with a blind and uncritical enthusiasm, or else condemned with a neo-
Olympian remoteness and contempt”,37 claims Berman, but there is clearly a third option, 
present in the writings of Adorno and Brown, in which modernity, like or even as 
enlightenment, is understood not as an event but as a continuance.  This understanding is 
in line with Berman’s conception of nineteenth-century dualism, in which modernity is 
viewed as both saviour and enemy.  This exploratory excitement is revealed in the works 
of Karl Marx most especially, who wrote that:  
everything seems pregnant with its contrary.  Machinery, gifted with the 
wonderful power of shortening and fructifying human labour, we behold starving 
and overworking it. […] The victories of art seem bought by the loss of character.  
At the same pace that mankind masters nature, man seems to become enslaved to 
other men or to his own infamy. […] All our invention and progress seem to 
result in endowing material forces with intellectual life, and in stultifying human 
life into a material force.38 
 
This Marxian distrust of progress, coupled with great curiosity about its yields, is in many 
ways similar to the approach of later writers such as Brown and Adorno.  Indeed, 
Jameson has argued that: “Adorno’s Marxism, which was no great help in the previous 
periods, may turn out to be just what we need today”.39  If this is true, it is because 
Adorno is not documenting the state of the world at the time of writing, as his laments 
about a specifically mid-century “culture industry” would seem to indicate, but rather the 
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state of the world in continual flux.  Adorno can only be right in his conception of 
enlightenment if it is not a process which achieves its peak in twentieth-century fascism, 
but is instead the focal point of an unfinished modernity.  Within Jameson’s reading of 
Adorno, enlightenment, like modernity and progress, must be seen as “something like the 
‘inner truth’ of earlier, slower, seemingly more representational cultures”.40  It is in this 
reading of Adorno that Brown’s underlying ideology in novels such as Beside the Ocean 
of Time is revealed: for the concept of modernity to be valid at this moment, it must have 
always been valid, and for the “primitive” to have been true in some distant era, it must 
also be true now.  Brown uses his novels to look to the past for a version of human life 
which is relevant to the present, rather than looking at it with nostalgia, and it is this 
crucial distinction which makes his work relevant to contemporary life.  
In his more stridently utopian works, Brown argues against the creation of what 
Adorno and Horkheimer famously term “the culture industry”, a confluence of powers 
which considers humans only as members of a species, without individual differentiation: 
“Now any person signifies only those attributes by which he can replace everybody else: 
he is interchangeable, a copy.  As an individual he is completely expendable and utterly 
insignificant.”41 Brown argues that individual worth, at both the level of the human and 
the isolated community, comes about both through its uniqueness and nonduplicability 
and through its value in the creation of a greater whole which is itself constituted in 
diversity.  In his writings, individual worth on the human level is often grounded in 
childhood, and too often adults come to accept the culture industry and the processes of 
modernity.   The role of stories in Brown’s vision is to allow the reader to regain this 
childlike appreciation for dreams and visions and for the value of individual imaginings.  
 54 
As seen above, Brown references a spiritual sphere to illustrate a utopian understanding 
of the world: “sometimes the ‘forefending angel warder’ sees the child and his images 
through the gray bleak time of adolescence, and guides him […] out into the vale of soul-
making, where dream and vision are still the master-light of all his seeing” (BOT 129). 
This “angel warder” is not only a spiritual guardian, however, but also all those, like 
Brown, who propose alternatives to enlightenment and progress and to the loss of 
individual value.  Poetry and fiction, in Brown’s view, allow the individual to continue to 
live as an individual through their emphasis on historical storytelling and imagination. 
Brown begins to address the division between storytelling and history in his 
representation of modern education. 
Brown represents the coming of intellectual enlightenment through his portrayal 
of education and the ways in which it distorts and deadens characters’ perceptions of the 
past.  In Beside the Ocean of Time, Brown continually stresses the difference between 
learned history and lived (if historically-based) stories.  Thorfinn Ragnarson, like Sigurd 
Bressay in Pictures in the Cave, is introduced in the process of skipping history lessons at 
school in order to fully immerse himself in these stories.  Living with and through an 
imaginative history and engaging with it intimately makes Thorfinn, in the eyes of those 
around him, a “lazy idle useless boy [who is] too late to do [his] history lesson” (BOT 
46). This idleness, for Brown, is commendable, for history as taught in a classroom 
setting is not only dull, but creates a distance between the listener and his or her own 
past.  Brown consistently represents education as a force brought to the islands from the 
outside world: teachers arrive from the mainland, stay for a few years, and then depart; 
the recitation of places and dates which they encourage serves to make the local foreign.  
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Education is a force of distancing and removal; the forces of enlightenment are those 
which separate humans from their natural and historical contexts.  Mr. Simon, the teacher 
in Beside the Ocean of Time, has “a way of making that exciting story dull, too”, 
whatever that story might be: 
Mr. Simon thwacked the blackboard with his pointer.  Battle of Bannockburn 
1314 was chalked on the blackboard. 
‘Battle of Bannockburn 1314,’ chanted the school children, over and over. 
It was as dull as ditchwater. (BOT 21) 
 
Education, for Brown, is a reductive force which takes lived experience and transforms it 
into rote learning.  History, when taught in the classroom and memorised as a series of 
names and dates, loses all of its salience; it makes itself irrelevant, because there is no 
connection between what is taught and the day-to-day experience of those who learn it.  
When Mr. Simon plans a “special treat” for the children, a field-trip to a primitive castle 
or broch, the children are “bored stiff”: whatever relevance the broch has to their lives, its 
contextualisation in education makes it appear far duller than “the life of tiny crabs and 
molluscs and delicate frail blossoms of seaweed” (BOT 75-6).  The minutiae of the 
natural world contain far more history, and more interest, than the stories of history when 
they are filtered through education and an outside voice. 
 The ambiguity of the context in which the events of history are placed is one of 
Brown’s primary concerns throughout his fiction.  As Ian Campbell points out, the 
schoolmaster or “dominie” in kailyard tradition is often the narrative voice, the bridge 
between the remoteness of Scottish life and the reader.42  In a work such as Robin 
Jenkins’s The Changeling, a subtle reworking of that tradition, the schoolmaster Charlie 
Forbes is portrayed as delusional about his role in shaping the lives of the poor students, 
but is nevertheless the primary actor in their stories, the man around whom the lives of 
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the students coalesce.  Education is a way into greater society, and a teacher, even one 
who is “conceited about his championing of people oppressed”, is the path into that 
society.43  The schoolteacher is always an outsider both in terms of birth and culture, and 
as such he represents the outside world which the reader shares.  Education forms an 
acceptable path to change because it leads “to advancement in a way which social and 
religious authorities condone”.44  Education thus focuses on the individual, for the society 
in which it prepares one to live is the society of individuals: education creates the post-
enlightenment world of individual dominance. In Beside the Ocean of Time Brown 
maintains the notion that education is both the path towards and the manifestation of 
enlightenment.  Mr. Simon’s lessons directly inform Thorfinn’s fantasies: his 
Bannockburn reverie is not prompted by a natural experience, but by a lesson.  While 
Brown postulates a divide between history as found in textbooks and stories which mirror 
that history but are only to be found in lived (or imagined) experience, the two continue 
to complement each other.   
 In this respect, Brown’s perspective on education can be considered to be 
somewhat Rousseauvian.  A brief comparison with Jean-Jacques Rousseau is especially 
useful here for, as this chapter attempts to show, Brown’s work has often received similar 
simplistic, nature-centric readings as that of Rousseau.  In Émile, Rousseau writes that: 
“education comes to us from nature, from men, or from things”.45  As Keith Ansell-
Pearson argues, the middle aspect of this becomes of greatest importance: societal 
education is that which provides a moral grounding: “we only become truly free and 
independent when we become moral beings united in society”.46  Rousseau, in Ansell-
Pearson’s reading, is not here arguing for a naïve return to nature, but instead “show[s] in 
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what way the social bond can lay claim to a legitimate hold on men’s hearts”.47  
Rousseau thus engages with the very tensions or antinomies which occupy Brown (and 
indeed MacIntyre, whose argument is at least in this respect somewhat Rousseauvian): 
those between society and nature, individuality and community, desire and reason. Nature 
in Rousseau’s thought is not a pre-existing whole to which one could return, as thinkers 
from Nietzsche to Jonathan Bate have argued.  Instead, as Julia Simon-Ingram argues, 
Rousseau posits a hypothetical state of nature from which humans emerge: the 
conception of a “natural man” allows the illumination of natural laws and rights.48   This 
natural state may have never existed, but, as Ansell-Pearson points out, it is necessary to 
hypothesise such a state to explain the present human situation.49  The will to domination 
that Adorno views as an enlightenment process is for Rousseau an outgrowth of social 
development: “the new enlightenment that resulted from this development [prudence] 
increased his superiority over the other animals by acquainting him with it. […] The 
more the mind became enlightened, the more industry was perfected”.50  For Rousseau, 
enlightenment is a necessarily occurring process which arises from the natural instinct for 
self-preservation. Both Brown and Rousseau examine the way in which education serves 
to draw the individual out from nature into the social.  For Rousseau, however, nature is 
limited to origin, while Brown finds nature to be no less originary, but also argues that it 
must be reconfronted on a daily basis so that the human templates of enlightenment and 
law can be continually reconsidered.   
By opening up his notion of nature to include not just humanity’s animal instincts, 
but all surrounding flora and fauna, Brown posits a natural world which stands in 
opposition to modern enlightenment.  If, as Adorno argues, enlightenment is predicated 
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on the decline of nature – “the subjugation of nature without which spirit does not 
exist”51 – Brown explores a world in which neither enlightenment humanity nor nature is 
completely dominant. Brown achieves this most directly in his depiction of selkie culture: 
that which is wholly animal is also wholly human.  Mara, in “The Press-Gang and the 
Seal Dance”, is no less a good (human) wife or mother for her longings to return to the 
sea as a seal.  That the relationship between a selkie and a man is the most fully and 
compassionately drawn in the novel suggests that the human and the animal both thrive 
when they are closest together; it is only when humanity leaves the animal behind that 
problems emerge.  What Rousseau sees as a development, then, Brown views as a 
divorce.  Rousseau’s account of enlightenment, which Simon-Ingram summarises as: 
“[the] individual’s increasing feeling of helplessness as the domination of nature leads to 
a form of self-domination characterized by objectification and alienation”,52 is arguably 
for Brown a surmountable problem in a way it never is for Rousseau.  In Brown’s fiction, 
the wilful refusal of enlightenment thought has the potential (admittedly almost never 
realised) to free humanity from that feeling of helplessness: Brown seems to argue, in 
passages such as the field-trip to the broch, that alienation and objectification can be 
overcome if people just spend more time observing the natural world.  Even for Brown, 
however, this is not a completely satisfactory solution, and his later novels struggle with 
humanity’s actual inability to return to a natural state.   
Read uncritically, this advocation of a return to nature would indeed be troubling.  
Even within his discussion of education, however, Brown begins to allow himself a 
broader philosophical perspective than is at first apparent. Like Sir Walter Scott, Brown 
writes from a position which is both within and without the documented culture: he uses 
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his novels to introduce a somewhat alien world and society to the outside reader at the 
same time that he documents a particular version of the world around him.  Just as Scott 
has been charged with “altering […] or creating history to suit the needs of his plot”,53 so 
too Brown posits an Orkney community which meets his philosophical needs.  Brown 
must surely have been aware of his perceived role as cultural emissary, a man who, to 
quote an article on his Booker Prize nomination, “has moulded, to an almost awesome 
degree, outsiders' and natives' perceptions of those elemental northern islands”.54  Brown 
has been viewed as a representative of the Orkneys, a man whose cultural role is to teach 
native life and stories to the outside world, and indeed even his autobiography begins 
with a discussion of the history and culture of the islands.  If Brown’s putative role as a 
teacher is emphasised, there is, then, an implicit self-criticism in the novel’s dismissal of 
Mr. Simon and his “schoolroom voice” (BOT 2), and the beginnings of a recognition, 
never fully stated, that educational forms of history are not so far from imaginative 
stories as the rest of the novel supposes.  In his focus on the primitive and the mythic, 
Brown uses history as an entry into the sorts of lived myths he prefers, so that the reader 
is not ultimately learning about the islands’ history, but through the novel finding a 
piecemeal sort of lived experience. Learned history, in Brown’s fiction, is always inferior 
to lived historically-based mythology, and it is this latter view of history which it is the 
poet’s duty to convey. 
 
B. Modernity and the Individual 
 The structure of Beside the Ocean of Time is unconventional in the ways in which 
it blends fiction and history; it is in many respects a collection of stories, set across eight 
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hundred years, through which Thorfinn lives, stories in which he briefly immerses 
himself before returning the framework of the present.  The stories are necessarily 
historical, but draw their strength from the imagination, and are most successful when 
they are farthest from conventional history, when they are, in Bernard O’Donoghue’s 
phrase, “at the more fictional end of the historical-fictional continuum”.55  Thorfinn lives 
through episodes from Norday’s past in a manner which combines dream and reality; he 
is a character in each episode, if not the hero, but the stories also arise out of his idleness 
and imagination: 
As a matter of fact, Thorfinn at that very moment was on a Swedish ship, the 
Solan Goose, anchored off a port in the Baltic.  The skipper, Rolf Rolfson, was 
making plans to meet the prince of Rus, with a view to trading with his people 
and establishing good relations. 
It should be said that Thorfinn was actually in the barn of Ingle, lying curled in 
the bow of his father’s fishing yole, with the collie Stalward sleeping in the stern. 
(BOT 4) 
 
These two paragraphs clearly indicate that Thorfinn’s journey is one of imagination, 
rather than an actual physical journey, but the use of the present tense for both, the 
balance of “fact” and “actually”, signifies that the separation between historical or 
empirical truth and imagination is less important than the reader might suppose.  
Thorfinn’s historical experience, though couched in daydreams, is as relevant to the 
reader as if it was historical fact; what is important is the quality of enchantment that 
these stories contain.  “The same ten or twelve stories, as the years pass, become ever 
more colourful and dramatic, so that it is hard in the end to recognize them from the bare 
original narratives; but the storyteller and his listeners are all the more pleased because of 
that” (BOT 62).  Here Brown begins to engage with the individuation that enlightenment 
offers: the stories gain value through their appeal to the unique storyteller or listener.  
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This is one of the most modern aspects of Brown’s text: although his stories themselves 
superficially advocate a return to an unenlightened primitivism, the appeal of the stories 
for a modern reader comes from their enlightenment context.  Brown is not, as it might 
seem, arguing for a relative truth-value, one in which the truth of a story comes not from 
its relation to history but from the pleasure it gives the listeners.  Instead, he is arguing 
that history is subservient to storytelling: the longest-lasting aspect of history is its very 
fictive quality.  And yet that quality is still immersed in history, for it is its basis in a 
shared past that lends a story its meaning.  In all of Brown’s fiction (if sometimes more 
naively than others), stories are the vehicle for meaning and culture; they are the remnant 
of the primitive even as they are captured and dispersed through enlightenment means.  
As Brown argues: 
It is impossible to understand Orkney in any prosaic way, as many people try to 
do, by reading tables of statistics about egg production or population drift, 
concerned only with the here and now.  Contemporary Orkney, cut off from the 
story of its past, is meaningless.  The majority of Orcadians have a kind of 
reverence for their history, but it is a romantic reverence, for the witches, the 
press-gang, the smugglers, the salt-tongued ministers, the Hudson’s Bay men, and 
above all for the Vikings; a kind of sentimental make-believe history, very 
different from the terrible and fruitful things that actually happened to our 
ancestors. (OT 27-8) 
 
Brown does not deny the dialectic of modernity, the necessary entwinement of the 
primitive and the modern, but instead advocates the cultural weight of the mythologized 
past.  In this passage, he also foregrounds his duality as insider and outsider, switching 
from “their history” to “our ancestors”; Brown continually examines the stories of the 
Orkneys both as a native and a medium to the outside reader. Brown’s fiction thus forms 
a rebuke to the criticisms Samuel Johnson made of Scottish natives’ “accounts of past 
times”: “we soon found what memorials were to be expected from an illiterate people, 
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whose whole time is a series of distress”.56   Brown’s primitivism is thus more nuanced 
than it might appear: he accepts the facts of history and modernity, as it were, but 
intentionally displaces them in favour of more germane stories.  In so doing, Brown 
assumes the enlightened stance of his readership: the reader must be able to integrate 
history and myth in a way Brown refuses to do within the confines of his work.  The 
elements of “make-believe” history listed above form a virtual précis of the stories told in 
Beside the Ocean of Time; these are the elements common to almost all of Brown’s 
works, and are thus central to the ways in which he wants his own experience and 
writings to be perceived. 
 It is tempting to assume that this replacing of an enlightenment “real” history with 
a “make-believe” one is Brown’s entire project, and it is to this end that Maclean’s 
criticism of Pictures in the Cave speaks.  If Brown were merely arguing in favour of 
storytelling and against history, his would be an irresponsible project in the face of 
modernity.  In later years, Brown himself admitted that he did not want to see works such 
as An Orkney Tapestry appear back in print, perhaps because of the force of his anti-
modern rhetoric.57 In his later work, modernity becomes a symbol of both destruction 
and hope.  Thorfinn is drafted into the second world war, the island of Norday is paved 
and deserted, and money becomes far more important than land or community, all terrible 
and not apparently fruitful events.  This very interest in “sentimental make-believe 
history” and the local, opposed to any focus on world events, dooms the islanders: they 
are unable to understand the events taking place around them and the larger power 
structures which have begun to interfere in their lives.  The laird’s factor, Thomas Vass 
(seen earlier as a Liberal supporting free trade above all else), serves as the novel’s 
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representative of acquiescence to outside political forces: “‘The government!’ said 
Thomas Vass.  ‘National security.  Too intricate for the likes of you to take in.  But don’t 
worry – never fear – you’ll be compensated beyond your wildest dreams.  You’ll be the 
wealthiest men in Orkney’” (BOT 180).  The inhabitants of Norday are unprepared for 
the rude introduction of modernity, seen here as both technological progress and 
sociological capitalism, and it is ultimately farmers, those people most closely linked to 
the land itself, whose lifestyle is most changed.  As O’Donoghue points out, “The more 
secure the stake in the local economy, and the more ratified it is by nature, the more 
easily it is destroyed by the modern world”.58   Even James MacTavish the publican, 
never presented sympathetically, is tragically forced to suicide by the newcomers; when 
his inn is no longer the only licensed property on the island, his life is made redundant.  
Each member of the community is identified by his or her occupation, and when those 
occupations are no longer necessary for the life of the community, the individual himself 
either dies or moves away.59  This itself is a very real sort of history, for as the individual 
members of the community lose the stories about themselves, the ways in which they are 
defined by what they do within the community, they can no longer fully exist on the 
island.  Here Brown’s dialectic of individualism comes to the fore: although the loss of 
occupation represents an archetypal loss, it also impacts named individuals.  The 
separation between individual and communal value is consistently blurred, and it is only 
when modernity, in the form of this technological progress, becomes dominant that the 
individual is necessarily made distinct from his larger role in society.  The military 
appropriation of the island brings great wealth - or at least its promise - to the islanders, 
but it strips them of their stories, and thus of the greater aspect of themselves. 
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 In the chapter “Aerodrome”, twenty-one islanders are introduced in as many 
pages, as well as seals, dogs, hens and cattle, and Brown shows sentence by sentence how 
the ways in which each individual life is effected changes the whole community.  Louis 
Stewart of Westvoe burns his farm, and sets his cattle to stampede into the sea, because 
no remuneration could match the worth of an eight-hundred-year-old farm: “Louis 
Stewart hadn’t thought about insurance – he nor his father nor his grandfather before him.  
In fact, he seemed to think that there was something wrong about defending a farm 
against tempest or fire with money” (BOT 188. Italics in original).  For a farmer such as 
Stewart, it is better to destroy what you have worked to build rather than have it bought 
from you; as valuable as the land is in itself, its primary value lies in the communal 
history of its working.  The individuals who suffer most are those whose history and 
stories are completely tied to the land and the moment. Ben Hoy, a retired ship’s 
engineer, is one of those shown in the greatest anguish, because his loss of Lookout 
Cottage strips him not only of his personal history, but of that of his ancestors: “the cry 
he vented after Ragna had read the [eviction] letter came from otherwhere.  Ben Hoy, 
when he retired from the sea, had restored Lookout with his own hands.  But his 
forebears had lived on the same site for generations” (BOT 184-5).  Hoy’s cry is in effect 
the cry of all his forebears: he speaks not only for himself, but for all those who have 
worked the same land before him, and thus his grief is much greater than if it were purely 
individualised.  These moments of despair are, crucially, the last the reader sees of Hoy 
or Stewart; they are not shown leaving the island, and Brown does not tell their stories 
afterwards, as he does with other characters, because, in effect, there are no stories left to 
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tell.  When these characters are removed from their landed past they are groundless: a 
belief in stories is not enough for one to continue to exist in the modern world. 
 There are only two people on the island who are able to make good of the 
military’s presence.  Jimmo Greenay, the “poorest man in the island, beachcomber and 
rat-catcher […and] a Tory” (BOT 22), becomes “the only happy man in Norday” (BOT 
183) when the military arrives.  He is content to eat the hot dogs and Coke he is given, 
despite not liking them, because his career, such as it is, is founded on being content with 
anything given to him.  Jimmo is the man who also stays to bury the last of the island’s 
dead when Norday is deserted, and it is in his dilapidated hut that Thorfinn finally 
resides.  Jimmo adapts to modernity because he is almost literally a man without history, 
one who can adapt to each day’s demands but seems to have no memory of the past, no 
family, no land of which to speak.  His very status as an outsider allows him to view the 
military’s arrival with less fear than the others, for he has less to lose.  Systems of 
government make no difference to one as poor as Jimmo, and the loss of stories matters 
less to one who has no one to whom to tell them.  This, too, is a despairing view of 
modernity; although Jimmo survives the invasion of global progress better than others in 
the novel, his is not a life to which anyone would aspire.  However, in the final portrayal 
of Thorfinn Ragnarson’s return to the island, Brown’s final understanding of 
entwinement of modernity and enlightenment, myth and history begins to become clear. 
 Thorfinn is also a necessary outsider.  The “laziest and most useless” (BOT 1) of 
all the boys on the island, his life is never grounded in land or occupation: he is instead 
only a “stumbler into time” (BOT 131).  In an omitted passage at the end of “A Man’s 
Life” Thorfinn’s father, Matthew Ragnarson, asks, “‘What would happen here when there 
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was only a dreamer to inherit’”?60  Thorfinn’s return to the island marks its apparent 
demise, for the land and instantiated community are no longer present: the island is both 
deserted and paved, the houses have fallen apart, and above all, there is no 
communication, and thus no stories, no continuance of history.  Thorfinn, however 
manages to tie all the various strands of the novel together: by watching others over the 
course of time, much like the neo-Hegelian angel discussed above, he is able to keep the 
myriad traditions alive.  He is first shown on his late-life return to the island repairing 
Jacob Olafson’s boat, the Scallop, last seen in “A Man’s Life”, and also observing the 
same “fringes of seaweed and rock studded with limpets” which capture the children’s 
attention in “The Broch”. The sustaining tasks he has not learned himself he still 
remembers through blood and ancestry: 
The man has worked creels, in a way, a long while ago, but then only as a boy 
who had come to bail and tie lobster claws; and then little was expected of, or 
hoped for, a dreamer like him.  ‘Ah well,’ says the man to the mournful fog-lost 
bird, ‘let’s hope the blood of a few generations remembers…’ (BOT 194)  
 
All of Thorfinn’s dreaming enables him to carry on the life of the island, even in solitude, 
in a way no single member of the community could have done before.  His return marks 
an escape from the twin horrors of war and urban dwelling in Edinburgh, and thus could 
be seen as a willed primitivism.  At the same time, his ability to instantiate historical 
traditions within a modern context allows the reader to approach history and modernity as  
processes which are indefinable without the other.  It is not that a dreamer inherits the 
land, but rather that all of the dreams and stories, the histories real and imagined, allow 
him to live in the land practically and fully.  Thorfinn’s remove from society enables him 
to continue past traditions with a knowledge of the present.  Crucially, he does not end 
the novel in solitude.  Sophie, the minister’s niece who first labelled Thorfinn a poet, has 
 67 
also returned to the island, and the two begin a family, one in which land and stories will 
begin to merge again.  The experience of modernity, then, has not destroyed the past, 
only forced it into new perspective. 
 Various critics have argued that the end of the novel is implicitly 
autobiographical, a way for Brown to justify his own departure from Edinburgh and 
return to Stromness, where he lived alone as a writer for close to half a century.61  
Certainly the Edinburgh “treadmill existence” represented in the novel bears marks of 
Brown’s own experience, and the novel which pushes Thorfinn to success, focusing on 
“the impact on a primitive simple society, close to the elements, of a massive modern 
technology”, is strikingly reminiscent of Greenvoe (BOT 214). There is, too, a lament 
about the topics on which Brown focuses throughout all of his writing: “Who nowadays 
is interested in the life of a poor islander, who has been here and there about the world 
and is not very popular with his neighbours and has no particular insights or skills, and 
has achieved nothing particularly worthwhile?” (BOT 213). This reads as a précis not 
only of Beside the Ocean of Time, but of Brown’s autobiographical writings as well.  
While it would be short-sighted to simply accept Brown’s repeated assurances that his 
work is not autobiographical, however, it is possible to see how Beside the Ocean of Time 
has been reworked to make it less so.  In the first draft of “Fisherman and Croftswoman”, 
Thorfinn is shown writing the earlier chapter “The Broch” and indeed the whole novel at 
hand: “Later in the [Thorfinn’s] novel, the story of the broch will be paralleled by the 
occupation of the island by the Royal Air Force in 1938-45 […] but that will only happen 
many chapters on”.62  This self-referentiality is removed from the final draft, however, 
and Thorfinn is instead shown: 
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trying to dredge something rich and strange out of the mythical past of the islands 
– the selkies who shed their coats on the moon-blanched sands and danced; the 
trows who live under the green knolls and love above all the music of men […]. 
And so there is great mystery in this connection between music and death and 
time and the food that the earth yields for the nourishment of men… (BOT 209) 
 
In this shift between the two drafts, Brown moves towards a more universal mode of 
representation: Beside the Ocean of Time cannot best be understood as closing the story 
of the Orkneys, but instead opens it up to include the entire world.  By deflecting real 
history and focusing on myth, Thorfinn – here apparently standing in for Brown in 
philosophical leanings, if not in fact – makes the stories of the islands more accessible to 
those outside that culture.   
 
C. The Embrace of Enlightenment 
Brown’s exploration of the tension between enlightenment and myth allows him 
to focus on the way in which the modern individual returns to myth qua myth.  For 
MacIntyre, pre-enlightenment poetry portrays: “a society which already embodies the 
form of epic or saga.  Its poetry articulates its form in individual or social life”.63  In 
Beside the Ocean of Time, Brown portrays a move in the opposite direction, in which the 
individual and social begin to articulate what is already found in poetry and myth.  In 
Brown’s discussion of modernity, myth can re-enter modernity as a gesture towards 
universality: history is isolated, but myths and stories, in stretching that history out, 
incorporate more aspects of the world than are approachable form the perspective of the 
enlightenment individual.  This is in keeping with a reading of Dialectic of Enlightenment 
which establishes a causal link between myth and enlightenment; in such a reading: 
“myth is itself historical, the result of an early process of enlightenment […] and contains 
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within itself the possibility of enlightenment”.64  Alexander Duttman ties this causal 
reading with Adorno’s work on opinion and exaggeration.  While Adorno argues that 
exaggeration has the potential for delusion, it also has the potential for truth, for: “all 
thinking is exaggeration, in so far as every thought that is one at all goes beyond its 
confirmation by the given facts”.65  Given Brown’s earlier arguments that historical 
veracity is nothing compared to engaging storytelling, and that the truth of myth is as 
close to an eternal truth as the truth of history, the argument found in Adorno that “only 
in the movement of exaggeration […] is thought capable of aspiring to truth”66 is born 
out by Brown’s wilful mythologizing of his own past.  A purely autobiographical text (as 
Brown portrays Thorfinn’s authorship of a markedly Greenvoe-like novel) fails to travel 
as far, or to be as close to truth, as the exaggerated thought, the mythologized form of 
history.  By adhering to a mythological perspective at the close of Beside the Ocean of 
Time Brown does not rule out enlightenment, but instead makes his novel more universal 
even as it engages with the inescapable Adornian dialectics presented in contemporary 
life.  The solution to the disaffection caused by modernity and the displacement which 
drives the islanders out of their homes and out of the story is to find the universal in the 
particular and to place the particular back within the context of the universal.  It is for this 
reason that Brown shies away from autobiographical interpretations; for the novel to be 
successful, it must incorporate not just the life of Brown himself, but also apply to the 
lives of all humanity. 
 Brown uses the final chapter to explore the limits of fiction in portraying both 
linear and nonlinear time.  The novel’s title fluctuates in the manuscript between 
“Beside” and “By the Ocean of Time”, which is itself the title of a chapter in Thomas 
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Mann’s The Magic Mountain, which Brown called in a 1984 interview “a wonderful 
book.”67  Mann’s novel, concerned in part with the effect of encroaching modernity, tells 
of the ways in which the novel can incorporate different sense of time to the extent that 
time becomes the novel’s subject, rather than a means through which story is revealed:  
I am speaking of cases where the story practices a hermetical magic, a temporal 
distortion of perspective reminding one of certain abnormal and transcendental 
experiences in actual life. […] Thus, or in some such way as in these sinister 
[opium-derived] dreams, can the narrative go to work with time; in some such 
way can time be dealt with in a tale.  And if this be so, then it is clear that time, 
while the medium of the narrative, can also become its subject.68 
 
For Brown, as for Mann, one of the ways in which a novel can confront modernity is by 
making time itself the focus of the work.  The various episodes in Beside the Ocean of 
Time are not just set in different moments in history, but are themselves concerned with 
the ways in which those moments collide.  Thorfinn, as shown above, occupies multiple 
epochs, and those episodes set in the past are no less present in the imagination of either 
Thorfinn or the reader for their apparent distance.  Although all of the islanders live with 
remnants of the past that intrude into their daily lives, the novel is the only way in which 
all of those moments can be accessed at once, made simultaneously visible.  The novel, 
historically tied to the Enlightenment both technologically and ideologically, becomes a 
tool by which the past is made not only more visible, but closer to the moment in which it 
is read.  From this perspective, Brown becomes much more welcoming of both the 
content and act of writing over the course of his work.  Whereas in Greenvoe writers and 
their technologies - especially typewriters - are viewed with suspicion (“‘How the hell,’ 
said Ivan Westray, ‘can a man write a book about a place if all he does it sit on his arse at 
a typewriter?’”69), by the time Brown writes Beside the Ocean of Time the gift of a 
typewriter is seen as a marvellous thing, an object of progress which unites different 
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cultures and times.  The typewriter is not an object of distancing, but instead allows the 
writer to draw different strands of time together.  The novel becomes a means of 
dissemination: it prevents the subject matter from being memorialised only and lets it be 
re-experienced in the present.  Those works which would initially appear to be 
monuments to the past become a way of keeping that past vital; for as one reads such a 
work the events portrayed in it become newly present and, hopefully, newly relevant.  
The role of the novel in modernity is to simultaneously preserve the past and to make it 
tangible to the contemporary reader.  In the words of Major Schneider, the kindly 
commandant who gives Thorfinn a typewriter while he is kept prisoner in Stalag 29B, 
“there are not enough poets in the world” (BOT 202). The job of the poet is to unite the 
past and the present, and thus avert “the apocalypse, when all the old values are 
consumed in flames” (BOT 206). 
 In this way, Brown situates the life of the poet in what Adorno and Horkheimer 
would describe as an Odyssean paradigm.  In their recasting of the Siren episode, Adorno 
and Horkheimer argue that the appeal of the Sirens is “that of losing oneself in the past,” 
but while the Sirens “know all that has happened, they demand the future as the price of 
that knowledge”.70   Odysseus here represents the enlightened individual, and by refusing 
the Sirens’ call he forces them into a mythic prehistory and renders them inconsequential 
to modern life. The enlightened self seeks linearity and causality in time; that is, the goal 
of the individuated self is to use the past as practical knowledge (in Rousseauvian terms, 
to use the past as a means to self-preservation).  This telos runs contrary to art and 
history, which are the mediums through which “what is gone [is rescued] as what is 
living instead of using it as the material of progress”.71  Art and history, then, serve to 
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make the past present, rather than distilling it into some workable knowledge.  The 
Sirens’ appeal is that of art and history, and it is against those means of representation 
that the enlightened self must struggle.  Enlightenment, according to Adorno and 
Horkheimer, is the process of defining the past as knowledge.  In Dialectic of 
Enlightenment, this becomes a paradigm of domination, a representation of the way in 
which domination over nature cannot be achieved without concurrent self- and social 
domination.  As Simon Jarvis articulates, power over nature, which is the true sign of 
enlightenment, is paid for by the blanket acceptance of those social systems which permit 
that domination to take place.72  Odysseus is here individualised by his role as the 
oppressor, and thus the entry-point into modernity (for regardless of Homeric intention, it 
is necessary for Adorno and Horkheimer’s interpretation that this refusal to answer the 
Sirens’ call marks the Sirens’ last hour).73   
 The will to domination, however, is not the only possible focal point of this 
interpretation of the Sirens.74  While Adorno and Horkheimer focus on the ways in which 
the episode stresses Odysseus’s rise to dominance, they elide the central notion that, if it 
is true that “the allurement of the Sirens remains superior”,75 then Odysseus, although he 
physically escapes, bears with him that same knowledge of the past they hold out.  
Odysseus is able to take hold of the pleasures of art and history and bring them with him 
into modernity without discarding the promised benefits of enlightenment.  The 
significance of Odysseus’s triumph over the Sirens is not only that he learns domination 
of self, nature and others, but that he is able to amalgamate the mythic, nonlinear, 
prehistorical notion of the past with the linear, enlightened notion of progress that lies at 
the centre of any conception of modernity.  While Habermas is able to reduce the 
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argument of Dialectic of Enlightenment to the rather crude paraphrase: “reason itself 
destroys the humanity which it had made possible in the first place”,76 there is surely a 
more germane interpretation of Adorno and Horkheimer’s work.  Although the 
Enlightenment necessarily brings with it the rise to self-domination, it also allows the 
individual to carry the trace of history in a manner not available to the primitive 
collective.  Odysseus alone among humanity hears the promises of the Sirens and 
survives, which puts him in the unique position of having all possible perspectives on the 
past open to him.   
 This ability to live both within and outside of time is, for an author like Brown, 
the central aspect of being a poet.  There are certainly dangers inherent in this approach.  
As Christopher Nealon argues, the work of those poets who accept the totality of 
modernity yet also hold to the mythic invites the reader “to take up a polemic affection 
for the obsolete, misguided, or trivial”.77  The poet who, like Odysseus, merges the past 
and present runs the risk of oversentimentality, of looking to the past not for self-
preservation but for nostalgia.  This is clearly the perspective taken by Maclean in the 
above-mentioned review of Pictures in the Cave: the primitivism he finds in Brown’s 
work is unwelcome because it is non-productive.  A more useful combination of myth 
and modernity comes from those writers who examine the past not as the past as such, 
but as the vestiges of myth of which enlightenment makes use.   As shown above, the 
examination of history as such does not interest Brown; instead, it is the ability to use 
both factual history and historical imaginings to illuminate the present which lies at the 
centre of his fiction. The Odyssean figure - for Brown, always the poet – becomes 
notable not for his domination of self and others, but for his mastery of both the past and 
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present and those states of intellectual development which they represent.  In gaining 
control over time, he is able to liberate the tropes of myth and enlightenment from their 
linear grounding and surpass the popular conception of the primitive and mythic elements 
of  humanity as being lost in a vague, unreachable past.  If the poet takes the lessons of 
the past and leaves them as they are, the work becomes nostalgic and sentimental.  By 
transforming the salient aspects of history into myth, however, the poet is able to 
incorporate them fully into modernity.  Although it is easy to read Adorno and 
Horkheimer’s metaphorical interpretation of The Odyssey as an ur-enlightenment text, it 
is dangerous to do so, for even in their interpretation it is possible to see the ways in 
which the pre-enlightenment mythos is carried on in the enlightenment project. 
 As well as focusing on the poet’s singular ability to incorporate historically-
derived myths within modernity, Brown also stresses the ways in which the apparently 
tragic elements of modernity can benefit the individual as poet.  The very acts which 
cause the island to be deserted, and which Thorfinn mourns, are those which enrich his 
writing.  In his original notes for Thorfinn’s return, Brown set out a string of changes to 
the island more in keeping with the changes that have taken place in the Orkneys since 
the war: the crofts have grown derelict and been absorbed into larger farms, the church 
only has a visiting minister, the Hall has become a youth hostel.78  In the final version of 
the novel, however, none of these changes have taken place; the land is instead utterly 
deserted with the exception of Thorfinn and Sophie.  This is, then, an almost literal return 
to an uninhabited Eden, a land in which one couple has the ability to change the destiny 
of their environment, to create new occupancy.  This is the danger in Brown’s vision: by 
choosing only certain elements of the past with which to work, and exaggerating those, 
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he finds himself in a position in which denying history entirely serves his novel best.  The 
rewards of enlightenment are only visible when the destruction it has wreaked is most 
apparent, the ability to create only fully revealed when all the rest is void.  If read 
literally, there is a distinctly anti-humanist strain in such imaginings, for it appears that in 
order for a poet to emerge the rest of the world must be destroyed.  However, Brown’s 
work can be understood to be less misanthropic if Thorfinn is conceived of within the 
Odyssean paradigm; in order to fully approach the entwinement of myth and 
enlightenment, the poet must be set at a remove from the rest of the human community.  
The silence in which poems are formed becomes the silence of shutting out the culture 
industry; the hope expressed at the end of Beside the Ocean of Time is the hope that 
modernity is itself surpassable. 
 The hope with which Brown ends the novel is made most apparent when it is 
contrasted with The Golden Bird, a far more pessimistic novella dealing with the arrival 
of modernity in the islands, written seven years earlier.79  Two parallel stories, that of a 
feud between the crofts of Gorse and Feaquoy and of the education of John Fiord, serve 
to illustrate the thesis that, while the islanders are grounded in the past, the processes of 
modernisation only serve to harm them.  The islanders live in a “willed harmony” which 
the arrival of outsiders and technology disrupts; for Brown, the arrival of modernity 
negates the very existence of the island community.  Fiord begins the novel as an infant 
in a mythic past: he is captured by an eagle which is then fought off by his mother, and he 
bears the scars for the rest of his life.  From that time forth he is known as “Eagle John”, 
and he is kept as something apart from the islanders: he is a peacekeeper between the 
divided crofts, but also the one student who embraces education.  He picks up “all the 
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offered branches of knowledge with effortless ease”,80 and finds his community not in the 
keeping of his own croft, as his parents do, but in reading the Orkneyinga Saga.  In this 
reading he comes to believe that Orkney is not “a backwater in the great ebb and flow of 
world history”, but that “the magnificence of history” has “seeped and sought down into 
the present” (GB 51).  In his education in Aberdeen, John Fiord is made “part of the new 
wave of enlightenment, prosperity, and progress that is breaking upon the world” (GB 
57), and it is this new wave of progress which he preaches to his students when he returns 
to the island as a teacher.  Yet, much like Mr. Simon in Beside the Ocean of Time, he  
teaches the children rote memorisation of names and dates, and is viewed as even more of 
an outsider because he comes from the community; in a strict sense, the perspective he 
shares is not native to him, and acts as a force of estrangement.  Unlike any other 
character in the novella, John Fiord lives with a teleological purpose: “‘I see it as my 
duty’”, he tells his students, 
‘to put a new richness into your lives.  Beyond this little stagnant pool lie the 
wonders and delights of Western Civilization, which is our heritage as well as the 
heritage of those who live in cities.  I will lead you – it is my duty – into this 
marvellous region.  But first of all we have to prepare ourselves – we have to yolk 
ourselves to the disciplines of word and number – we have to recognize that we 
are not isolated here in a little backwater, but that we too have a part in time and 
in place: which is to say, I have to teach you first of all the rudiments of history 
and geography’. (GB 96) 
 
In his dependency on progress and his love for the “delights of Western Civilization”, 
Fiord is forced to renounce his own heritage.  When questioned about the scars from the 
eagle talons, he tells his students that: “‘it is precisely that kind of superstition that keeps 
us sunk in our brutishness and ignorance’” (GB 103).  He denies the entire story of his 
infancy, presented quite factually earlier in the novella, because the story is itself 
unreasonable.  Fiord is the new self-made man, one who has stripped himself of a 
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specific, pre-modern heritage in order to bring his community, and himself, into 
modernity. 
 His attempt fails, however.  Fiord is rejected by his lady-friend in Hamnavoe, 
presumably for being too parochial, and when he woos his only friend on the island, 
Sunniva Sinclair, a deaf and mute student, he is ignored by her as she turns her focus to 
small local tragedies.  Fiord’s enlightenment project wins him neither the respect of his 
students, nor the love of a woman, nor a place in the community.  He is tormented by the 
images of daily life in the community, the fish and the rose, and even when he begins to 
relent, letting the children gather shells about the island instead of staying in the 
classroom, he is unable to convince anyone in the island that modernity is something to 
be desired.  At the novella’s end, as Matthew Flett, the heir to the Gorse croft, dies on 
account of his new motorised fishing boat, Fiord is “left alone”.  Progress, enlightenment 
and education are all wasted, because they are not forms of knowledge which can be 
transferred to the community, but are only the domain of the individual.  Rather than 
separating himself out from the mass in order to dominate them, as we see Odysseus do, 
Fiord is himself dominated by his separation.  This is the negative aspect of Dialectic of 
Enlightenment identified by Habermas: reason, in its advent, destroys both itself and the 
reasoning individual.  Maura Nolan, in her reading of Adorno, focuses on the liberating 
aspects of the disjunction between the diachronic and the synchronic: the incompatibility 
of these two ways of viewing time provides “a potential for freedom from the strictures 
of linear historicity”.81  This freedom, however, is crippling to the individual who holds it 
and yet tries to integrate himself within a community bound within the synchronic.  The 
community itself is no great place: the islanders are petty and bitter, gossiping and 
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wilfully ignorant, but to be left outside of it is even worse.  If Brown has a moral in this 
tale, it is that nature is not only a force against which the islanders struggle, but a force 
that inevitably wins.  The fruits of enlightenment are of no use to the individual who 
continues to attempt to ground himself within a world governed by the combination of 
the natural and the mythic. Fiord was spared from the eagle as a child, but never truly re-
enters the community from which he was grasped, just as Matthew Flett’s motorboat fails 
to keep him safe from natural forces.  Fiord’s special status as a made outsider, an 
islander who has received his glimpse of modernity elsewhere, permits him to see the 
necessity of enlightenment, but his own self-fashioning is unable to help the larger 
community. Following Adorno and Horkheimer’s discussion of the Sirens, Fiord is an 
Odysseus who is able to resist the Sirens’ call but cannot prevent his men from following; 
the resistance of one man is ultimately valueless. Even as glimpses of modern life appear 
in the story – automobiles, cigarettes, vegetarian socialists – the islanders are unable to 
see past their small joys and disappointments, and this is why nature defeats society and, 
as Jay Parini writes, “is contrasted with the flux of brief, difficult lives”.82  Individuals 
cannot survive in the community, but neither can the community survive in its premythic 
state: it is only nature, the one constant, which prevails. 
The inhabitants of the island as portrayed in The Golden Bird truly are willed 
primitives: they intentionally remain ignorant of the outside world.  The  definition 
Adorno and Horkheimer provide of Greek religion is applicable here: 
Everything unknown and alien is primary and undifferentiated: that which 
transcends the confines of experience; whatever in things is more than their 
previously known reality.  What the primitive experiences in this regard is not a 
spiritual as opposed to a material substance, but the intricacy of the Natural in 
contrast to the individual.83 
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In the pre-enlightenment community, traditions are often upheld for their own sake, and 
influence from the outside cannot be taken into consideration. These communities, be 
they Greek or Orcadian, fail to separate out the practical benefits of enlightenment from 
its damaging elements.  It is this lack of differentiation which dooms the islanders: they 
are unable to see either the good modernity may contain as well or its ills.  The islanders 
also fail to make the crucial differentiation between technological progress and 
intellectual enlightenment, a distinction Brown himself tends to ignore in some of his 
early work.  The arrival of an educated man and of an automobile are one and the same, 
and by tying together various strands of modernity in order to fully ignore them, the 
islanders damn themselves.  Above all, The Golden Bird is the story of the death of a 
community as represented by the deaths of its individual occupants.  The novel is filled 
with deaths shocking and mundane, funerals revelatory and tragic, but there are always 
“more deaths than births in the valley”.  Each death, too, is the death not only of an 
individual but of all that they represented within the community: 
And sometimes, if it chanced to be the last old man or old woman in a croft, the 
door was closed for ever.  The hearth-fire that had never gone out for maybe a 
hundred years was gray peat-ash.  Kettle and pot rusted.  Rain dripped from the 
thatch.  The curtain  across the bed rotted.  The wood of rafter and table began to 
warp slowly.  A roofing stone might fall and smash in the narrow alley between 
house and byre. (GB 58-9) 
 
Nature here reclaims both land and people; it is the only outside force which works in the 
islanders’ lives.  Although the rise to domination of an individual fails to affect the 
community, the death of an individual becomes the death of all.  Brown is not stinting in 
his criticism here: modernity is the cause of the community’s collapse, to be sure, but the 
community’s resistance to modernity also hastens their end.  There is, in short, no way 
out for the members of such a community: nature cannot be dominated, nor can 
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enlightenment succeed, and as outside forces begin to encroach, the community has no 
choice but to disband.  The novella is a cautionary tale about the perils of enlightenment, 
for both those who embrace it and those who reject it are equally damned.  Death is 
inevitable; modernity only hastens it.   
 From this rather pessimistic background, it becomes possible to see how Brown, 
in his final novel, comes to a tentative peace with modernity.  Beside the Ocean of Time 
contains none of the bitter irony of An Orkney Tapestry or the despair of The Golden 
Bird; instead, it accepts the arrival of progress, and even the destruction of community, 
with great sadness, but with the residual hope that something good can come of it.  This 
good is immediately presented as creation and poetry: spurred by death and silence, the 
poetry of Thorfinn’s expected son promises be as close to perfection as possible.  Yet it is 
possible to see how Brown’s readers could question this peacemaking – surely it is not 
worth the destruction of a community to create a few truly worthwhile poems?  Brown 
would surely agree.  What he injects into this discourse, though, is an implicit concept of 
“substitution”. 
The Arabist Louis Massignon, towards the end of his life, founded a Christian 
community called Badaliya, its members centered around the principle of substituting 
themselves for others.  Giorgio Agamben, in his discussion of community, focuses on the 
second principle of substitution, which is hospitality: 
substituting oneself for another does not mean compensating for what the other 
lacks, nor correcting his or her errors, but exiling oneself to the other as he or she 
is in order to offer Christ hospitality in the other’s own soul, in the other’s own 
taking-place.  This substitution no longer knows a place of its own, but the taking-
place of every single being is already common – an empty space offered to the 
one, irrevocable hospitality.84 
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The empty space in which each being has her taking-place is, for Brown, the space of 
enlightenment.  The devastation of Norday then, is not the result of a tragic modernity, 
but the opening up of a new community.  The poet, for Brown, stands in and substitutes 
for, all of humanity, both as it is and as it should be: the return to Norday is not an 
escape, but the means for the emergence of poetry.  In Brown’s vision the rise of 
modernity does not make up for the losses it entails, but is salvaged by the creation of a 
shared common space, which is human life.  What the poet does is to accept the travails 
of enlightenment and mythology at the same time, to take them out of their own places, 
their own eras, and in doing so to make them newly whole. 
Brown’s poet is thus a messianic figure as much as an Odysseusean one, for the 
rise to domination serves in his vision to aid the rest of humanity.  The poet thus serves to 
unite modernity with the conception of God found in Ecclesiastes, which moves Thorfinn 
“in spite of himself”: “I know that, whatsoever God doeth, it shall be for ever. […] That 
which hath been is now; and that which is to be hath already been; and God requireth that 
which is past” (BOT 48).  The imbalance between the diachronic and the synchronic 
becomes fruitful in Brown’s late vision, for they can be conjoined within the perspective 
of this (by now rather mystical) poet.  The poet, in this glorified standing at which Brown 
hints, cannot fight enlightenment, for enlightenment is the very process which allows the 
poet to recognise himself as such.  In the isolated, individualised work of the writer, 
however, there is a substitution for the community which came before.  There is no true 
will to primitivism left for Brown, because such a will would deny the world as it is.  
Instead, there is a will to substitution and amalgamation, a will to carry forward pre-
enlightenment ideals into the present, and to carry the enlightenment process back into 
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the past.  While in isolation this vision of the poet cannot but be seen as strained and 
somewhat ludicrous, Brown attempts to excuse it by having placed Thorfinn in the most 
ordinary of circumstances, both in the present actuality and in his past imaginings.  The 
intermingling of myth and enlightenment in order to make a new whole becomes more 
immediately palpable because the poet in whom this combination occurs comes from the 
most ordinary means.  Thorfinn, a reduced man living on a reduced island, cannot solve 
the problems of modernity any better than John Fiord could, but in his poetry, and 
especially in the awaited poetry of his son, he can make modernity into a new thing 
altogether, a process that moves backwards and forwards in time, untouched by the 
“bright finger” of apocalypse. 
 Beside the Ocean of Time is thus a utopian text both in its engagement with 
modernity and the possibility it raises for something better.  Brown is in certain respects 
an heir to Ernst Bloch, himself a “decisive influence” on Adorno.85  In his essay “Karl 
Marx, Death, and the Apocalypse” Bloch questions the individualisation which 
enlightenment yields, yet also accepts that it is finally the only way forward: 
Does not a great inwardness, which traversed the self-encounter in ever rising 
loops, ever higher levels of integration, reduce precisely the simple power to turn 
back socially, to do right in politics, and to think? […] But it is no less essential 
that we kindle a light before our feet.  Precisely the one who was a thousand steps 
ahead can help more easily and closely than someone who blindly gasps along or 
adds his voice to the currently feasible.86 
 
What the poet must do, for both Bloch and Brown, is “to shape a path from the lonely 
waking dream of inner self-encounter to the dream that goes out to shape the eternal 
world”.87  The process of enlightenment, the birth to domination of the individual, the 
mastery of nature and the negation of community – these are all presented throughout 
Brown’s work as great horrors.  At the end of his life, however, he accepts not only their 
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irrevocability but also their opening of the world.  Brown himself writes from an 
enlightenment perspective, however unwillingly, as do to a certain extent all novelists, 
even those who profess to write against modernity and progress.   And thus Beside the 
Ocean of Time becomes an attempt to finally accept the irrevocability of enlightenment, 
to understand that the individual shaped by modernity is the one who will shape the 
world.  This is far from an embrace of modernity, but is instead an acceptance that it has 
formed both the author and reader, that it is impossible to approach a text, or a 
community, from an anti-enlightenment perspective.  Brown also at this point fully 
accepts the dialectic of enlightenment and mythos and the self-reflexivity with which they 
must be approached.  There can be no will to primitivism, then, because that very act of 
willing oneself into something that is no longer present requires the individuation of the 
self which enlightenment has produced.   
 There is, finally, no clear-cut border between enlightenment and primitivism in 
the works of Brown.  There is, instead, a pervasive desire to stretch the boundaries of our 
understanding, to force the reader to work outside the bounds of linear time.  Beside the 
Ocean of Time is thus a successfully utopian novel because the very act of reading it 
forces the reader to reconsider modernity itself.  The novel takes the reader out of her 
own perspective in order that she may re-evaluate the world and her own place in it.  
This, then, is Brown’s vision of the promise of art in the modern age: art is that which 
stands outside of time and, in doing so, forces the reader into a nonlinear relationship 
with enlightenment and primitivism both.  The world cannot be undone, only 
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The story of Magnus Erlendson,1 Earl of Orkney, is perhaps the best-known to 
emerge from the islands, the “most famous episode in Orkney’s history”.2   In John 
Mooney’s modern hagiography, Magnus Erlendson is held to be “the outstanding 
personality of the Orkneys in olden days as well as in our own times”.3  This claim still 
stands seventy years after Mooney’s biography, thanks not only to the continued 
popularity of the Orkneyinga Saga and related Icelandic tellings, but as a result of George 
Mackay Brown’s repeated reworking of the story, most specifically in An Orkney 
Tapestry, The Loom of Light and Magnus.  Brown calls Magnus’s martyrdom “The great 
drama at the heart of the Orkney story”,4 and later begins and ends his autobiography 
with references to Magnus: “These historical events form the backdrop to much of the 
narrative and verse that I have written.  Without the violent beauty of those happenings 
eight and a half centuries ago, my writing would have been quite different” (FI 9).  While 
he attests to the stylistic influence of the sagas in his work and to the ways in which they 
impart “the importance of pure shape” (FI 65), Brown also keeps central the mystical 
elements of the story: the last line of his autobiography reads: “I say, once a day at least, 
‘Saint Magnus, pray for us…’” (FI 187).  For Brown, the religious and the historical 
elements of the Magnus story are necessarily entwined; historical veracity is no more 
central to his reading of the sagas than their function as devotional texts.  In his tellings of 
this story, most particularly in the three texts named above but also in many of his short 
stories and poems, Brown continually rebalances the tension between these two elements 
of history and myth.  Crucially, however, he not only addresses this tension, but also uses 
it to explore further the divide between individualism and community, the value of 
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sacrifice and the significance of death.  Brown uses the story of Magnus to demonstrate 
the ways in which the life of an individual can stand in for the life of the community and 
how the death of an individual can be the defining event in a community’s existence.  
Saint Magnus is the central figure in Brown’s writing (and, perhaps, given his 
involvement in the St. Magnus Festival among other events, in his life), and it is in his 
reworkings of this one story that his greatest philosophical and religious methods and 
beliefs become most clear. 
 
A. Medieval and Modern Variants of the Magnus Myth 
 There are three primary narratives of the life and death of Magnus Erlendson, all 
drawn from the same Latin biography, written in the early twelfth century by a priest 
known as Master Robert.5  The most widely disseminated and oldest of these translations 
is found in the Orkneyinga Saga itself, which situates Magnus’s martyrdom within the 
context of the history of the earls of Orkney until the early thirteenth century.  Two 
separate sagas, quite closely related, are devoted entirely to Magnus, the Longer Magnus 
Saga and Shorter Magnus Saga (hereafter LMS and SMS respectively).  The SMS, 
approximately concurrent with the Orkneyinga Saga, is particularly focused on the 
moment of Magnus’s death; it does not include great detail on Magnus’s childhood, 
primarily limiting itself to events concerning the battle of the Menai Strait, in which 
Magnus, serving under the Norwegian king Magnus Barelegs, refuses to fight against the 
Welsh and instead recites the psalter from the deck of the ship, an episode which appears 
in every variant.  A full half of the saga is concerned with the miracles performed by 
Magnus after his death, a listing of small-scale works, mostly concerning peasants, which 
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are recounted quite calmly, with few pauses for religious invocation.  In this moderation 
between religious and historical impulse, the SMS reads very similarly to the account of 
Magnus’s life given in the Orkneyinga Saga, the “most sober”6 of the three extant 
versions.  It is in many ways simply an abridgement of the longer account given in the 
Saga.  Its importance lies in separating the story of Magnus out from that of other earls; 
the reader is forced to consider the text not just as history, but also as quite possibly 
something with greater individual cultural significance.  Little attention is given in either 
the Saga or the SMS to the childhoods of Magnus and his cousin Hakon Paulson.  The 
Saga, however, includes an interlude in which Paulson receives his fortune from a 
Swedish wise man, who foretells that: “‘During your life you’ll be the cause of a crime 
for which you’ll barely be able to atone – perhaps never – to that god you believe in’”.7 
This prophecy sets up the two primary themes of all three variants: the life of Magnus is 
one which gains its import in hindsight – which is to say that the significance of 
Magnus’s life is drawn from knowledge of his martyrdom and sainthood, rather than 
from his living accomplishments – and the ways in which that martyrdom serves to 
represent the shift from Scandinavian religions to Christianity. 
 The author of the Orkneyinga Saga does not dwell on the religious import of the 
Magnus story overmuch, interjecting only two fervent interludes of devotional writing 
into its primarily political narrative.  The first such deviation from pure historical 
narrative comes when Magnus is killed.  According to the recorder, Magnus: 
prayed not only for himself and his friends but for his enemies and murderers, 
forgiving them with all his heart for their crimes against him.  He confessed his 
own sins before God, praying that his soul might be washed clean by the spilling 
of his own blood, then placed it in God’s hands.  He asked that he might be 
greeted by God’s angels and carried by them into the peace of Paradise.8 
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This voicing of Magnus’s private prayers is a significant departure from the tone of the 
rest of the Saga, which is largely an unexaggerated account of battles and successions 
without significant authorial intrusion or supposition.    The saga author’s willingness to 
deviate from verifiable events speaks to the story’s religious, rather than political, 
significance.  The death of Rognvald, one of the “most popular and gifted” of the Earls of 
Orkney, which occurs only sixty years before that of Magnus, is treated almost cursorily 
(“Rognvald was carrying his lap-dog with him and it was this that betrayed him.  They 
killed him on the spot among the rocks”).9  Clearly, for the author of the sagas Magnus’s 
inward struggle is central to the story’s value; his death leads not only to the succession 
of Hakon Paulson to unified rule, but to a series of miracles which inspire religious 
devotion.  The miracles themselves are accorded a chapter of their own, at the end of 
which the saga author offers this prayer: 
[we] close this particular account with the prayer that he who wrote this record, he 
who has told it, and all who listen to it may enjoy from that holy knight of God, 
Earl Magnus, blessings and the answer to their prayers for the remission of their 
sins and for everlasting joy: also from our Almighty Lord Jesus Christ, succour 
and mercy, peace and rejoicing, both now and in the future, from Him who was, is 
and ever shall be the one and only true and eternal God, who gives, wills and 
commands all good things: for ever and ever, Amen.10 
 
There is no other passage in the Saga remotely like this one.  Nowhere else does the 
author appear, and nowhere else is Christianity invoked, except as a political expedient.  
The Magnus episode is clearly separated out from the rest of the history: it allows the 
appearance of the recorder and, furthermore, a display of that recorder’s own faith.  There 
is no pretence towards objectivity here, no attempt to tell the story as another in a series 
of political assassinations.  The weight of the story is founded upon not only the 
religiously significant events contained within, but upon the manner in which they appeal 
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to later readers.  For these reasons, as well as stylistic differences (what the translator 
Alexander Burt Taylor calls its “unctuous tone and edifying purpose”), it is assumed that 
the episode is of different authorship than the rest of the Saga.11  Even if this episode 
stands out as “a clunking interpolation of Christian propaganda into the saga as a 
whole”,12 as Robin Waugh argues, it is nevertheless remarkable that none of the variants 
presumes that Magnus is killed for religious reasons.  Magnus never openly declares his 
Christianity, for instance, nor does Hakon – occasionally seen in more recent texts as 
representative of Scandinavian religious practices – use religious difference as a rationale 
for the killing.  Instead, the role of Christianity is limited to the discussion of miracles 
and the interpolations of the narrator, elements which are further emphasised in later 
variants. 
In the final medieval version of the story, the LMS, the religious element of the 
story is strongly foregrounded.   This version begins with an invocation to the greater 
glory of God, who has used the life of Magnus to demonstrate his will to all humanity, 
both those contemporary to Magnus and those in the present: 
Praise glory and splendour and honour be to Almighty God, our redeemer and 
maker, for his manifold mercy and grace, which he bestows on us who dwell on 
the uttermost edge of the world; so that after the saying of the masters who so set 
it in their books, it seems to them as though we were come out of the world.  And 
yet all the same though it be so, God hath deigned to show us his mercy, 
especially in that he hath let us come to the knowledge of his blessed name; and 
therewith given us strong pillars, the most saintly forerunners of holy Christianity, 
from whose holiness the whole North shines and beams near and far.  These [… 
include] Magnus, the Isle-earl, who brightens the Orkneys with his holiness, to 
whose honour the aftercoming Saga is put together.13 
 
The tonal shift in the LMS is not only lexical,14 but is also apparent in both the changed 
focus, wherein the history related is not to be examined for its own sake but for its 
relevance to modern Christianity, and in the appearance of the author as a commentator.  
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The LMS purports to be the work of Master Robert himself, and is interspersed with 
sermons on the significance of Magnus’s martyrdom from the priest.  Even the style is 
foregrounded, not as being in keeping with standards of other Icelandic sagas, but in 
keeping with God’s will: “for the Lord made short discourses, so we make this story plain 
with clear words and pure telling, as God hath granted us to discern”.15  The interest of 
the author is not in recording history for its own sake, or for that of genealogies or 
political means, but in recording a version of history which glorifies God.  Contemporary 
reviews noted that Dasent’s translation of the LMS, quoted above, “hardly does justice to 
the […] difference between the plain, straightforward style of ordinary history and the 
swelling chant of the interpolator”.16  The LMS, and to a certain extent the chapters of the 
Saga which focus solely on Magnus, are distinct from the remainder of the Saga, and 
from the style of Icelandic sagas generally.  The aims of the LMS must thus be seen as 
foreign to those of the rest of the Saga; its dissemination is not for the sake of historical 
record, but for that of religious exhortation. 
 Unlike the two earlier versions of the story, the author of the LMS spends 
considerable time on Magnus’s childhood.  No new stories are included, but instead the 
author reiterates the continual assurance that Magnus has lived a holy, unblemished life, 
one which befits his martyrdom.  The author carefully places all of the brutalities of life 
as a medieval earl within the context of this seemingly predetermined saintliness:  
Though to many good birth might turn to pride and spoiling of temper, this 
blessed youth was already in the first off shoot of his childhood bright and learned 
by the teaching of the Holy Spirit. [… M]any turn their customs after those with 
whom they live, and whosoever toucheth tar is defiled of it; so when Magnus had 
come to be about fullgrown of age, placed among grim and wicked men who were 
ill-willed against good habits, unstable in the faith, opposed to right laws, stiff-
necked in learning, yielding to evil habits, gainsayers and disobedient to God’s 
commandments; he seemed for some winters like wicked men, and as a Viking 
 94 
with robbers and warriors he lived by robbery and plunder, and stood by at 
manslaughters along with others.  But it is to be believed that he did this more 
from the wickedness and egging on of bad men than from his own badness.17 
 
Magnus can, indeed, do no wrong.  The author does not deny his part in war and viking, 
but instead removes him of the burden of responsibility.  As one of God’s elect (as later 
generations of Scots would have seen it), the historical events of his life pale in 
consideration to what comes after.  This passage, too, implicitly relates the worldly 
temptations of Magnus to those of Christ as presented in the Gospel of Saint Matthew 
(4.1-11) in order to show how Magnus “found Christ-like strength and inspirations to 
throw off the fetters of violent ways”.18  Although this version of the story dates only ten 
or twenty years after the Orkneyinga Saga19 (and purports to be much earlier in origin), 
the saintliness of Magnus has by this point become almost the whole story.  Magnus has 
become, in this telling, fully Christ-like: “And this his deed was needed for the highest 
proof, that on that spot he should become the sacrifice of God, as the helpful sacrifice of 
Our Lord Jesus Christ’s body and blood was offered up for the good of the whole 
world”.20  In order to clarify this symbolic martyrdom, in the LMS Magnus is not killed 
after a political discussion that he comes to of his own will, as occurs in the other 
variants, but is forcibly dragged out of Mass by Hakon’s men, “the most harmful 
wolves”.21  Magnus, in this version of the story, is glorified not only by the miracles 
which follow his death, nor the way in which he dies, but in every moment of his life.  
Each incident in his life serves to illustrate his saintliness (and, where possible, the 
evilness of Hakon).  The LMS enters fully into hagiography; while it changes little in the 
general outline of Magnus’s biography, it refocuses the reader’s attention on the ways in 
which that biography can be used to exemplify a Christian life. 
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 This turn towards religious instruction is best exemplified in the passage 
following Magnus’s death.  The Orkneyinga Saga and the SMS include a description of 
Magnus’s first miracle – in which the land on which Magnus is killed turns from rocky 
and barren to green and fertile at the instant of his death – and briefly mention miracles to 
come.  Both variants then turn to Hakon’s rule and only include stories of Magnus’s 
miracles much later.  In the LMS, the story of this first miracle is followed by a lengthy 
sermon purportedly given by Master Robert on the feastday of St. Magnus.  Not only 
does the reader experience the fullness of Magnus’s sainthood long before the miracular 
proof, but the scope of Magnus’s influence is opened up far beyond the local peoples of 
Orkney: Magnus “drove away the throne of the lordship of the Devil out of the northern 
airt of the world […] he conquered the world and the world’s lords, and he ascended a 
noble victor over the world, taking from his holy master, our Lord Jesus Christ, a crown 
of glory”.22  The congregation listening to this sermon is then asked to “follow the 
footsteps and life of the glorious martyr”, though “his life and holy virtue is rather more 
praiseworthy and wonderful than possible to be imitated by our weakness”.23  Magnus is 
no longer an earl whose life is told in the context of other earls; he is instead made fully 
into a saint, at the expense of being less than human, an example for human conduct 
whose actual life is quite beside the point.  Within a matter of years, in three texts built 
from the same source material, it is possible to see Magnus transformed from Earl to 
Saint. 
 The saintly aspect of Magnus’s life is the one which most greatly interests John 
Mooney, his modern biographer.  Mooney’s hagiography was published only three years 
before Alexander Taylor’s definitive edition of the Saga, in which aspects of the Magnus 
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story are dismissed as “monotonous and puerile”,24 but is completely opposed to Taylor’s 
methodology.  Taylor views the accounts of miracles as historical curiosities:  
In an age when the concepts of Natural Law and what the modern world calls 
Common Sense were transcended by the concept of Divine Omnipotence, any 
coincidence or apparent abnormality in the normal course of events was 
interpreted as an intervention of God in terrestrial affairs. […] In this manner are 
to be explained the miracles of Saint Magnus.25 
 
Mooney, however, attempts to historicise these miracles: “whether we believe or do not 
believe that these were supernatural events, it is necessary and right to consider them in 
the light of that century, and not in the light of the present century”.26  This is, however, 
as impartial as Mooney gets, and he is far more often accustomed to include phrases such 
as: “The story of his life is a demonstration of the heights which may be reached by the 
man in whose spirit the heart of Christ abides”.27  Mooney’s purpose in his biography, 
scholarly ambition aside, is to demonstrate the ways in which the Magnus story 
represents “the triumph of Good over Evil”.28  In this manner, Mooney most closely 
follows the text of the LMS, viewing Magnus as an exemplar of Christian behaviour, and 
reinterpreting all the events of his life with that ideal in mind.  This polarisation of the 
religious and the historical has informed the dominant reading of the Magnus story, as 
can be seen not only in more recent variations but also in criticism such as Elizabeth 
Huberman’s apologia for Brown’s Magnus, discussed below.  What began as historical 
event is now most often read as a clearcut story of the triumph of good over evil, an 
interpretation that Brown himself attempts to dispel. 
 Mooney’s text is important to the study of Brown’s own reworkings of the tales 
not only because, by virtue of its popularity and influence, it is likely that Brown drew 
upon it for his own work (OT 23-4),29 but also because Mooney, more explicitly than 
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other biographers, labours to introduce ways in which the Magnus story can be made 
relevant to modern life.  In writing of the ways in which Magnus represents the coming 
of Christianity, Mooney points out that: “the history of Europe in the second decade of 
the twentieth century proved that the Christianity of the nations was still a blend of 
Odinism and Christianity”.30  Mooney continues this somewhat tenuous claim that the 
First World War is illustrative of Magnus’s own Christian goals by arguing that Magnus 
was 
in advance of his time. […] In that far-off, dark Past, did he have a vision of the 
futility of war? […] Ten million lives were sacrificed in the Great War, in the 
hope that there would be no more wars, yet in less than twenty years there are 
fears of a worse conflict.  Peace and goodwill can prevail only when men realise 
that ‘all they that take the sword shall perish with the sword’.31 
 
This passage is remarkably prescient of Brown’s own final version of the story in 
Magnus, in which the events of the Second World War are closely paralleled with 
Magnus’s death on Egilsay.  Mooney’s biography is predicated on turning the image of 
Magnus as a warring earl into that of a modern pacifist: “to him the Gospel was more 
powerful than the sword; and his witness for Christ and His teaching had a message for 
his own times and ours”.32  Mooney’s focus, then, is not on Magnus as an historical 
figure but as a particularly modern one, not on Magnus as a Northern ruler but as a 
Christian.  For Mooney, as for the authors of religious and tourist pamphlets in the 
ensuing decades such as D.P. Thomson, the death of Magnus “proved the turning point in 
the religious history of Orkney”.33  Until Brown became the dominant popular interpreter 
of the Magnus story the religious elements of the narrative became almost wholly 
dominant over the political, despite, as mentioned above, it being virtually impossible to 
interpret this martyrdom as one founded in religious motives.  In works such as those by 
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Mooney and Thomson, Magnus becomes a far more familiar saint, one who has lived a 
godly life and can be used as an example for the reader to follow.  Like the author of the 
LMS, Mooney never explicitly denies the more violent aspects of Magnus’s life, but 
rather insists that they were out of character, that the saint Magnus became in (and after) 
death was the same man in his life.  Magnus becomes a tool for religious and cultural 
exploration, a man whose life was formed retroactively in regards to his death. 
 
B. The Seamless Garment: An Orkney Tapestry and The Loom of Light 
 Brown, in his reworking of the Magnus story, immediately recognises the 
difficulties of hagiography.  His first major attempt at telling the story lies at the centre of 
An Orkney Tapestry, in the chapter “Martyr”.  Brown laments that “we cannot get a clear 
picture of the man because his monkish biographer has smudged the outline with 
conventional pious platitudes” (OT 72).  The chapter consists primarily of quotations 
from Taylor’s translation of the Saga, which Brown has adapted to a slightly more 
modern tongue – in order to “round out a meaning” (OT 12) – interspersed with Brown’s 
reflections on the significance of the tale.  For Brown, the focus on a predestined 
saintliness found in the earlier accounts and the ways in which Magnus is portrayed as 
having lived a blameless life form a “pietistic fog”.  At the same time, however, “The 
events that gather about him are so extraordinary, and were witnessed by so many people, 
and were enacted in such a hard light, that there is no faking of the record” (OT 73). 
Brown repeatedly argues that the events of Magnus’s life are so extraordinary that they 
could not have been invented, only witnessed: “no one could have invented the psalter in 
the Welsh battle, or the tears of Lifolf the cook-executioner, or the conversation between 
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Hakon and Magnus’s mother” (OT 83).  In Brown’s reading of the story, it is those 
elements which are most strange which are most true.  This claim initially jars grossly 
with Brown’s assertion in the same book that: “If the Viking myth is true, it is true with 
so many reservations and qualifications as to be almost meaningless.  No harm is done, 
except that the corridors of history get filled with unreal figures and hollow voices” (OT 
28).  Brown himself later admitted that in An Orkney Tapestry he “wrenched history too 
far out of its frame” (FI 170).  What Brown begins to do in “Martyr” – a project he 
continues for many years – is to establish the idea of a popular history which is culturally 
validated and finds its truth value in consensus.  In An Orkney Tapestry he is far from 
successful: if Viking myths are “almost meaningless”, Christian ones remain “not 
possible […] to fake” (OT 84).  The issue of which myths Brown chooses to preserve, 
and why, will be addressed at greater length below.  Brown’s focus in this chapter, 
however, and one to which he returns repeatedly, is the symbol of the Seamless Garment, 
at times standing variously for community, God and political unity. 
 The “Seamless Garment” of An Orkney Tapestry firstly represents community: 
the “warmth and comfort and well-being of the people, […] their identity and their ethos” 
(OT 77).  This is “the coat of diurnal hand-to-mouth existence” (OT 77) that concerns 
everyone within the community, and the one on which Brown focuses most heavily in his 
first telling of the Magnus story.   Magnus’s death forms “another section of the Seamless 
Garment” (OT 70) because it is central not only to the life and succession of the ruling 
families, but to all members of the community: in this metaphor, there are no events that 
can take place within the community which concern only a few people.  Brown also uses 
the metaphor to include the ceremonial coat worn by the ruling earl.  Magnus’s death 
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allows the coat not to be split, because it is worn by one man within the context of a 
unified rule under Hakon Paulson.  Finally, Brown writes of a third coat, which is that of 
Christianity; it is “the long white weave of innocence”.  In Magnus, this third aspect 
forms the dominant use of the metaphor.  A long section, similar in placement and style 
to Master Robert’s sermons in the LMS,  is devoted to Bishop William’s homily, 
“Concerning the Two Coats, of Caesar and of God, that cover Adam’s Shame”, in which 
the coat of community and the coat of earldom become one; the ceremonial garment does 
not only cover the earl, but “in a mystical way it enwraps the whole community”.34  
Bishop William is unable to write of the heavenly cloak of Christianity; it is instead 
presented to Magnus in dreams and visions, ultimately carried by an angel or man only 
Magnus can see as he says his final Mass (M 141-7).  The use of the imagery of a coat, 
both in An Orkney Tapestry and the works which follow, is also able to tie together both 
religious and secular influences.  Brown highlights the biblical parable of the wedding 
feast (Matthew 22:2-14) in which a man is cast out of a wedding for not being properly 
attired: the metaphor of the perfect garment thus is used to stand for Magnus’s ability to 
be accepted by God.   The metaphor works in the opposite direction as well, however, for 
clothing is traditionally used in the sagas to represent the beneficence of a king or earl: it 
is the mark he gives to a retainer or loyal subject.35  The gift of clothing in traditional 
sagas represents both acceptance and generosity.  While the single metaphor is perhaps 
overworked over the course of Brown’s rewritings, especially in The Loom of Light, he 
employs it in order to find a new approach to the way in which a saint can be understood: 
not for his actions and death alone, but as one part of a wider community.  As George M. 
Brunsden argues, in many instances in Western Christendom “veneration of the saint 
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becomes an expression of communalism”.36  In his metaphor of the seamless garment 
Brown attempts to show why this might be so, how the death of one man, and miracles 
performed on a scant few more (seventeen, in the case of Magnus), can alter an entire 
community. 
 For Brown, the “truest sign of martyrdom” is not contained in the death or the 
miracles, but in “the abundant horn of peace that tiled over the islands” after Magnus’s 
death (OT 85).  For, as Ranald says in Brown’s novel Vinland – written much later but set 
in the years immediately preceding the birth of Magnus –  “‘What’s needed in Orkney is 
a saint’”.37  What truly sanctifies a martyr, for Brown, is the effect that such a man’s 
death has on the community at large.  It is for this reason that Brown introduces his 
tinkers, Jock and Mary, witnesses to the first (and only) miracle described in each of his 
versions, in a scene which changes very little.  “No saga-man would have written about 
folk like Jock and Mary”, Brown contends, “two vagrants who wander about the shores 
and burns, as secret and dangerous as otters” (OT 86), but they are loosely tied to some of 
the Orkney and Shetland islanders who experienced miracles.  Rowena Murray explicitly 
links them to Sigurd and Thorbjorn in the Orkneyinga Saga,38 who are cured of their 
crippledness, alongside a ferryman called Bergfinn Skatason who is cured of blindness, 
when they keep vigil at Magnus’s grave.39 Jock and Mary are also archetypes of the 
lowest peasants, however, wholly dependent on the society above them.  Jock is a 
believer, the first islander to pray for the intercession of Saint Magnus, while Mary, who 
is cured of her blindness by a spray of sea-water, believes in miracles no more strongly 
after receiving one than beforehand.  The heart of the scene is Jock’s prayer to Magnus, 
in which he pleads, attempts to make many deals, professes his love for Mary and 
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apologises for her lack of faith, even as he is constantly met with silence and the Bishop’s 
declaration that: “‘There’s no Saint Magnus […] only the tomb of the earl who was 
murdered in Egilsay’” (OT 93).  At the moment of the miracle, there is almost no 
dialogue, only lengthy, unperformable stage directions, in which Brown discusses the 
clay in the soul of each human, and states that: “Harder than precious stones are acts of 
pity and praise and charity. […] With these jewels are purchased meantime many a 
miracle and blessing for the afflicted ones of the earth” (OT 96).  Magnus himself is 
“now in two places at once.  He is lying with a terrible wound in his face, in the church 
near where the two tinkers are girding themselves for the road. […] Also he is pure 
essence in another intensity, a hoarder of the treasures of charity and prayer, a guardian” 
(OT 96).  This is neither successful playwriting nor especially convincing prose; it is at 
these moments, when he is attempting to be most sincere, that Brown’s style falters most 
and he adopts a lexicon and rhythm which do not befit his story.  His interpretation of 
sainthood is made more clear because of it, however.  For Brown, saints do not exist at a 
remove from the community from which they emerged, but act as guardians for all within 
that community.   Mary is the recipient of the first miracle not because she is grateful or 
deserving, but because Jock intercedes on her behalf.  True religion lies in the actions of 
the community, its lowest members above all.  In his autobiography, Brown writes that 
long before his conversion to Catholicism, he was disappointed by the mass itself, but 
found that: “The devotion of the working-class women did move me: here they found 
beauty and peace in the midst of drab lives” (FI 53).  Brown is, in his life and works, not 
interested in a Protestant form of personal salvation as would be espoused by a Luther or 
Calvin, but in the effects of religious belief on an entire community.  It is to this end that 
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his miracles are, as in the Saga, small and quiet; by handing them to unbelievers, he 
further cements the notion of Magnus’s death as forming the salvation of the community 
at large. 
 The one-act play concerning Jock and Mary in An Orkney Tapestry is introduced 
with the lines: “The story of Magnus and Hakon unfolds like a drama.  Some day a play 
will be written about it; I have not the ability myself; but I end this chapter with a scene 
in dramatic form […] as a suggestion of what might be possible” (OT 85-6).  Clearly 
Brown overcame his self-doubt, for his play on the same subject, The Loom of Light, was 
produced in Kirkwall in 1972.  The outline of the story is much the same as in the Saga 
and in the “Martyr” chapter, although Brown admitted in an unpublished interview at the 
time that: “I haven’t scrupled to use my imagination when I thought it might illumine 
some dark places”.40  In this case, the “dark places” Brown seeks to illumine are the lives 
of the surrounding community inhabitants.  A chorus is instituted both to set the scene 
and to convey verbally the themes Brown was limited to expressing in stage directions in 
the earlier version.  As Donald Campbell argues, the chorus is modern, even Brechtian, 
and yet also allows Brown to create an atmosphere of ancient ritual.41  Indeed, the chorus 
can be seen as a tool of distancing the audience, for in its repetition of seasonal 
observations, the chorus serves to prove that the events in this story are not as 
extraordinary as they might initially appear, but are grounded in the world as it is.  This 
expanded version of the play attempts to include all that the Saga leaves unmentioned: 
the croftwomen, monks, fishermen and peasants.42   The play is divided into seven 
sections which correspond almost exactly to those in Magnus.43   The first scene, 
“Seedtime”, opens with the peasants Hild and Mans – as Berthold Schoene points out, a 
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diminutive form of “Magnus”44 – ploughing the field.  Hild herself is yoked to the 
plough, as their ox is lame.  The couple represent alternate views on those who hold 
power in the islands: Mans’s dislike for the factor, the earls, the bishop and the king is 
echoed later by the tinker Mary’s disdain for the mechanisms of the church.  The chorus’s 
songs to the sea, coupled with Mans’s belief that, to the wealthy, the peasants are “just 
beasts”,45 exemplifies the social split found in the Orkneys before Magnus’s martyrdom.  
The atmosphere Brown sets up in this scene is not one of violence, as in Magnus, but of 
distrust; the requirements of self-preservation are so great that all the world is an enemy 
to the peasants.  Brown also introduces here, in the chorus’s Bridal Song, the theme of 
the garment: 
Listen: somewhere a loom is set 
Beyond moth and rust. 
Fall, tissue of peace, from the loom, 
A single fold of light,  
That the just man 
May walk at last in a white coat among his people.46 
 
By beginning the play in the absence of Magnus and his family – Erlend and Thora, 
whose wedding is being celebrated, are never named – Brown foregrounds not the act of 
martyrdom itself, but the people Magnus’s death serves to save.  He returns to Hild and 
Mans in the final scene, “The Harvest”.  Little has changed: the peasants are still 
labouring and distrustful.  There is a new air of compassion here, however; in giving Jock 
and Mary a bannock, Hild says: “‘We were as poor as them last winter.  And poorer the 
winter before that.  The war’s over.  We can all eat in peace.  We have Hakon, our good 
earl, to thank for that.  We’re only as rich as the poorest folk among us.’” 47 Hakon’s rule, 
predicated on Magnus’s death, has not only granted increased prosperity to the peasants, 
but also given them a broader, more humane world-view.  The peace which Magnus’s 
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death brings is little noticed by the peasants, and Magnus himself is never mentioned by 
them, yet his death is used to benefit the entire community. 
 Four of the remaining five scenes illustrate the life of Magnus.  (The fourth scene 
of the play, “The Fields in Summer”, returns to Hild and Mans during the war between 
the earls, in which the peasants are menaced by both Hakon and Magnus’s soldiers.)  In 
the first biographical scene Magnus and Hakon, along with those boys who will grow to 
become their advisors, begin their education at the cathedral on Birsay.  While the 
episode itself is unmentioned in any of the older accounts, it echoes the LMS description 
of Magnus’s childhood, in which, “He cared little for loose company and games like 
other young men, but rather showed himself of seemly conduct, though he were young in 
the tale of winters; because at once was revealed in him the evident gift of the Holy 
Spirit, which guided him to all good things”.48  In Brown’s version of Magnus’s entry 
into religious education, the child ignores those around him – who, by birth or religious 
authority, represent all of the power on the island – in order to minister to a wounded 
seal. Brown here literalises the Bishop’s claim from earlier in the scene that Magnus and 
Hakon are “bringing that old wound [the vying earldoms] to the brothers for a year or 
so”.49  As shown in the previous chapter, the human world is best understood not as a 
departure from the natural world, but as part of a continuity; so here, the wounded seal is 
used to represent not only a rent between humans and nature, but the violence within 
human society itself.  Not only is the seal wounded, however, but “his coat’s all blood”;50 
Brown here is overworking his metaphor of “The coat-of-state riven […] so [that] 
Orkney, poor Orkney, bleeds from generation to generation”,51 voiced by the Bishop 
moments earlier.  Magnus’s purpose with both the seal and the Orkneys, then, is to 
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staunch the blood.  In a poem repeated verbatim in Magnus (as, indeed, is the majority of 
dialogue in The Loom of Light), Magnus sings to the seal: 
Come from the rock now, cold one. 
See, I have a fish for you in my hand.  
My name is Magnus. 
I have told the hunters to leave this shore. 
There is a wound in your head. 
If you do not come to me soon you will die. 
Your blood will grow cold as shells. 
Rats and crabs will cover your beautiful coat.52 
 
Magnus sees himself as prohibiting violence in order to protect the beautiful coat, not 
only of the seal, but of community, earldom and God. 
 This metaphor of the coat continues to appear throughout the play.  In this short 
form, Brown resists developing the metaphor, instead letting repeated uses of the imagery 
surface in so many contexts that the reader cannot help but make connections.  Indeed, 
the image of the coat appears to stand for absolutely everything.  In “The Song of Battle”, 
depicting the battle of the Menai Strait, Magnus is shown reading from the psalter, in 
accordance with all early versions, but Brown includes those passages he reads: “Why 
take ye thought for raiment?” (Matthew 6:28); “Who is […] this beautiful one in his 
robe?” (Isaiah 63:1); “The king’s daughter[‘s …] clothing is of wrought gold” (Psalm 
45:13); as well as a retelling of the Genesis story of Joseph’s robe and a recitation of the 
23rd Psalm.  These passages are not selected so much for their religious significance as 
for their bare mentioning of “coats”; Brown here is continuing to force his metaphor by 
constant repetition.  The chorus, for instance, denotes the colour of the monks’ clothing at 
the beginning of every scene: it changes from  “long bright coats” (first four scenes) to 
“long black coats” for the two scenes which depict Magnus’s martyrdom – which, given 
that Magnus’s death falls on Easter Monday, must be regarded as poetic license on 
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Brown’s part, as the liturgical colours of Easter are traditionally white and gold – to “long 
bright coats” again at the close of the play.  At the moment of his death, Magnus gives his 
coat to the chef/executioner Lifolf, even as he voices doubts that he is not worthy of a 
more heavenly garment: “maybe it’s not for me, that coat.  There’s too much blood and 
ashes on my hands.  That coat is woven of prayers, charities, vows, penances, fastings.”53  
The literal coat of state Magnus gives to Hakon, for: “The strong man who relishes 
government, only he can suffer it on his shoulders”.54  Curiously, Brown does not make 
explicit the obvious parallel with Christ, whose coat is used in a lottery at the time of his 
death, so that it might not be torn (John 19:23-24).  Despite the somewhat hackneyed 
imagery here, what Brown is attempting is clear: for Magnus to be relevant to the 
contemporary reader, his death must be significant not only from a religious standpoint, 
or even from a political, but also in the way in which it affects the entire surrounding 
community.  The coat must then carry both religious and political weight, but more 
importantly it stands for the community as a whole; in Magnus’s wearing and subsequent 
rejection of this coat Brown focuses on his varying role as representative/saviour of the 
community, even when his actions are the very thing from which the community must be 
saved.  This emphasis on the way in which one life (or rather, one death) can alter the 
entire world around it forms the centre of his fullest imaging of the story, his novel 
Magnus. 
 
C. Magnus and the Nature of Sacrifice 
 Magnus is written “on the stark framework of the play”.55  Brown himself 
contends that in this final version lies “the best writing I have done” (FI 171).  As Julian 
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D’Arcy argues, the novel “is indeed the culmination of Mackay Brown’s study and 
interpretation of the Orkney saint’s life”,56 in part because the form of the novel allows 
far more experimental variation than either the biographical short story or play.  Brown 
himself cites his attempt to make “as full use as possible of the more varied techniques at 
the novelist’s disposal”.57  Most specifically, rather than representing the varied 
viewpoints of the larger community only through action and setting, he does so through a 
wide range of stylistic and lexical devices; in many ways, Magnus, for all its dependence 
on medieval sources, is the most contemporary of all Brown’s fictional works.   In an 
essay praising the Orkneyinga Saga, published only a month before the release of 
Magnus, Brown argues that: “In these present days of ghastly narrative styles, here was 
prose simple, direct, and dramatic”.58  His work in Orkney Tapestry and Loom of Light 
can be seen as an attempt to emulate that style.  Especially in the “Martyr” chapter, the 
bulk of writing is inseparable from the Saga itself, and is largely a variant translation.  In 
Magnus, however, Brown embraces the very “ghastly narrative styles” which he 
elsewhere derides; the story is told in a blend of drama, verse and prose.  It is also told 
both in language which mimics the sagas and in language which mimics present-day 
news bulletins.  Although the full measure of stylistic diversity is most easily seen in the 
climactic chapter, “The Killing”, the remainder of the novel is also a blend of 
contemporary and medieval styles and, in those styles, ways of looking at the figure of 
Magnus.  Brown’s mission in the novel is, indeed, to reinvent Magnus for contemporary 
readers, to remove the “pietistic fog” of early accounts and present a timeless figure who 
is nevertheless still grounded in a specific era. 
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 The most notable reworking is seen in the final chapter, “Harvest,” much of 
which is repeated from the earlier two imaginings.  In the five years between “Martyr” 
and Magnus, however, Brown has significantly reduced the import of the miracle, until in 
its final version it is almost unnoticeable.  In the one-act play included in “Martyr”, 
Magnus is, in parenthetical asides, virtually present at the moment of Mary’s restored 
sight: “Saint Magnus the Martyr accepts the flame [of Jock’s candle].  He touches it to 
immortality, a hard diamond.  The radiance he reserves, to give back again where it is 
needed” (OT 96-7).  Jock then accepts the direct correlation between his lighting of a 
candle and the restoration of Mary’s sight: “Who would think a ha’penny candle would 
light up the world?” (OT 98).  This miracle is closely related to those in the Saga, in 
which peasants from the Orkneys and Shetlands are cured of blindness, insanity and other 
ailments after keeping a vigil at Magnus’s grave or, after he is canonised, contributing 
money to his shrine.  When Brown revisits the scene in The Loom of Light, however, he 
slightly subdues the religious revelation.  While Jock makes the same statement about his 
ha’penny candle, the lines about Magnus have been removed.  The monks’ litany, 
chanted throughout in all versions, is changed at the moment of Mary’s cure from “St 
Tredwell, virgin”, to “St Tredwell, keeper of eyes”, so that the possibility is raised that 
Magnus is not responsible for the miracle, but that it is the intercession of the whole body 
of saints which cures Mary.  At the close of Magnus, little initially appears to have 
changed in Brown’s imagining: indeed, perhaps the only change in the depiction of 
Magnus from “Martyr” is one of tense, and in most other respects the passage is identical.  
However, the response of Jock and Mary changes subtly.  While Mary remains 
ungrateful, Jock loses the religious fervour he presents in the earlier passages.  After he 
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shouts the final line (again present in all three versions) –  “Saint Magnus the Martyr, 
pray for us…. Jock the tinker said it before any of you” – he is shown to have “put the 
empty sack over his shoulder and turned and moved off after the sea-washed feet of 
Mary” (M 206).  What has changed is that Jock and Mary are placed back in the 
community of the islands: “The great red vat-and-lamp-and-loom was high in the east 
now.  Under the sun the crofters of Orkney brought out their peaceful scythes for the 
second morning of the harvest.  There were glitters and flashes all over Birsay” (M 206).  
The direct gratitude and wonder of the earlier versions has changed into an acceptance 
that Magnus in death does not serve to perform miracles so much as to preserve 
normalcy.  The miracle on which the reader is meant to focus is not one of restored 
eyesight, but one of maintained peace.  In this slight shift of perspective, Brown is using 
his final version of the story to turn his focus not to the saint or his actions, but to the 
community at large. 
 In many respects, Brown’s shift away from the focus on miracles that dominates 
previous accounts, and indeed grows more central to the story over time, dominates the 
way in which the story is told.  In medieval Christianity, especially in its Anglo-Saxon 
variants, it was quite common to have royal saints, political leaders (most often kings 
themselves) who are killed for political purposes and whose saintliness follows almost as 
an afterthought.  As Margaret Cormack argues, “Although the hagiographers may try to 
provide a rationale for the crime that would give it religious significance, it is clear that 
the real cause for the elimination of the victims was their status as potential rivals to the 
throne”.59  The loose outlines of Magnus’s life certainly fit this summary; even as later 
accounts elaborate on Magnus’s godliness in life, few deny that he was murdered for 
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political reasons, rather than religious ones.  Indeed, Brunsden has argued that the 
canonisation of Magnus was itself largely political, a cult formed to oppose the popularity 
of King Olaf, the Norse King.60  Brunsden’s account certainly helps explain Magnus’s 
popularity not just in the Orkneys, but in Iceland and Shetland as well, areas which would 
be uncomfortable with a Norse saint.  The accounts of miracles may then be thought of as 
something of an afterthought, a latent justification for Magnus’s martyrdom.  While 
Brown writes from a Christian perspective, and is indebted to such writers as Mooney in 
his attempts to show that Magnus lived a largely holy life, in Magnus he attempts to 
secularise the saint and to foreground the political implications of this death.  Magnus’s 
death cannot be seen in purely religious terms, as critics such as Patrick Reilly have 
argued.  Reilly sees the novel as representing “the man of God confronting the men of 
power [...] an Orkney re-enactment of Golgotha”.61  He is right to note the Christ-like 
framework in which Magnus’s actions are placed, but entirely ignores their political 
ramifications, the very aspect of the story Brown is attempting to highlight.  Instead, as 
Schoene argues, “Brown resuscitates the Orkney martyr as both a credible historical 
agent and a heavenly saint”.62   Much more will be said below about Brown’s portrayal of 
Magnus as a saint, but first his portrayal of Magnus as an earl must be examined. 
 The one scene wholly new to the novel falls in the chapter “The Temptations”.  
The chapter begins as a pastiche of ancient texts, sounding somewhat biblical and 
somewhat indebted to the sagas, but also more distanced and reserved than either:  
It was said, concerning the holy martyr Magnus, that to gain his soul’s kingdom 
he had to suffer five grievous temptations, and but that he was upheld then and 
ever and near the hour of his blessed martyrdom by a certain comforter that was 
sent to him, his soul might have been overborne by the evil one and brought down 
into the fires of hell. (M 67) 
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Here, more than anywhere else in the novel, is Magnus’s death prefigured by his life; 
Brown here stipulates a teleological martyrdom.  The chapter contains a reading of 
Magnus’s actions which presupposes a certain end, even if that end is always in flux, as 
well as a necessary ‘Being-towards-death’, about which more will be said below.  There 
is, too, a deliberate echo of the three temptations of Christ, in which he rejects hunger, 
power over self and power over the world (Matthew 4:1-11).  What is surprising in this 
chapter is the way in which Brown configures the four temptations shown.  The first 
temptation is the battle of Menai Strait, in which Magnus chooses a psalter over an axe; 
the second Magnus’s marriage, in which Magnus chooses to remain a virgin; the third the 
death of his father Erlend, in which he takes up the earldom but ignores the advice of the 
chancellor Aristius.  The first two here are found in all other accounts; the third, while 
original, is no great departure from the sagas.  Throughout, Brown includes his familiar 
images of cloths and looms and writes in a style as deliberately hagiographic as Mooney 
or the LMS.  In the fourth temptation, however, Brown’s focus dramatically shifts.  The 
tempter – and only here is the tempter clearly identified as such – comes in the form of a 
monk, asking Magnus to renounce the earldom, to retire to a monastery and spend the 
rest of his life in peace.  Departing from hagiographic tradition, it is in this case the 
tempter who gains the reader’s sympathies.  If the text is read as preconfigured and the 
eventual outcome is known, then it is clear that the tempter’s plan is, in fact, better than 
Magnus’s, for his forecast is entirely accurate: “There may be worse to come – civil war, 
mercenaries riding through the cornfields.  Murder.  Burning.  Rape” (M 78).  Given that 
all of these events do come to pass, Magnus’s response that: “God has made me an earl in 
this place. […] My work is a work of peace, to bind up the wounds in the music” (M 79), 
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falls somewhere between arrogance and delusion.  It is, after all, not anything Magnus 
does in life which guarantees peace for the island, but his death.  Even the Keeper of the 
Loom, Magnus’s self-appointed guardian, argues on the tempter’s side –  “Go out on the 
roads with that sword, Magnus, and you’ll lose everything” (M 79) – before accepting 
that “there is no other way” (M 80) than that which Magnus eventually chooses. 
 Brown is here raising a number of complications for conventional interpretations 
of the story; in depicting Magnus as a man who chooses war, Brown denies the panacea 
that Mooney and others offer in their insistence that anything Magnus may have done in 
life which did not befit a saint was only due to the coercion of his friends.  The chapter 
which follows “The Temptations” is “Scarecrow”, a telling of the war through the eyes of 
Jock and Mary and Hild and Mans which is fleshed out from “The Fields in Summer” in 
The Loom of Light.  In the earlier play, the soldiers on both sides are bitter and 
destructive, but it is made clear that the damages inflicted by Magnus’s soldiers are 
against his orders.63  In the novel, however, the earls are made far more culpable: the 
soldiers not only despoil the fields, but murder innocents.  “These mercenaries were evil, 
which ever side they supported” (M 85), writes Brown, but the earls are equally blamed: 
Mans rages against them both, and, in their equal destruction of his fields, he is shown to 
be justified (M 96).  In his positioning of these two chapters, Brown demonstrates that the 
perceived path to Magnus’s martyrdom is also the path towards political discord and war.  
This raises the necessary issue of value and responsibility: how many men must 
Magnus’s soldiers have killed, Brown seems to be asking, for his death to still be worth 
the loss of other lives?   
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Brown is very careful to situate the entire story within a culture of violence and 
death.  The opening of the novel, in its depictions of the daily life of peasants, could read 
as an echo of, say, The Return of the Native were it not for the repeated mention of 
“scars,” “corpses” and “blood”.  The third of the bridal songs which end the chapter also 
forecasts not redemption so much as death: 
What is the lost cry in the heart of the earth? 
   I am wounded.  I have taken a wound in 
   my flesh.  The lips of it will never  
   come together.  Fire has been thrust 
   deep in the wound.  My flesh is branded. 
          IT IS THE SUN.  IT IS THE PLOUGH AND 
          THE SOWER. (M 28) 
 
Magnus’s path, in Brown’s imagining, is far from glorious.  It is instead filled with blood 
and death, with the sacrifice not only of the saint’s life but that of others.  While 
numerous critics have made note of the “contemporary” setting and style of large 
portions of “The Killing”, few have examined the ways in which the whole novel is made 
more contemporary through its refusal to accept simple, unblemished martyrdom.  Even 
as Magnus, Christ-like, resists temptation, his choices lead to the deaths of others as well 
as widespread peace.  The question of sacrifice and responsibility thus takes on a 
peculiarly modern tint, greatly, if unconsciously, indebted to Søren Kierkegaard. 
 Kierkegaard, in Fear and Trembling, examines the paradox in which the 
particular is made higher than the universal through faith.  In his willingness to sacrifice 
his son, Abraham is not a tragic hero, but “either a murderer or a believer”.64  The 
individual act must be seen as a paradoxical suspension of universal ethics in which the 
act that could possibly fulfil a higher ethical code is also one that defies pre-existing 
ethics.    As Hent de Vries argues, the example of Abraham “shows that in every genuine 
 115 
decision the ethical must be sacrificed”.65  Kierkegaard attempts to see how one can 
admire a man who has forsaken universal ethics in favour of the absolute.   
By his act he overstepped the ethical entirely and possessed a higher telos outside 
of it, in relation to which he suspended the former.  For I should very much like to 
know how one would bring Abraham’s act into relation with the universal, and 
whether it is possible to discover any connection whatever between what 
Abraham did and the universal […] except the fact that he transgressed it.66 
 
The question then becomes: is an act of faith which goes against common or universal 
ethics still a worthy act?  For Kierkegaard this remains a paradox, one which “does not 
permit of mediation”.67  Abraham, in his sacrifice of Isaac, became, as an individual, 
higher than the universal through an act of faith. The sacrificing of ethics is that which 
creates the singular.  For Kierkegaard, the “single individual” is he who can make a 
decision which sacrifices universal ethics; as de Vries points out, the “sole incarnation of 
this single individual is the martyr”.68  The martyr, through sacrifice – both the physical 
sacrifice of the self and the sacrifice of universal ethics – becomes wholly singular.  
Jacques Derrida shows how this sacrifice is made not only according to the strictures of 
faith but also out of duty: 
The absolutes of duty and of responsibility presume that one denounce, refute, 
and transcend, at the same time, all duty, all responsibility, and every human law.  
It calls for a betrayal of everything that manifests itself within the order of 
universal generality. […] In a word, ethics must be sacrificed in the name of 
duty.69 
 
Abraham, then, is not acting ethically, but out of duty to the absolute, which is a greater 
duty than that to the universal.  Yet such an act still requires a “recognizing, confirming, 
and reaffirming [of] the very thing one sacrifices, namely, the order of human ethics and 
responsibility”.70  For both Kierkegaard and Derrida, then, Abraham’s sacrifice is not 
only the (averted) one of Isaac, but also one of the “universal ethical sphere” itself.71  
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Abraham is ethically dutiful in his unethical actions; because the absolute other (in this 
case, God) demands the sacrifice of universal ethics, Abraham is able as an individual – 
and moreover as an individual martyr in Kierkegaard’s formulation – to transcend ethics. 
 This is the paradox through which Brown is working in Magnus.  Magnus 
chooses a path to sainthood and martyrdom which includes the rape and murder of the 
people for whom his sacrifice is theoretically made.  As is shown in “The Temptations”, 
Magnus wills the destruction of the community in order to save it, thereby suspending 
himself from any sort of traditional ethics.  Brown is distinctly uncomfortable with this 
elevation of the individual against the community and the universal, yet at the same time, 
in order to accept Magnus as a saint, he must accept him as distinct from the surrounding 
community.  Yet for Brown, the “singular individual” of the sacrifice also works on 
behalf of the singular community.  Brown places the community and the universal in 
opposition: the particular and individual community stands against the universal even as 
it would conventionally embody it.  As will be shown below, the notion of sacrifice is 
deeply entwined with that of the community because only in a suspension of universal 
ethics can an individual sacrifice serve the good of the individual community.  For 
Brown, universal ethics only allow “peace-making” of the sort Hakon and Magnus’s 
friends propose: a series of deals and temporary solutions.  In the mouth of the bishop, 
Brown places the idea of a higher peace: “‘Peace-making […] is at best the patching of 
an old coat.  To make true peace, the pax Christi, is to weave the seamless garment’” (M 
119).  The peace of Christ is the peace that comes through sacrifice, the sacrifice that, as 
Jean-Luc Nancy writes, is simultaneously “unique [… and] consummated for all”.72  And 
it is in this constant invoking of the seamless garment that Brown finds a solution to the 
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paradox of individual responsibility in opposition to universal ethics.  In Bishop 
William’s homily, “Concerning the Two Coats, of Caesar and of God, that cover Adam’s 
Shame”, the first coat, that of Caesar, is the coat of earldom, of power, and of community 
itself; of the second coat he says nothing, except that it is “woven upon no earthly looms” 
(M 113).  For Magnus’s sacrifice to be full and sufficient, it is necessary that he wears 
both coats; his martyrdom can only serve its purpose if he is the embodiment of the 
community itself; his individual responsibility gains meaning only after he takes on the 
earldom, and thus becomes responsible for the entire community. 
 Brown’s approach to this paradox of responsibility initially seems like a 
simplification of Kierkegaard’s approach, for surely if Magnus is preordained to do such 
a thing on behalf of his community, as at least the reader is aware, then the choice is 
simplified if not completely eliminated.  Magnus cannot do other than become a martyr.  
Brown, however, is instead attempting to redefine what it is to be an individual.  For 
Kierkegaard, in this paradox of Abraham: “the individual as the individual is higher than 
the universal and as the individual stands in an absolute relation to the absolute/or else 
faith never existed, because it has always existed”.73  For Brown, however, the individual 
is the way in which the universal stands in relation to the absolute: only in the form of the 
individual who takes on the problems and desires of the community can either approach 
the absolute.  The relation of the self to God and the community can only be on the level 
of the individual.  The faith with which the individual proceeds is an individual matter, 
one which must constantly be redefined.  If Magnus were never to waver, then the matter 
of faith would, as Kierkegaard insists, become irrelevant.  But in depicting the 
temptations of Magnus as temptations, by demonstrating that Magnus has available to 
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him all of the benefits of being an individual human, and yet chooses this sacrifice, 
Brown demonstrates that it is through Magnus that the community as a whole comes to a 
knowledge of the absolute, comes to faith.  
Magnus’s death must be understood as both martyrdom and sacrifice, then, where 
the first is an act outside of the particular community in which it takes place and the latter 
is intrinsically connected to the community.  As René Girard has repeatedly shown, the 
sacrifice of an individual, as a surrogate victim or a scapegoat, serves to remove violence 
from a community.  The individual who is sacrificed must be someone kept at a remove 
from the given community but intimately known to it, either a slave, such as the Greek 
pharmakos or a king.  The act of violence against one individual, in the form of sacrifice, 
transforms the “violence of all against all [which] would finally annihilate the community 
[…] into a war of all against one, thanks to which the unity of the community is re-
established”.74  Sacrifice is thus a unique and individual act and yet one which at the 
same time unifies the surrounding community.75  It is a suspension of universal ethics 
which creates, if not the universal community, at least the community as a unified whole.  
As Girard writes: “The surrogate victim dies so that the entire community, threatened by 
the same fate [of generalised violence], can be reborn”.76  Again, in Magnus Brown 
demonstrates that the community is predicated on this individual act.  As Nancy writes in 
his discussion of “early” sacrifice – in this case Jesus and Socrates – the sacrifice of the 
individual “is not simply unique, therefore, but, by virtue of its uniqueness, elevated to 
the principle or essence of sacrifice”.77  Magnus’s death is both an individual sacrifice in 
an individual community and a manifestation of the essence of sacrifice, as will be shown 
below in a discussion of his apparent transformation into Dietrich Bonhoeffer.  What is 
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clear here is that this death works in at least four ways.  Following the saga accounts, 
Magnus’s death is an instance of classic martyrdom, an act which displays the glory of 
God through the death of the individual believer.  It is also primarily an individual act, 
outside or against universal ethics, insofar as it is a self-sacrifice, one which is willed not 
by the executioner but by the individual about to die.  At the same time, it is an act which 
unifies the surrounding community: it is only through Magnus’s death that peace comes 
to the Orkneys. Finally, Magnus’s death is an example of sacrifice as such, both unique 
and universal.  What remains consistent across all of these interpretations is that the death 
of Magnus is Brown’s primary example of the way in which the individual stands in 
relation to the community. 
 
D. The Moment and Being of Death 
 In order to understand fully this sacrifice, it is necessary to explore the ways in 
which Brown treats the moment of death.  “The Killing” is by far the longest chapter in 
Magnus, the most challenging in style and narrative, and also the most elusive, slipping 
from reportage to anthropological discourse to hagiography without, ultimately, even 
documenting the moment of Magnus’s death.  As this is in many respects the most 
controversial passage in all of Brown’s fiction, it demands examination from a variety of 
angles: from that of style, from that of the meaning of sacrifice as discussed above and, 
finally, from that of the nature of ‘Being-towards-death’ in the life of a saint.  The 
chapter, which fills more than a quarter of the novel, is split into ten sections of unequal 
length.  Each section is written in a different register, from apparently wholly separate 
perspectives.  Brown here condenses the stylistic diversity of his portmanteau works such 
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as Orkney Tapestry into one historical moment.  It is for this reason that Magnus has been 
hailed as “an assemblage of brilliant fragments”78 or, less favourably, is charged with 
“flout[ing] every convention of the novel”.79  Even if the reader accepts the abstraction of 
previous chapters, which are far more concerned with the depiction of a given period in 
Magnus’s life (or the life of the community around him) than in narrative causality, the 
fragmentation in “The Killing” is still surprising and unusual, far closer stylistically to the 
Circe episode in Ulysses than to anything in the Sagas.  The chapter is wilfully obtuse, at 
least compared to the rest of Brown’s work, but not to the end of confusing the reader, or 
causing her to focus unduly on one aspect of the novel.  Rather, by interweaving a variety 
of styles and perspectives, Brown is attempting to demonstrate the apparent timelessness 
of the story by using both archaic and contemporary narrative styles, and to give the 
reader something with which she can personally identify.  The mixture of styles in “The 
Killing” is Brown’s attempt to open the novel up to include far more of the world than 
might originally be seen in an historic tale. 
 The chapter begins with a short passage written in a pseudo-medieval saga style, 
one which does not echo any of the known translations of the Saga but instead comes 
closest to Anglo-Saxon pieces of the period: “When that holy season of pasch was 
overpast, the jarls busked them both for the tryst” (M 123).  If not perhaps as artful as 
Joyce’s “Before born babe bliss had.  Within womb won he worship”,80 Brown’s stylistic 
shift here serves a similar purpose: it draws the reader’s attention to the very artificiality 
of style, to the constructed nature of the novel.  To that end, Brown introduces a first-
person narrator, echoing the “saga-men”, who is understood to be ordering the narrative: 
“I must tell now concerning the jarl Hakon Paul’s son, how he summoned about him an 
 121 
host, and set them in eight war-hungry ships” (M 123).  Brown, in this passage, is 
clarifying to the reader that the story she is about to read is neither organic, nor a pure 
historical narrative, but is created towards a specific end.  The story of Magnus’s death is 
important because of the way it is interpreted by later generations; Hakon asks himself: 
“what would the saga-man say about a furtive cold callous murder (that was how it would 
be seen, no matter from what root of necessity and realism the act had sprung)?” (M 161).  
In these asides, Brown constantly reminds the reader that there are always multiple levels 
of interpretation which are not always true to the acts which took place.  The novel 
Magnus is itself such an interpretation, as the introduction of the first-person narrator 
demonstrates: Brown does not presume, as Mooney does, to be telling a wholly honest 
account of Magnus’s life and death, but instead one that is filtered through time and 
memory. 
 The chapter then moves to a style not dissimilar to that employed in the rest of the 
novel, a looping, hyper-poetic but nonetheless fairly realistic prose: “Oars rose and fell in 
the firth.  The blades shattered the glass with regular plangencies.  Circular dark wounds 
marked the path of the ship Flame through the firth, but the sea soon healed itself again” 
(M 123).  Brown focuses in this segment on the differentiation between dream and reality 
and on the frailty of human observation.  The sea is apparently calm, but is also filled 
with a threat that finally emerges in the form of a great single wave, a portent taken from 
the Saga.  The wave is preceded by a detailed account of Magnus’s dream of a nuptial 
wedding, to which he arrives wearing a coat stained with sea-slime, grease and urine, 
only to remember that a better coat is waiting for him.  This dream is interrupted by the 
coming of the wave.  In the Saga, Magnus’s response is calm: “‘It’s not surprising that 
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you should be worried by this,’ said the Earl, ‘for I think it forebodes of my death. […] 
We’d better reckon with the possibility that cousin Hakon isn’t going to be entirely 
honest with us at this meeting.’”81  Brown’s earl, however, while he interprets the wave 
as a warning, tells his men to row on so that he can attend to the wedding feast of which 
he has just dreamed.  The border between nature and fate, between dream and reality, has 
grown blurred, and Brown is again here pointing to the difficulties of interpretation and 
the flexibility of historical fact.  The portent that comes through natural signs is, too, a 
commonplace figuration of death over time, arguably “foreign both to the cults of the 
miraculous and to Christian piety”, in Phillippe Aries’s classic formulation.82  The wave’s 
signification of death would thus have been clear to both the sailors and contemporary 
readers of the earliest accounts, making Magnus’s simultaneous acceptance of its 
meaning and refusal to heed it all the more strange.  Finn Thorkelson, one of the sailors, 
thinks: “God help the people of Orkney who have an incompetent like this in charge of 
their affairs. […] A wedding – a coat for a wedding – for God’s sweet sake!” (M 130).  
This is one of Brown’s less subtle ironies, for in his telling of the story Magnus’s 
martyrdom is, in fact, “for God’s sweet sake”.  Brown gives voice to characters who are 
ignorant of the greater situation in order to stress the ways in which miracles cannot 
always be understood, even by their eyewitnesses.  The reader’s sympathies are easily 
split at this point in the chapter: Magnus must now be seen as either a madman, willing 
his own death in service to a strange dream, or a saint, sacrificing all in order to fulfil a 
duty which cannot be understood by those around him.  Brown presents these two options 
as fairly as possible; the reader is welcome not to follow Brown’s interpretation of 
events, nor to believe in Magnus’s sanctity. 
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 To accentuate the ambiguity of the events further, Brown turns to a contemporary 
newscast style in order to depict the reactions of the local inhabitants to the events on 
Egilsay.  In this segment, the focus is on a “black-out of news” (M 130); the inhabitants 
of Egilsay are notable not for their reactions to the events, but for the way in which they 
continue their day-to-day activities while these great events are taking place.  Even as 
Magnus walks the island, apologising for the misdeeds that have taken place during his 
rule, it is only the outside observer, in this case an unidentified news crew, which makes 
the events noteworthy.  Again, in this range of discourses and narrative structures, Brown 
is foregrounding his own role in constructing the story, in highlighting certain elements 
and not others.  As Michael Strysick argues, the foregrounding of narrativity itself is a 
fundamental postmodern approach to thinking about the way human relations and 
communities are established.83  In these three sections of prelude, as well as the mass that 
follows, the anthropological discussions of the nature of sacrifice, the lengthy treaty-
making between Hakon and Magnus and, finally, the transition for the titular killing to a 
German concentration camp, Brown illustrates the ways in which communities are 
formed across time, the ways in which patterns emerge which cannot be seen by anyone 
involved in these events, but only by an outside observer, such as the reader. 
 This multiplicity of styles and perspectives allows Brown to easily shift between  
the individual act and its public or communal representation.  In his discussion of Dasein 
as Being-towards-death, which will be further explored below, Heidegger argues that the 
“Self of everydayness is the “they” [which] is constituted by the way things have been 
publicly interpreted.”84  If, as has been shown in the disparate writings of Girard and 
Nancy, sacrifice is a unique act which works towards communal unification, Brown must 
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depict both sides, the sacrifice in its individuality and the public in its everydayness.  The 
Heideggerian public “they”, through “information services such as the newspaper”, 
becomes indistinct: not the sum total of all individual Others, but its own Being.  The 
“they” is created through the vehicles of modernity and enlightenment: 
Distantiality, averageness, and levelling down, as ways of Being for the “they”, 
constitute what we know as ‘publicness’ [“die Offentlichkeit”].  Publicness 
proximally controls every way in which the world and Dasein get interpreted, and 
it is always right – not because there is some distinctive and primary relationship-
of-Being in which it is related to ‘Things’, or because it avails itself of some 
transparency on the part of Dasein which it has explicitly appropriated, but 
because it is insensitive to every difference of level and genuineness and thus 
never gets to the ‘heart of the matter’ [“auf die Sachen”].85 
 
As Dorothea Frede argues, in Being and Time: “the experience of coming to terms with 
our finitude in the anxiety of facing up to death is the crucial situation that forces us to 
wrench ourselves away from domination by the anonymous public understanding”.86  
This “they” is not the conglomeration of individual others, but a wholly new Being into 
which the individual Dasein, in its everyday Being, is subsumed up until the point of 
death, or the anxiety preceding that death.  The “they” is, in a sense, Being as it is 
perceived in the world, by the world.   
 This “they” is what Brown is trying to illustrate in the first three sections of “The 
Killing”: a public Being into which the individual is subsumed.  In the news portion, for 
instance, Jock and Mary are among the interviewees, but while the reader is more 
familiar with, and sympathetic to, them than any of the other interviewees, they are 
“levelled” with the others; individual perspective is immaterial compared to the common 
medium of news.  The reader is implicated in this “they”, as is Brown himself, for it is 
only in this series of interpretations and perspectives that any understanding of events 
takes place.  The rationale behind the diversity of styles and narrative structures in “The 
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Killing” is this very inability of the public Being to reach “the heart of the matter”: the 
reader, the writer, the peasants and the saga-men are always necessarily kept at a 
distance.  Brown writes as he does both to remove that distance, in the hope that in one of 
the variants the reader will find a way closer to the story’s heart, but also to highlight the 
impossibility of fully doing so.  Martyrdom necessarily remains a mystery, even in a text 
centred on such a martyr, and Brown does not attempt to explain it or to fully enter into 
the mystery that is the Self at the moment of death. 
 Brown’s most serious exploration of this mystery comes not in his depiction of 
Magnus’s actual death, in which the saint is both replaced by another and the moment of 
death is unseen and forgotten even by its witnesses, but in his depiction of Magnus’s last 
mass.  This passage is the purest statement of religious faith in Brown’s writing, and also 
one of the passages in which he is most willing to engage with ambiguity and to abandon 
the conceptions of Good and Evil which so many critics have highlighted in their 
readings of this novel.  Brown turns first to eternity; even as Magnus trembles at his 
approaching death, with ashen mouth, he is reminded through his meditation that “the 
generations, and even the hills and seas, come and go, and only the Word stands, which 
was there – all wisdom, beauty, truth, love – before the fires of creation, and will still be 
there inviolate among the ashes of the world’s end” (M 138).  These considerations of the 
end of the world lead Magnus to the beginning, for “All time was gathered up into that 
ritual half-hour, the entire history of mankind, as well the events that have not yet 
happened as the things recorded in chronicles and sagas.  That is to say, history both 
repeats itself and does not repeat itself” (M 139).  This is perhaps Brown’s clearest 
statement of purpose in the novel: the novel, like the mass, exists in order to encapsulate 
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the “unimaginably complex events of time into the ritual words and movements of a half-
hour” (M 139).  For a novel like Magnus to be meaningful to a contemporary audience, in 
Brown’s understanding, the focus must be not on the specificity of given events, but on 
observable constants in “the human situation”.  History is thus best understood as a 
symbolic process, both abstract and “a jewel enduring and flaming” (M 140).  The 
incorporation of daily life into history, for Brown, comes through Christianity, which 
“invests the creatures who move among these elements with an incalculable worth and 
dignity” (M 140).  Brown’s focus on the community in his telling of the story, on the 
peasants as well as the earls, is not only an attempt to portray a wider context for these 
events, but also to imbue them with sacrament.  Like the mass, for Brown the novel is a 
mixture of the symbolic and the sensual.  Art thrives on the constants which are made 
visible through symbolism, but may also incorporate the minor events of history, because 
the full constancy of human experience cannot be wholly known in the present.   
Brown’s work attempts to balance the experience of momentary lives with “the 
eye of an angel” who would see “the whole history of men” with “the brevity and beauty 
of this dance at the altar” (M 129).  (This project is taken up more literally in Beside the 
Ocean of Time, as is discussed in the first chapter.)  The novel, like the mass, 
incorporates all things in anticipation of a full revelation to come.  In this he echoes 
Walter Benjamin, who argues that: 
A chronicler who recites events without distinguishing between major and minor 
ones acts in accordance with the following truth: nothing that has ever happened 
should be regarded as lost for history.  To be sure, only a redeemed mankind 
receives the fullness of its past – which is to say, only for a redeemed mankind 
has its past become citable in all its moments.  Each moment it has lived becomes 
a citation á l’ordre du jour – and that day is Judgement Day.87 
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For Brown, then, history becomes a testament, and the value of events which can only be 
hinted at in the present will become known only later; the “actions of Everyman [… 
reverberate] through the whole web of time” (M 141).  For Brown, like Benjamin, 
mankind is not yet redeemed. Just as Benjamin attests to the “weak Messianic power”88 
in each generation, however, Brown also argues that: “the pain of all history might be 
touched with healing by a right action in the present” (M 141). 
 While this is the closest Brown ever comes to stating his goals in writing Magnus, 
the section ends almost in repudiation of this philosophical thesis.  Magnus rejects the 
consolations of mass and art alike as he is beset with terror at the prospect of his death:  
“His spirit was too cold to be warmed any more by that subtle weave of imagery.  The 
Mass today was simply the movements of an old man and a boy” (M 141).  Magnus is 
seized by what Derrida terms the mysterium tremendum, the “terrifying mystery, the 
dread, fear and trembling of the Christian in the experience of the sacrificial gift.”89  For 
Derrida, here interpreting Patočka, this moment comes when one is in the moment of 
becoming a person, “and a person can become what it is only in being paralyzed 
[transie], in its very singularity, by the gaze of God”.90  For Magnus, this mysterium 
tremendum is revealed both as the sensuous feeling of tremendous cold and as the 
symbolic atonement for sins.  Magnus, renouncing the pride which has allowed him to 
arrive at this moment, acknowledges his failings as both a man and an earl: “He offered 
all that he had left: the peace and the pain” (M 145).  Magnus, in preparation for death, 
becomes most wholly himself, even as he becomes “the chosen man [who] might have to 
mingle himself with the dust” (M 141).  This moment of reconciliation and fear is found 
to some extent in the previous accounts of Magnus’s life.  In the Saga, Magnus is shown 
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“covering his face with his hands and shedding many tears in the sight of God” before 
praying “not only for himself and his friends but for his enemies and murderers”.91  This 
moment of tears and prayer has been moved in Brown’s account, however, to the scene 
of the mass in order to demonstrate the intentionality of Magnus’s sacrifice; Brown is 
insistent on the recognition that this is a meaningful sacrifice because it is fully willed.  
(In the Saga, all that is said about the mass is that “Some people say that Mass was sung 
for him and he received the sacrament”.92)  Magnus’s death gains significance when it is 
placed in this highly religious, thoughtful context.  At this juncture Brown seems willing 
to lose much of the value he has placed on the individual’s place within the community, 
and focus solely on the way in which that individual acts on behalf of the community.  
Magnus’s sacrifice is known, is willed, and thus is changed; it is no longer merely a 
political expedient or even a religious symbol, but something greater. 
 Brown is hesitant at this point to make explicit exactly how this sacrifice is made 
greater and whether it is for the glory of God or the unification of the community.  He 
instead includes an extremely long, formulaic section detailing the bargaining for 
Magnus’s life.  Virtually every paragraph begins the same way: “Finn Thorkelson/Hold 
Ragnarson/Sighvat Sokk/et al. said…”.  Although he has abandoned much of the stylistic 
experimentation of the previous sections, Brown seems to be willing the reader to read 
this as a court transcript, a series of testimonies about Magnus’s value in the community 
in which Magnus himself plays no part.  This section also marks perhaps the most 
significant change in the story from both the saga versions and Orkney Tapestry.  In these 
earlier versions, Magnus himself offers Hakon three alternatives to his own death 
(pilgrimage to Rome, exile in Scotland and mutilation in prison); in both Loom of Light 
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and Magnus, Magnus is notably absent from the scene.  D’Arcy argues that in this 
alteration Brown “removes this worldly blemish from [Magnus’s] martyrdom and 
underlines the preordained nature of his fate”.93  The passage certainly serves to reinforce 
the innocence of Hakon, clearly seen in every version as willing to accept compromise 
but finally turned towards death by the persuasion of his councillors.  In its strange 
emphasis on Hakon’s golden armband, too, the passage reaches for the symbolic, as, at 
the moment of decision, “the arm of the man […] was an intolerable blaze now in the 
noon sun” (M 163), an echo of the flaming jewel of symbolism itself mentioned in the 
previous section.  But too much emphasis has been placed, over the course of the novel, 
on Magnus’s misdeeds for him to be perceived free of worldly blemish at this point, as 
D’Arcy argues.  Instead, Magnus’s absence at his own sentence serves to clarify the way 
in which the sacrifice must be seen as a universal instance as well as a particular one. 
 Before turning to the actual moment of death, Brown includes a number of 
discussions of the anthro-historical nature and significance of sacrifice. For Brown, all 
sacrifice, in all cultures, works towards the same purpose.  Sacrifice is as essential to a 
community as agriculture: it represents the tearing “of long wounds in the earth [… that 
is] one of the great discoveries” (M 168).  At the same time that it is completely physical, 
sacrifice is also completely symbolic.  Animal sacrifice, for instance, prefigures the 
Christian Eucharist and the doctrine of transubstantiation: “a man eats a dripping sliver of 
ox imbued with divinity and thereby he (the wayward one) takes into himself both the 
sweetness and wisdom of the god (in so far as his being can bear such intensities) and 
also a draught of the dark primitive power of the earth” (M 166).  Brown here emphasises 
the gift inherent in sacrifice: the redemption or unification brought by sacrifice is not 
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deserved by humanity, “the wayward unstable partner” (M 165), but is instead a gift 
which allows humans to achieve a closer relationship with God through the intervention  
or intercession of the other, what Girard calls the surrogate victim.  Brown’s account of 
the history of sacrifice is teleologically centred on Christ and the Eucharist:  
That was the only central sacrifice of history. I am the bread of life.  All previous 
rituals had been a foreshadowing of this; all subsequent rituals a re-enactment.  
The fires at the centre of the earth, the sun above, all divine essences and 
ecstasies, come to this silence at last – a circle of bread and a cup of wine on an 
altar. (M 169) 
 
Brown writes of how the Eucharist was prefigured by Melchisedec. who brings forth 
bread and wine when he blesses Abraham (Genesis 14:18).  There is nothing in the 
biblical account which relates directly to Brown’s claim that at this moment “Men uttered 
new words to one another – ‘pity’, ‘mercy’, ‘love’, ‘patience’, ‘peace’ – as if this new 
food in some sense quickened their minds and hearts” (M 168).  Brown’s interpretation is 
quite clearly manipulated to indicate the Christian Eucharist, and draws on the Pauline 
notion that Melchisedec allows for Christ, insofar as the latter is a perfected, consecrated 
high priest (Hebrews 7:26-28).  While this account of the nature of sacrifice is not 
especially well-grounded in anthro-historical or theological tradition and research, it 
instead reveals that which Brown views as the particular value of sacrifice.   
 These four short passages on the nature of sacrifice are absolutely central to the 
novel, for it is in them that the reader can see that Brown is not interested in writing a 
conventional novel which would follow traditional narrative structures or tap familiar 
emotional resonances.  Brown inserts them then not to further the story, but to make sure 
that the reader is fully aware of the nature of sacrifice before the sacrifice takes place.  
Inasmuch as it is the narrative of the life of a given individual, Magnus is just as much a 
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treatise on the nature and value of sacrifice itself and account of why it is that “At certain 
times and in certain circumstances men still crave spectacular sacrifice” (M 170).  For 
Brown, sacrifice is central both to this particular narrative and to all narratives in general 
because of its simultaneous uniqueness and universality. It is the only possible act which 
can fully illustrate the interaction between the individual and the community, because it is 
simultaneously always individual and always communal.94  These passages also form a 
rationale for Brown’s remarkable transition from the twelfth century to the twentieth in 
the final scene in the chapter, a transition which only works if the reader is fully 
convinced by Brown’s argument that every example of sacrifice refers back (or forwards) 
to Christ.  This claim is central to the novel: Magnus, like Bonhoeffer, is sacrificed 
because at times “bread and wine seem to certain men to be too mild a sacrifice” (M 170). 
The difficulty in this passage may be seen in the way it has been read since; critics 
such as Elizabeth Huberman and Reilly have been far too willing to accept the guidelines 
Brown lays out for the understanding of these events.  Huberman writes that: “As an 
historic figure, he becomes the protagonist in an event that transcends history, since his 
martyrdom now appears as but a single instance in an endlessly recurring pattern. […] 
[T]he rite of sacrifice not only recurs eternally, but is eternally required.”95  In similarly 
elevated language, Reilly argues that: “What raises the bloody business above the level of 
a mafia killing is the sacrificial element, the cross embraced, without which man is 
lashed, Ixion-like, to a wheel of murder and reprisal”.96  Huberman and Reilly are two of 
the more strident apologists for this interpretation of the novel, in which Brown’s theme 
of ritual and recurrence is fully embraced and accepted, but many early reviewers are 
similarly willing to read this portion of the novel as a theological excursus.  However, as 
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is shown above, Brown spends the majority of the novel arguing against such a simple 
interpretation, striving to impress upon the reader the political and communal 
implications of Magnus’s life and death as well as the religious ones.  It is insufficient to 
regard Magnus’s death as merely echoing Christ’s; instead, Magnus’s death, as portrayed 
by Brown, must be seen as highlighting the very nature of all human deaths. 
 In order to address fully the question of how Magnus’s life leads towards a certain 
type of death, and how that death retroactively transforms his life, as throughout the 
novel Brown claims, it is necessary to explore briefly the Heideggerian notion of Being-
towards-death alluded to above.  Heidegger here draws upon Meister Eckhart’s notion of 
the centrality of Being as revealed through death: “The martyrs are dead and have lost 
their life but have received being”.97  For Eckhart – in some respects like Kierkegaard 
after him – martyrdom is the quintessential death because it reveals the way in which 
death gives being.  Heidegger follows and expands this notion in his explication of 
Being-towards-death, which is the way in which Dasein comes to understand itself:  “In 
Being-towards-death, Dasein comports itself towards itself as a distinctive potentiality-
for-Being.”98  Death is at once that which limits individual possibility – it imposes a finite 
number of possibilities for the individual life – but at the same time, the recognition of 
the possibility of death itself gives the individual an understanding of her own specific 
potentiality.  Death is the way in which Dasein is separated from its everydayness, from 
the “they” discussed above.  The potentiality-of-Being revealed in death is the foundation 
of Dasein’s coming to an end, and thus the root of the wholeness of Dasein:  “Dying is 
something that every Dasein itself must take upon itself at the time.”99  Death is both the 
fulfilment of an individual life and also the way in which the individual life is made 
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known as itself.  The two-fold aspect of dying, wherein it is both necessarily one’s own 
and where in its opening up of possibility it is marked as separate from merely perishing, 
make it constitutive of Dasein.  Death is then a fulfilment of Being, but not, crucially, in 
a linear sense.  It is not the case that, in Being-towards-death, there is Being which 
reaches fulfilment at the moment of its ending.  Rather, there is in the possibility of death 
an essential “not-yet” which Dasein already is, which is necessarily incorporated in 
Being.  Death, and the everpresent possibility of death, is that which gives being.  Death 
reveals that towards which life has always been moving:  “The ‘ending’ which we have 
in view when we speak of death, does not signify Dasein’s Being-at-an-end [Zu-Ende-
sein], but a Being-towards-the-end [Sein zum Ende] of this entity.  Death is a way to be, 
which Dasein takes over as soon as it is.”100  Thus life is not a process towards a 
wholeness which can only be achieved at the moment of death; instead, death creates this 
wholeness in such a way that life is based upon its possibility.  Death is not only 
anticipated in life, but drawn upon and fulfilled in life itself.101 
 When death is understood as possibility and as that which necessarily transcends 
time (for it is the concept of death as linear culmination that critics such as Paul Edwards 
believe misleads Heideggerian interpreters, causing them to “reify” the moment of 
death102), it becomes apparent why Brown chooses to avoid showing the moment of 
Magnus’s death, and instead fixes the conception of death to a point when Magnus is in 
preparation, in the mysterium tremendum.  Magnus’s death, although it is a death unlike 
that of almost all others by virtue of its symbolic value as sacrifice, is something that 
exists throughout his life.  This is not the death-driven understanding of martyrdom that 
appears in the sagas or in Mooney, in which the events of Magnus’s life are given 
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credence by the knowledge those authors had of his death, which creates their interest in 
the life that precedes it, but a more complicated understanding in which the possibility of 
Magnus’s martyrdom, as well as the actuality of it, is that which makes Magnus’s life 
whole.  Brown does not show the reader Magnus’s actual death because his death has 
been coexistent and awaited throughout his life. Brown thus follows Heidegger in this 
notion of death as that aspect of one’s being which provides wholeness, not at the 
moment of death, but in the life itself.  The final scene in the novel in which Magnus is 
still alive comes as a coda to the passages on sacrifice.  Brown writes that men still desire 
“spectacular sacrifice”: 
They root everywhere for a victim and a scapegoat to stand between the tribe and 
the anger of inexorable Fate. 
So Magnus Erlendson, when he came up from the shore that Easter 
Monday, towards noon, to the stone in the centre of the island, saw against the sun 
eleven men and a boy and a man with an axe in his hand who was weeping. (M 
170) 
 
Magnus thus combines Girard’s concept of the sacrificial scapegoat as the unifier of the 
community and Heidegger’s notion of death as that which reveals individual potentiality. 
At the same time, however, the above passage marks a surprising exit for the 
titular protagonist of a biographical novel.  This is the last moment at which Magnus is 
shown in the novel, and he is here voiceless, forced into symbolism and transformed by 
the other into that which the island community requires him to be.  Indeed, it is this 
disappearance which marks the novel as distinctly philosophical, rather than based in 
narrative efficiency.  For Brown, Magnus’s death does not need to be shown to the 
reader, for it already has been shown: every scene which has involved Magnus, and 
indeed every scene which has not, has made his death manifest.  It is not that Magnus 
could not live other than he did because he was fated to be a martyr, as the sagas would 
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have it, but that Magnus’s martyrdom was not limited to his death, but was instead 
present throughout his life.  It is not the actuality of his death, or the manner of it, which 
interests Brown: it is the possibility of his death which exists throughout the course of his 
life which makes Magnus a worthy subject.  Magnus’s martyrdom, then, is revealed in 
his Being-towards-death, in his existence as self, far more than in his actual murder on 
Easter Monday on Egilsay. 
 And yet Brown does show a death, or at least offers the prelude to another death.  
Isobel Murray, in her recent introduction to the novel, argues that the concentration camp 
scene has, in the past, “obscured almost any other questions, but it is a very short passage, 
easy to magnify out of context”.103  Indeed, from the early reviews one would think that 
this passage was the centre of the novel, the stylistic and narrative climax, which it is 
emphatically not.  For Brown, the climax is one of ideas, not events, and is interspersed 
throughout the course of the novel.  The passage is, however, exceedingly different from 
anything else in Brown’s fiction, and for that reason alone deserves careful consideration.  
It is, to begin with, one of a small handful of first-person narratives, which Rowena 
Murray takes to carry special symbolic meaning: the style of the passage “brings with it 
the associations of the executioner’s innocence, of Magnus’s helplessness, and of the 
inexorable forces of evil and lust for power which manipulate them both”.104  While a 
shift to first-person narration is unlikely in any novel to carry that much symbolic weight, 
it is all the same an important move, for it jars the reader and forces her to take note of 
the passage as something distinct and removed from the careful discussions of the nature 
of sacrifice which have preceded it.  This passage is the most confrontational in the 
novel, for its success is dependent on the reader’s acceptance of Brown’s claims about 
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the nature of death and time: the shift from Magnus to Bonhoeffer only makes sense if 
sacrifice is seen as both unique and essential at the same time.  Thus, in both stylistic 
device and narrative placement, Brown is announcing this passage as one he finds 
especially important.  He repeats this sentiment in his autobiography, where he gives this 
passage the longest textual criticism of any of his work: 
such incidents are not isolated casual happenings in time, but are repetitions of 
some archetypal pattern; an image or an event stamped on the spirit of a man at 
the very beginning of man’s time on earth, that will go on repeating itself over 
and over in every life without exception until history at last yields a meaning.  
The life and death of Magnus must therefore be shown to be contemporary, and to 
have a resonance in the twentieth century.  I did not have far to go to find a 
parallel: a concentration camp in central Europe in the spring of 1944. (FI 178-9) 
 
If one accepts Brown’s conceptualisation of the novel, then, the Bonhoeffer passage is 
not merely inserted in order to enliven the novel or to provide another sort of voicing, but 
for the same philosophical/theological purposes that are found behind the structuring of 
the rest of “The Killing”.  The passage is not ultimately intended to add to the novel as a 
biographical or historical narrative but is instead focused on the emotional and symbolic 
resonance of sacrifice itself.   As much as Brown derided films, this move is far closer to 
the work of Eisenstein, or even the Chaplin of Modern Times, than to the work of those 
ruralist writers with whom he is most often compared.  Alan Bold, one of Brown’s 
staunchest defenders, compares his technique in “The Killing” to Brechtian 
Verfremdungseffekte, a technique of “distancing the reader from the cathartic flow of 
fictional narrative”.105  Whether regarded as a modernist or even postmodernist gesture, 
Brown is clearly labouring to present the death of Magnus as an event which must be 
considered both as a singular event and an archetypal one.  The moment of sacrifice is 
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always unique and irreducible, yet in its essence and its communal purpose it can be 
shown to be always present in human life. 
 The choice of setting, however, is far from the obvious parallel that Brown claims 
it to be in his autobiography.  Bonhoeffer, whom Brown grudgingly acknowledges as his 
inspiration (FI 179), was indeed being given hagiographic treatment around the time of 
Magnus,106 and the bare outlines of his death are much as Brown portrays them.   Until 
his death, however, Bonhoeffer’s life was closer to a saint such as Columba, if a 
comparison must be made: a relatively quiet life given to religious contemplation.107  
Killed for his resistance to the Nazi scheme, his death could not be said to have brought 
peace or miracles any more than that of thousands of other religious resisters.  Indeed, by 
maintaining the principles of the Magnus story, by making the narrator of this segment 
Lifolf the chef, who insists that the events of the concentration camp at which he works 
“had nothing to do with me” (M 171), Brown in affect depoliticises the action.   
The  German major in Magnus proposes that the prisoner must be killed because: 
‘For years he has spoken about such things as “the brotherhood of man”, “the 
spirit of peace that ought to brood upon all the peoples of the world”, “the 
universal kingdom of love”. […] We wish to show this pure spirit, by means of 
the butcher’s hook, that he is, after all, when all is said and done, an animal like 
other men.’ (M 176) 
 
The reader is naturally expected to oppose this killing and to side with the apparent 
martyr.  And yet Brown comes close to undermining this sentiment, for in keeping his 
protagonist anonymous and inserting this story inside that of Magnus, the Bonhoeffer 
figure becomes merely symbolic.  In his desire to show the world as a system of 
repetitions, Brown robs the events he portrays of much of their individual import.  It is 
tempting to read this passage of the novel as implying that, in their echoing of Christ’s 
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death, the deaths of Magnus and Bonhoeffer have themselves lost their particular import 
and singularity.  This not only counters the bulk of Brown’s argument throughout the 
novel, but also the teachings of Bonhoeffer, who wrote: 
So long as we live, so long as we do not know the boundary of life, death, how 
can we possibly say what life is in itself? [...] Life is not a thing, an entity or 
concept; it is a person, a particular and unique person, and it is this particular 
person, not in respect of what this person has in common with other persons, but 
in the I of this person.108 
 
The final segment of “The Killing”, in its emphasis on the patterns and repetitions of 
human life and dismissal of individual particulars, refutes the arguments of both Brown 
and the man he is apparently using as his protagonist. By stripping these sacrifices of 
their individual worth, their political and emotional resonances, Brown does them a great, 
if unconscious, disservice.109 
 This failure of this passage to adequately represent the sacrifice as both unique 
and archetypal does not undermine the entire novel, however, for Brown early on sets up 
the fallibility of a work of fiction.  In the Bishop’s first letter, written just as Magnus 
makes his first appearance in the novel, he writes: 
‘But in the end nothing matters.  The chronicler writes his history in the royal 
palace, but the saga was conceived and “finis” put to it before the beginning of 
time; and soon enough there will be no one to relish the dark struttings and 
puppetry of men, for even the gods, the only creators and begetters, are doomed to 
perish.’ (M 39) 
 
This passage is not mere apocalyptic despair, but a comment on the way in which the 
chronicler, or novelist, cannot tell the totality of human life, immersed in it as he is, but 
only a small, inaccurate part of it.  Brown’s intent, in his portrayal of Magnus’s life as 
Being-towards-death and in his understanding of a continual death that offers possibility 
through life by means of its own limitless possibility of impossibility, is not only to 
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demarcate the life of one man, but of humanity in general.  This is the end served by the 
continual mentions of death, violence and apocalypse.  The individual or particular 
community itself will die, and achieve wholeness through that death, for that “finis” is 
already present in the lives of both the whole and its constituent parts.  (See the 
discussion of Greenvoe in chapter four.)  This is, finally, why Brown is unable to 
conceive of Magnus without the community which surrounds him; the individual 
ultimately stands in for both the specific community and the larger community of  a 
humanity fast approaching its own end.  This implied communal Dasein is the bravest 
aspect of the novel, and perhaps the aspect which elevates it to more than a theological 
treatise: Brown is not looking at the life of Magnus to stand in for the (sacrificial) death 
of the individual, as it would appear, but for the death of the community itself. 
 As Maurice Blanchot argues in The Unavowable Community (analysed at greater 
length in chapter five), the sacrifice that founds the community at the same time undoes 
it. Sacrifice is a gift and abandonment, and thus is “the ordeal that exposes [the 
community] to its necessary disappearance”.110  Or, as Nancy reads Girard: if the whole 
of Western culture is determined by sacrifice, then sacrifice must also come to represent 
“the closure of the West” and the failure of community.111  Brown places sacrifice at the 
heart of the community in order here to examine how a community comes to be unified; 
it is worth suggesting that his mirroring of Magnus’s death with that of Bonhoeffer, a 
death which in no way creates a community or puts an end to communal violence, 
illustrates the impossibility of community in the modern era.  Even if one does not take 
this step, what remains clear from the above discussions of Kierkegaard, Heidegger and 
Girard is that Brown is using the story of Magnus to illustrate the centrality of the 
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individual life, and thus the individual death, to the workings of community.  The 
individual sacrifice is that which stands against the universal even as it unifies the 
community; it is a death which is present throughout the life of the individual; and it is 
one which must ultimately be seen as both unique and archetypal.  Brown thus places a 
tremendous weight on the significance of the sacrifice, using it to unite both disparate 
works and disparate sequences within each of those works.  This weight, however, 
ultimately allows the reader to see that for Brown it is sacrifice itself which is constitutive 
of community and which reveals community for what it is.  The community is finally that 
which is predicated on the individual: the story of Magnus does not illustrate a unique 
moment in religious history, but is a way to understand the workings of community itself. 
 Despite Brown’s life-long interest in the story of Magnus, there are only a few 
small codas to the novel.  Three long poems, “Songs for St Magnus Day” from the 1989 
collection The Wreck of the Archangel, the stand-alone poem from the same year “Tryst 
on Egilsay”, and “Saint Magnus” from the posthumous 1998 collection Stained Glass 
Windows all make use of the same framework which Brown employs in the longer works 
discussed above.112  In each of these poems, the focus is not on Magnus himself, but on 
the community which surrounds him.  The first of these poems ends with a general 
“invocation of the blind and infirm” to Magnus to “keep for us a jar of light / Beyond sun 
and star”.113  Here the “us” is ultimately inclusive, encompassing not only the poor, or 
even the people of Orkney, but the readers as well.  “Tryst on Egilsay” develops this 
theme, as well as making use of the stylistic innovation of “The Killing”, in dividing the 
narration equally between Earl Hakon, a helmsman of the ship Magnus takes to Egilsay, 
the killers, a priest, Magnus himself, two tinkers, and the “men of Egilsay”.  In the mass 
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which marks the end of each of Brown’s full-length imaginings of the story, the tinkers 
observe: 
– All the world can drink from that cup, 
The two tinkers that we are, 
And the lord Magnus with the heavy folds about him 
And Aud the skipper 
And the fisherman with a bunch of herring 
And the wife with a loaf from the fire.114 
 
Magnus’s death is most significant for the way in which it can unite the individuals of the 
island, both “high and low”.  In both of these poems, Brown presents a newly-unified 
community: this is a community created by sacrifice.  “Saint Magnus” presents these 
themes in a very different style: the poem is narrated by an old woman who is enraged by 
the way in which the feud between Magnus and Hakon has led to widespread violence.  
Magnus matters to her not as a martyr or a potential saint, but rather as a political figure 
whose decisions have led to the deaths of those she loves.  Yet Magnus, going off to his 
death, is able to cure her of her pain as he kisses her on the cheek, “a thing Valt never did 
/ for fear of fishermen’s mockery, and old Jon did only / when he was merry with ale at 
harvest home and Yule”.115  Here Magnus’s achievement is not on the level of the whole 
community, but instead comes in the form of affection between two individuals.  This 
poem is suggestive of a new relation between individual and community, but primarily 
illustrates, like the scenes with Jock and Mary in the earlier works, that moments of great 
significance do not need to be recognised by the people they affect in order to retain 
power. 
Brown’s most significant coda to the novel is found in the short story “The Feast 
at Paplay” from 1983.  While stylistically more traditional than Magnus, the story shares 
its approach to the sagas.  Based on Chapter 52 of the Saga, the story tells of Hakon’s 
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meeting, after Magnus’s murder on Egilsay, with Thora, Magnus’s mother and Ingerth, 
his wife: the moment at which Hakon “began to feel the burden of his crime”.116  As in 
Magnus, Brown’s primary concern is not with the events of history so much as the 
surrounding community context: three-quarters of the story is concerned with the 
preparation for the feast.  It begins with the slaughter of a pig, which dies “in floods of 
gore”, echoing the simultaneous, but unknown, death of Magnus.117  As in Magnus, 
violence is understood to be a necessary, daily aspect of community life; Magnus’s death, 
recognised by Ingerth long before Thora, is treated in a subdued manner, like that of any 
other man on the island.  “‘Men die.  Never a day but a man dies in this island or that.  So 
long as this dead man in Egilsay was shriven and given heavenly bread for his journey, 
then he’s happy enough, I’m sure.’”118  Although Thora does not know that it is her son 
of whom she is speaking, she is at this moment forgiving Hakon, for she accepts 
Magnus’s death as part of a larger pattern.  The majority of the story is concerned with 
her distress at Ingerth’s refusal to celebrate Easter fully:  
‘The Lord is risen […] Does that mean nothing to you?  Of course it means 
nothing, if one does not see all the actions of Christ’s life in the events of every 
day.  Today in the island of Egilsay your husband and his cousin – the two earls – 
who have been on bad terms for years, they are holding a meeting. […] Orkney 
that has been bleeding to death for many winters, that is dead in fact and laid in a 
hollow rock; Orkney is to be resurrected again this very day.  Does that mean 
nothing to you?’119 
 
Thus Brown makes explicit the link between Magnus and the community at large; his 
death both symbolises the death of the community and, although Thora does not know 
this, will result in its resurrection, and in the return of peaceful life.  The death of Magnus 
serves to prove “that it is Christ who rules the universe, not Fate”.120  As with Magnus, 
the story is impossible to understand if Magnus’s death is not understood as a 
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Christological sacrifice, and if the individual is not seen as representative of the 
community.  If these precepts were not taken into account, “The Feast at Paplay” would 
merely be a rather strange story about a mother who is not concerned with grieving for 
her son.  Instead, by assuming the symbolic account of Magnus’s death, Brown is using 
the story to explore further the ways in which the martyrdom impacts upon everyone 
within the community, even allowing for peace between his mother and his murderer.  
For Brown, this is the first of Magnus’s miracles: while Ingerth is filled with nothing but 
hateful invectives, Thora calls Hakon “son”.  After Magnus’s death, all of the violence on 
the island seems to come to a halt, and situations which should lead to violence become 
peaceful.   
Brown ends the story with one of his favourite ambiguously symbolic images: 
“On the half-finished cloth in the loom could be seen now, in the torchlight, a sun, a 
cornstalk, a cup”.121  These are, of course, both the images of daily life and of the 
Christian Eucharist.  If this story is to be read as a coda to Magnus, then it becomes clear 
that this loom contains the wedding garment for which Magnus searches up until his 
death.  Not only is it a garment filled with symbolism, but it is, in effect, a priestly 
garment, woven with the images of a Eucharistic robe.   Although Magnus is mentioned 
in many of the poems and stories Brown wrote after Andrina, he gradually became 
interested primarily in the story’s most purely symbolic elements.  A poem like “St 
Magnus”, written shortly before his death, tells the entirety of the novel in twenty-eight 
lines; the change from a white coat to “a red martyr coat” becomes the drama of the 
narrative, rather than any of the story’s events.122  Similarly, in “St Magnus Day 1992”, 
Brown writes: 
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But the poor still dance (thank God). 
Because of the saints 
We, a throng out of winter, 
Dance now in coats brighter than Solomon.123 
 
The repetitive image of coats and sacrifice, in these later poems, gets somewhat muddled.  
The events described have, perhaps, grown so familiar to Brown that they are no longer 
worth explaining, and he instead rewrites the story focusing only on its thematic 
elements, ignoring its dramatic and historical basis.  It is, ultimately, only in Magnus that 
Brown is able to explore the nature of Magnus’s death, the way in which the individual 
comes to serve on behalf of, and as representative of, the community and the way in 
which the life of the community becomes a single entity through the life of one member. 
 It is finally worth mentioning the primary medium through which Magnus has 
become known to a wider audience, Peter Maxwell Davies’s The Martyrdom of Saint 
Magnus.  In his libretto, Davies sticks quite closely to the novel, often, in scenes such as 
“The Reporters”, providing a word-for-word setting of the material.  The only notable 
change is in the character of Blind Mary, who seeks, and accepts, her own restoration of 
sight.  The finale of the opera consists of a declaration on the nature of sacrifice repeated 
from Brown’s chapter “The Killing”, followed by an explicit inclusion of the audience, 
who are told, upon leaving, to “Go now and carry the peace of Christ into the world”.124  
Davies makes explicit what Brown is content to leave implicit, and the story perhaps 
becomes slightly less dramatic for losing the ambiguity Brown has worked into it.   The 
libretto does serve, however, to illustrate how, for all of his sometimes unwieldy 
symbolism and the repetition of a few elements to the point where they almost become 
meaningless, Brown was largely able to create an ambiguous, ambitious account of the 
death of an individual and the way that death impacts upon the surrounding community, a 
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Symbolic Histories: Time in a Red Coat and Vinland 
 
If Magnus and Beside the Ocean of Time are Brown’s attempts to demonstrate the 
ways in which history can coalesce around or be understood in regards to a given 
individual or community, then his other two major late works of fiction, Time in a Red 
Coat and Vinland, serve as explorations of the way in which history can also exist as a 
force in its own right.1  The protagonists of these two novels are kept at a remove both 
from history and community; in this separation they are best understood not as fully-
formed individuals, but instead as observers of larger social forces.  These two novels 
highlight patterns of human behaviour across long periods of time; they are Brown’s least 
parochial works, but nevertheless echo some of his most familiar themes, in particular the 
tension between the individual and the communal.  Both novels are schematic, heavily 
symbolic, and not overly concerned with either narrative structure or character 
development, and it is for this reason that they are undoubtedly the least popular of 
Brown’s longer fictions.2   Both novels are largely conceptual, even philosophical, and 
concerned with reflections on the nature of the historical novel as such.  These novels, 
especially Time in a Red Coat, form a response to the familiar charges that Brown’s work 
only romanticises the past, that it creates a falsely idyllic myth of an anti-modern Orkney 
and is thus unable to address modern concerns.  In these two works, one set across 
hundreds of years and the other incorporating virtually every aspect of Viking life, Brown 
charts humanity’s growing ease with violence and predicts its imminent destruction.   
Simultaneously, however, both novels are concerned with the ways in which history 
transforms into, and can be best understood through, myth.  While best read as 
companions to Brown’s more fully-developed fictions, they remain the most searching 
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explorations in Brown’s work of the potential failures and distractions of mythology, as 
well as the potential benefits of interpreting history through the filter of myth.  Brown 
explicitly engages with the question, posed by Hayden White, of “whether historical 
events can be truthfully represented as manifesting the structures and processes of events 
met with more commonly in certain kinds of ‘imaginative’ discourses”.3  Both novels are 
primarily concerned with the intersection of history and myth in order to draw attention 
to the role of narrative itself.  These two novels, then, while clearly “historical” in form, 
are also perhaps the most modern of Brown’s career: they consistently raise the questions 
of how it is that history is to be understood in modern life and what it is that historically-
based texts can successfully teach the modern reader. 
 In Time in a Red Coat, Brown raises the same questions about the nature of 
subjective experience in regards to history that can be found in the later works of 
Heidegger.  For Heidegger and many of his followers, the self is not a being within 
history.  Instead, the way in which one understands time and history defines the very 
being of the self and being in general.  Brown’s novel may in fact be best understood not 
as a text with conventional narrative aims, but as a series of questions on human nature 
and violence framed in the dual contexts of historical narrative and fairy-tale sensibility, 
coupled with a discourse on the nature of fiction in general. Given the philosophical and 
self-reflexive premises of Brown’s later fiction, it is necessary to engage in a fuller 
discussion of some strains of twentieth-century philosophies of art and history before 
engaging fully with Brown’s novels.  For thinkers as diverse as Heidegger and Jameson, 
the closely intertwined concepts of art and history must be separated from their 
foundationalist conceptions, in which they are thought of as conduits of truth, in order to 
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be usefully understood.  Art must be understood as the work itself, and through the work 
it does, rather than being seen as something static and whole in itself, such as a picture or 
an historical document.  For Heidegger, the work opens the distinction between earth and 
the world: the work is something distinctly temporal.  As will be shown below, it is this 
notion of the work as that which, through its temporality, allows us to distinguish 
between historicity and history that determines Heidegger’s concerns.  This notion is also 
found in Brown’s novels. 
Within these two novels, Brown foregrounds the ways in which history is 
represented in art in order both to demonstrate the loss of art as an immediate bearer of 
truth and to explore what possibilities for truth remain to the modern writer.4  He is thus 
engaged with those concerns which Heidegger makes explicit: for the latter, if the past is 
viewed objectively, as something which must be represented to the subject – that is, 
something which has no function outside of its self-representation – then it can hold no 
truth, but can only be mourned as something now necessarily separated from that 
conception of truth.  In “The Age of the World Picture” Heidegger examines the 
changing notion of art in contemporary life: as Being becomes defined as that which can 
be represented to the mind of a subject, the value of art becomes subjective and/or 
aesthetic, rather than functioning as an arena for the emergence of truth.5  In this, argues 
Anthony Cascardi, Heidegger is heir to Hegel, for whom, “Art in its original sense, as an 
immediate bearer of truth, is impossible in the modern age; moreover the consequences 
of this impossibility determine our relationship to the past as one of a loss that is coupled 
with an impossible desire to grasp the truth in a sensuously immediate form”.6  Within 
the rise of a scientific understanding of the world, art, as the bearer of truth, is replaced 
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by history, which is representational.  For Heidegger, that which is objectified and made 
representational cannot be a bearer of the truth.  This movement towards objectification 
in effect anaesthetises history; the past becomes something that can be used for 
representational or explanatory purposes, but not for the emergence of truth.  This is not 
only a comment on the Hegelian and Heideggerian predilection for ancient, especially 
Greek, art, but on the emergent ahistoricity of history itself.  As Jameson argues, one 
engages with history not to discover “the ‘truth’ of the philosophical description [… but] 
the situation which suddenly allows the veil to be ripped away from this intolerable 
ontological bedrock”.7  For Jameson, the loss of historicity allows, through the rejection 
of an ontological or metaphysical foundationalism, the emergence of a view of the past as 
abstract and indeed mysterious.  For Heidegger, a fixation on history as a representational 
and concrete “It was” creates a fixity of thought which ignores temporality.8  Although 
they are working towards substantially different ends, both Heidegger and Jameson reject 
the notion that history (as object or representation) can be thought of as a form or bearer 
of truth – for Heidegger, that which is unconcealed – but instead argue that any 
discussion of history must incorporate the loss of historicity. 
For Hegel as well as Heidegger, modern art is inherently ahistorical.  In his work 
on ahistoricity and the historical novel, Lukács cites the influence of Goethe on Hegel: 
for Goethe, “all that has remained of true poetry lives and breathes only in 
anachronisms”.9  This claim echoes Hegel’s notion that literature does not change the 
inner substance of the historical matters with which it is concerned, but changes the 
expression of that substance in order to fulfil the needs of a contemporary culture.  For 
Lukács, it is only when the past is portrayed as the “necessary prehistory of the present”, 
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that the necessity of anachronism becomes clear.  Lukács uses this Hegelian argument in 
defence of an historical novelist such as Scott, who simply allows “his characters to 
express feelings and thoughts about real, historical relationships in a much clearer way 
than the actual men and women of the time could have done”.10  For Scott, this 
“intermingling [of] fiction with truth” is necessary to make the historical novel relevant 
to the contemporary reader: “It is necessary, for exciting interest of any kind, that the 
subject assumed should be, as it were, translated into the manners, as well as the 
language, of the age we live in”.11  Lukács, following Scott, argues that the relevance of 
an historically-based text does not lie in its historical accuracy, but in the truth it can 
convey about the present.  While Lukács does not claim to see art as a filter, in his 
discussion of Scott that is clearly what the work of art has become: a tool of translation 
between cultural idioms.  As filtered through both the author and the audience, this 
translation is necessarily subjective and thus art is still kept at a remove from being a 
direct bearer of truth. 
For Heidegger, nature and history are objectified in the drive to represent 
something’s Being, just as art is made subjective: they become “the objects of a 
representing that explains”.12  As Heidegger interprets Hegel, the latter “experienced the 
essence of history in terms of the essence of being in the sense of absolute subjectivity”, 
yet “To this day there has been no experience of history that, seen philosophically, could 
respond to this experience of history”.13  For Heidegger, history cannot relate directly to 
the experience of being.  Instead, he posits an intermediary stage of “reflection” which 
“transports the man of the future into that ‘between’ in which he belongs to Being and yet 
remains a stranger amid that which is”.14  This transitory stage is in effect a way to escape 
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the stratifying nature of modern life, in which history can only be examined in a certain 
way (objectively, as what is past).  This reflective stage also allows us to approach art as 
the work, rather than as something limited by its aestheticisation.  There is, then, in this 
essay, a hope for an art which works through history without limiting it to what is past 
and “set in place”, to what is objective, but which actively reflects Being itself.  Art, in its 
unlimited and eternal form, without modern constrictions, does not reflect or represent a 
pre-existing truth, but instead is itself “the becoming and happening of truth. […] [T]ruth 
[…] happens in being composed.”15  For this reason, when Heidegger writes of the 
creation of a work of art, he speaks of emergence, of pulling forth: “to create is to cause 
something to emerge as a thing that has been brought forth.”16    
Truth is itself, however, necessarily ahistorical.  As Heidegger writes, “The 
establishing of truth in the work is the bringing forth of a being such as never was before 
and will never come to be again”.17  The aestheticisation of art is that which lets the 
nonsensuous “shine through”,18 but Heidegger cautions that it may not be impossible to 
enter into the poetic experience.19  Instead, in the modern or scientific era, truth is 
approached not through the work of art that is the “becoming and happening of truth”, but 
through the objectification and representation of nature and history.  Within Heidegger’s 
late work there is a divide between what the work of art should and must do – that is, 
cause truth to emerge – and the demands of a scientific approach, which relies on 
objectification.  Heidegger thus sets up a role for the work of art which he immediately 
makes impossible even as he insists that it must come to pass.  This tension, if not his 
conclusions, will occupy the rest of the chapter: Brown and the various critics and 
philosophers discussed question how it might be possible for either art or history – and, 
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moreover, for history as art – to represent or bear truth, especially when truth itself 
becomes an impossible concept.  Heidegger offers no solutions, but instead quotes 
Hölderlin’s poem “To the Germans” as an example of the way in which history and art 
can combine towards truth: 
How narrowly bounded is our lifetime, 
We see and count the number of our years. 
But have the years of nations 
Been seen by mortal eye? 
 
If your soul throbs in longing 
Over its own time, mourning, then 
You linger on the cold shore 
Among your own and never know them.20 
 
Art with this understanding is thus a way out of the “narrow bounds” of an individual 
lifetime, for reflection allows a knowledge of modernity that incorporates the past and is 
not limited to what can be experienced in the lifetime of a given individual.  The past 
becomes concealed through subjective experience, and it is art that creates the process of 
unconcealing.  For Hölderlin, as interpreted by Heidegger, art rooted solely in a 
subjective experience of modernity leads to mourning; the gaze of an individual life is 
necessarily insufficient to encounter fully or understand the past.  Yet the emergence of 
subjectivism also raises the question of community. As Heidegger writes: “only where 
man remains subject does the positive struggle against individualism and for the 
community […] have any meaning”.21  Heidegger thus proposes a tear between art, 
which must transcend the subjective individual, and the community, which is dependent 
on the subjective individual.  (This view will be contrasted below with Nancy’s claim 
that “history is community”.) The question of art and history’s relation to the truth is thus 
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also finally a question of the individual’s relation to the community, a question that 
Brown reformulates throughout Time in a Red Coat. 
 
A. Symbol and Allegory in Time in a Red Coat 
 Within Time in a Red Coat Brown addresses the way in which, in a Heideggerian 
manner, art can be drawn forth from truth in two ways: through an analysis of art as such, 
specifically in literary tropes, and through a focus on mythic elements.  The novel is not 
an attempt to portray the truth of historical incident so much as it is a series of questions 
concerning how truth could possibly be portrayed.  It is best read as a novel of doubt in 
which neither myth, nor historical realism, nor any form of art is enough to portray the 
truth fully, but must nevertheless be accepted as the best possibility for any potential 
unconcealment of the truth.  In the novel, Brown adopts a fairy-tale structure, one which 
the reader can easily recognise as artificial and non-naturalistic, in order to demonstrate 
that everything which follows in the novel is witnessed through a set of layers, filters and 
interpretations. For Brown, it is impossible for the truth to be clearly revealed in the form 
of an historical novel; the fantastic is as appropriate, and as arbitrary, a form to unconceal 
truth as the realistic.  At the start of the novel, the introductory Masque, a dumb puppet 
show representing the history of the heroine’s village, gives way to the breaching of “The 
Wall”: a mythologized past gives way to an intrusive present, and art gives way to 
violence.  This shift does not show that real life is “an illusion”, as Hilda Spear claims,22 
but instead is used by Brown to reveal the poles between which his heroine will hover 
over the course of the novel: mythology, peace and art on the one hand, and immediate 
violence and the difficulty of history as lived experience on the other.  “Real life” is just 
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that: real, present and deadly, but the presence of myth is always at play as a way of 
interpreting life that both reflects on the given moment and incorporates it into a larger 
notion of history.  Neither myth, which serves as a form of reflection, nor actual 
experience are capable of revealing the truth single-handedly; for Brown it is only in their 
combination that any truth may be approached.   
To this end, the nameless heroine is given a White and Black Guardian.  The 
White Guardian represents sun, music, “the fullness of the earth”, “the ancient poems and 
tales”; the Black Guardian promises death, “long labour, full of pain” and dragons that 
will “scorch you to the bone”.23  Modernity, in Brown’s fairy-tale-like conception, is 
overseen by the Black Guardian and his promises of dragons (hereafter used to represent 
all human violence): “The dove has left this garden.  It is now the time of the dragon” 
(TRC 15).24  The mythological world guarded by the White Guardian (notably centred on 
the very elements of Brown’s Orkney-based fictions) has given way to violence and 
destruction.  Throughout the remainder of the novel, Brown examines those elements of a 
mythologized past which are still present in modernity, and sees what possible utopia 
may exist in the future.  By grounding the story in the sensibility of a fairy-tale, Brown 
allows himself to mingle history and myth as much as he desires; it is a way of 
expressing a non-objectified history and possibly a way to refute the bounds of modern 
perspective.  In this respect, comparisons have frequently been drawn with modern 
fantasists ranging from Peake25 to Tolkien,26 both of whom constructed elaborate 
fantastical worlds which subtly echo contemporary life.  Brown himself, in an article 
written for The Independent some years after the novel’s release, argued that “such a tale 
does not call for a naturalistic treatment”, in part because it is not drawn from his own 
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life: “the book is not realistic, because I have hardly stirred a foot out of my own islands: 
Orkney.  It is more a sombre fable than the novel that people expect to read nowadays.”27  
In his drafts for this article, Brown alternates between calling the novel a fairy-tale, a 
fable, or “high fantasy”: what is crucial in his own reading of the work is that it avoids a 
realistic approach in order that it can more fully comment on greater tropes across human 
history.  The novel cannot be read purely as myth, however: it is far too concerned with 
the actuality of lived experience, past and present.  The fairy-tale elements of the novel 
are only revealed in contrast with the realistic elements: they are used to support Brown’s 
claims about the way the world really is, rather than to distract the reader in an escapist 
manner.  The use of a fantastical lexicon and setting can thus be seen as a liberation of 
perspective, a way of providing commentary on the world around one that does not 
directly invoke it. 
 What Brown does with this dual perspective is not, perhaps, as consistently 
engaging as the reader would hope.  His narrative traces his heroine, unchanged except 
for her white coat, which is covered with blood and grime by the novel’s end, from 
medieval Asia to an Orkney-like island, Ottervoe, sometime in the near future.  The novel 
can initially can be read as the story of how a given individual can “walk among the 
flames of hell, and come back, and be sound again in her flesh and mind” (TRC 226).  
Such an interpretation is supported by the apparent triumph of the White Guardian at the 
novel’s end, when the novel moves into a more familiar pastoral mode and the passage of 
the girl through the novel is told as pure fairy-tale.  Ottervoe itself falls into the template 
of Brown’s writings on the Orkneys: there is a “strict and mild” factor (TRC 230); even 
when faced with emigration, the children still play “bright-limbed and shrill-tongued, 
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among the rock-pools and the dunes and the seabirds” (TRC 232); there is still “a great 
intimacy between sea and fishermen” (TRC 236).  The life of the island community has 
apparently resisted change, even as it is continually confronted with it.  The return of 
Simon Thorfinnson, a small figure in a Napoleonic battle that occupies much of the 
novel’s second half, to his home community is presented as a small triumph: in a novel 
about the impossibility of  continuance in a violent world, here is a man who has 
managed to achieve his desire.  (That this may, in fact, occur some hundred years after 
his death is apparently not a great concern for Brown.)  Community is here presented 
quite simply as a force of constancy: it is that from which the individual comes and to 
which he redemptively returns.  Yet even in that redemption, one which is echoed at the 
finale of Beside the Ocean of Time, there is a voice of despair, as the girl – now an old 
woman named Maurya who has hung up her coat – tells her grandson that: “‘It’s a lie, 
like all stories.  For even the sea was burnt at last.  All broken, the harps and the mirrors.  
An island strewn with skulls.  I am a stone mouth that speaks.  There’s no need for you or 
anyone to listen any more’” (TRC 249).  The images she uses are deliberately fantastic, 
pointing as it were to stories which have not yet been told.  If all stories are lies, the 
woman implies, there is no point in telling them at all.  Schoene points to the very end of 
the novel, a few paragraphs later, in which a child claims that “‘Yes, we got history 
again, of course.  The kettle’ll soon be singing’” (TRC 249), as a refutation of the 
heroine’s claims, an intervention of perspective that ends the novel “on a positive note.”28  
This interpretation does not adequately address what has come before, however, for if the 
heroine’s struggle is to be trusted, it leaves the reader with the knowledge that myth is 
ultimately not enough to re-establish history.  In this refutation of the heroine’s 
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experience throughout the novel, Schoene echoes Brown’s assertion that the role of 
children in the novel is to make “a sweet pure promise that indeed all shall be well”.29   
Brown himself cannot be trusted here as an interpreter of his novel, however.  
This final chapter can be found in close to a dozen distinct drafts in Brown’s papers, and 
only the last few contain any promise of hope.  The first ten drafts are all presented as 
monologues by the old woman, defending her stories out of a fear that she’ll be sent to an 
asylum: indeed, in these earlier drafts it seems more than likely that the preceding novel 
has only been a fantasy of an old Orkney woman unhappy with the life she lives.  In one 
draft, the novel ends not with redemption, or even an acceptance that there is merit in 
storytelling, but with confusion: 
‘Why shouldn’t I be a princess now and then?  Once upon a time.  Does it do any 
harm to anybody?  An old thing at the door of death, she can imagine anything 
and she can say anything she likes so long as she is not hurting anybody. […] 
Little princess, once you were womb-blind and one day you will be a cold coffin 
face.  Princess, follow the dragon through the arrows and the wounds and the suits 
of armour.  Make music on a broken flute.  Give gold to poor people.  What can 
be wrong in that?  Tell me.  We were all princesses.  We gave gold and we were 
silent with sorrow.  The dragon drank the blood of men and he roared and he 
belched out terrible fires from his mouth.’30 
 
The conflict presented in this ending is nearly overwhelming: fairy-tales are presented as 
a means of escape from the promise of death, but even they ultimately harbour a potential 
for destruction in the form of dragons.  Although this more pessimistic ending was 
deleted by the final drafts, the tone remains clear throughout the past chapter, as the 
woman despairs of the value of storytelling.  The child who appears at the very end 
speaks out of ignorance, and this brief note of positivity is not enough to change 
retroactively all that has come before.  It is ultimately with this notion of stories as 
useless commodities in a time of war – and, as the novel has demonstrated, all of human 
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history is a time of war – that the novel ends.  A mythic view, then, is not enough; the 
violence of the present intrudes on everything, and those who have “walked through 
hell”, by which Brown means those who have witnessed the events of modernity, “too 
hideous and horrible for words” (TRC 227), cannot emerge unscathed.  Stories are a 
temporary comfort for children, but they are finally insufficient as either commentary or 
escape.  The individual who has witnessed violence cannot be integrated into either a real 
or mythic community. 
For Rowena and Brian Murray, this self-critical despair is the heart of the novel: 
“Brown risked destroying everything he had built up in his writing up to this point. […] 
Remarkably, the narrative voice in this novel wearily rolls out each of these [tropes] and 
explicitly comments on their tedious familiarity.”31  Indeed, at least one reviewer of the 
novel believed that Time in a Red Coat “has made it clear that [Brown’s] preoccupation 
with Orkney is to some extent a metaphor”.32  While it is unlikely that Brown would 
countenance such a statement, the novel is certainly concerned with the difficulty of 
making metaphors or stories seem new and relevant.  In pointing to a river as a figure for 
“the life of the whole tribe, the whole nation, the totality of the human race, and indeed of 
all creation itself”, Brown admits that he is employing “a worn metaphor” (TRC 31).  Yet 
Brown traces out this metaphor for two pages, continually embellishing it, even while 
admitting that his work here is “tedious” (TRC 32).  This passage, as shown below, is 
perhaps the key to the novel, for it is one of a very few places in his fiction where Brown 
comments on the nature of his writing in order to combat his image as a primitive 
storyteller in touch with the land.  Here Brown is using an environmental metaphor to 
comment on the nature of life, a trope which appears regularly in his writings, but also to 
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demonstrate the ways in which neither the image itself nor its use in this particular novel 
are completely satisfactory.  This is not the only instance of an authorial aside on the 
nature of life compared to something in the natural environment: later on, Brown writes 
that “Time is a dark wood, in which men and animals and worms live and have their 
being” (TRC 60), truth is a “perdurable seamless garment” (TRC 173), and so on.  These 
foregrounded metaphors are especially worthy of attention because they were added late 
in the writing of the text, possibly as a solution to the difficulty of writing a pure fairy-
tale.  Time in a Red Coat was originally written as a straightforward play dealing with 
mythical scenes, and only transformed into a novel during the last few months of writing.  
The dramatic form of the story mirrors that of the novel; the scenes are laid out 
identically and contain the same action and much of the same dialogue.  There are two 
primary changes between the work’s life as a play and as a novel: the introduction of a 
metafictional tone and the substitution of simple chapter titles for lengthy, descriptive 
scene headings.  These headings are notable in themselves: they are a pastiche of 
nineteenth-century literature and represent more clearly than anything in the text the tone 
Brown is trying to establish in the play.  The scene which becomes “The Taken Town” in 
the novel is known in the play as “She Comes to a Town without Townspeople, a Town 
All Broken Stone, a Town of Timbers Blackened and Smoking, a Town of Rats Below 
and Ravens Above”. 33  The replacement of such elongated and over-elaborate titles with 
simple, mythic images, followed by the exploration of these images in an impartial tone, 
suggests that Brown found the work as pure fairy-tale to be unsustainable late in his 
writing.  The story needs to be estranged in order to make it new.  In the final form of the 
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novel, Brown accomplishes this estrangement not through fantastical means, but through 
metafictional comment. 
Brown continually calls attention to the inadequacy of the metaphors he employs, 
yet nevertheless foregrounds them strongly; the novel is continually interrupted by these 
authorial pronouncements on the nature of being.  In his earlier story “The Day of the 
Ox”, Brown writes of a town which has “been at peace for a generation” and so lost its 
“life-relish”: without conflict, there are no new stories to be told.34  Even though nothing 
in Brown’s writing suggests that he is writing from a world at peace, the very basis of 
Time in a Red Coat is that all its stories are ancient and perhaps no longer relevant to the 
way life is now lived.  The way to make these stories newly relevant is by doing violence 
to them, not the physical violence that engenders storytelling in “The Day of the Ox”, but 
narrative violence.  Brown thus admits that his metaphors, derived largely from fairy-
tales, cannot capture the true nature of time, or life, or truth, but also argues that there is 
no other way to express these concepts.  The only way to illustrate the necessity of 
metaphor and story when these concepts have become too familiar is to point out their 
failings.  Read in this light, it is difficult not to see the novel as almost entirely self-
critical. Brown draws on a notion of authorial awareness in the manner of a canonically 
postmodern writer like John Fowles.  Both authors admit that their fiction is built on 
artifice and use that realisation to foreground the impossibility of any traditional narrative 
structure to tell the truth.  Brown’s descriptions of rural landscapes, such as appear in 
virtually all of his work, come across here almost as parody:  
Here, in such a landscape, is the very heart of peace and plenitude.  Pastoral 
slopes, a shepherd boy under the tree with his pipe; the milking-girl crossing the 
field from the cows to churn and cheese-press, a wooden bucket of milk in each 
hand (white heavy brimming circles) and the beasts languid and herb-smelling 
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after the sweet burdens have been drawn from their udders; they lie about the 
field, white cows and dappled cows, gently shifting their jaws on the cud. (TRC 
72) 
 
This is a landscape that has never existed, except in Romantic paintings and fairy-tales. 
Given his earlier reservations about the inability of stories to tell the truth, Brown 
seemingly expects the reader to reject automatically such an overwrought description and 
instead read it as a decoy from the actual truth of a violent, meaningless life.  Passages 
such as this (and there are many, scattered throughout the novel) are not intended to be 
read as accurate descriptions of a landscape, but as reminders that the novel itself (both 
universally and particularly) mythologizes what it narrates and that stories are, in the end, 
lies.   
 And yet it is still difficult to read this novel as completely nihilistic or completely 
opposed to the function of fiction.  Even if fairy-tales and myths are insufficient and 
cannot shield either the reader or the characters from a terrible world, Brown still finds 
value in them.  Early in the novel, Brown includes a long treatise on the value of this 
strange mythic storytelling and of his nameless, ageless heroine: 
In a sense – in the poetical way of looking at things, which packs a whole world 
into a symbol, in order to make simple and joyous and comprehensible the 
manifold confusions of life – in a sense the young girl in the boat crossing the 
river is not only all the young women who have crossed the river in time past and 
who will cross it in time to come. […]  She is more, she is all women, all the girl 
children and the old ones who have added their salt drops to the sweet on-flowing 
river of life, and who hate war and women and war-makers with a bitter hatred. 
(TRC 33) 
 
As in his earlier extended metaphor of the river, in which a river does not represent only 
an individual life but “all creation”, Brown is here stretching his metaphorical imagery as 
far as he can; it is not enough for the purposes of this novel to have a heroine who 
represents the confrontation of any given individual with a larger violent world, but she 
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must be “all women”.  The most notable part of this passage, however, is not the wildly 
extended metaphor, but what Brown has to say about symbolism in general: it not only 
makes the world comprehensible, but “joyous”.   Joy is an element not mentioned in 
many of Brown’s other discourses on the value of symbolism (the longest being in “The 
Killing” in Magnus, although it does receive a brief note in Vinland), but in Time in a 
Red Coat it is the entire secret mechanism of the novel.  The entire surface of the novel 
points towards the invalidity of storytelling, the uselessness of fairy-tales, but whether in 
his discussion of symbols or his descriptions of overly precious rural landscapes, Brown 
seems to be making the argument that stories are still worthwhile because they overcome 
confusion with joy. 
 As a statement on the value of fiction, however, “joyous” is perhaps an 
insufficient framework on which to hang a novel, and Brown has more serious underlying 
intentions. Schoene argues that, since the novel’s “strangeness and obscurity make a 
reading along conventional lines problematic” – an easily accepted thesis – the novel 
must be read allegorically.35  He here echoes some of the early reviews, such as that of 
David Profumo, who wrote that the novel “is filled with recurrent figures and shapes 
(spiritual symbols, elemental motifs) which remove the need for extensive historical 
realism”.36  Profumo and Schoene argue that, in weighting his novel so much more 
towards the mythic than the historical, Brown must intend a mythic, rather than historical, 
reading.  As will be shown below, for the purposes of this novel it is a false dichotomy; 
the difficulty with such an interpretation is that the novel, if looked at as myth or 
allegory, loses much of both its contemporary and historical relevance. In order to 
accentuate the allegorical elements of the novel, Schoene appears to accept fully Brown’s 
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authorial interludes as giving new life to the metaphors he employs, such as that of the 
metaphorical river discussed above: “This interweaving of the three distinctly separate 
entities of river, humanity and narrative culminates in a beautiful allegorical description 
of the dynamic complexities of communal identity in general”.37  Schoene employs a 
somewhat reductionist argument here: given that it is impossible to read the novel as 
realist prose – the mode in which the majority of Brown’s fiction can be read – he turns 
to the pointers within the text itself and to Brown’s outward assurance that this work can 
be read as fairy-tale or allegory.  (This recurrent combination and confusion of “myth”, 
“fairy-tale” and “allegory” is troubling in itself, both in the novel and in the criticism that 
follows.  The novel certainly incorporates both mythic and fairy-tale elements, on which 
much of this mode of criticism rests, but it is difficult to argue that the inclusion of 
mythic elements makes the novel mythic in itself.)  Whether in Profumo’s review, in 
which he argues that “sustaining the myth while staving off the fairy-tale is necessary for 
this type of rarefied fiction”,38 or in Schoene’s study, where he calls Time in a Red Coat 
“an unusual text that has more in common with a fairy tale or mythic narrative than the 
traditional novel”,39 the novel has been primarily read as a work of imaginative or even 
fantastical fiction, ignoring Brown’s claims within the text itself that this is an 
insufficient approach. 
Given that the novel is “a very poetical book”, Schoene argues, it is fair to assume 
that “it is based on the allegorical poem with which it concludes”.40  The poem itself 
appears in drafts as early as January 1979, and the whole of the novel is imbued with its 
language and themes.  In this poem, the various repeated images of the novel are shown 
to be representative of the natural elements: the dragon, for instance, stands not only for 
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war but also for fire.  If the novel were indeed to be drawn backwards from this poem, its 
thesis would appear to be that the balance between elements, between war and peace, 
modernity and pastoral life, is what makes the world whole - “In the garden four 
creatures / Dwelling together. / […] Come fish, speak to the dragon. / Come fish, first, / 
The horse and the bird will follow” (TRC 248-9).  The poem points towards an elemental 
unity; while the girl has been searching to destroy the dragon of violence throughout the 
novel, a retroactive application of this allegorical poem would imply that the girl’s 
struggle has been useless, for violence is a necessary aspect of the world.  As made clear 
in the early draft of the final chapter cited above, the dragon wins, and violence not only 
cannot be eradicated, but is necessary for the construction of the narrative.  Schoene, 
interestingly, is not willing to go this far in his reading of the novel as allegorical, and it 
is this hesitation that makes his argument difficult to accept; for one to read the novel as 
an allegory, it must be an allegory of something.  He argues that “the function of the girl 
in the allegory […] exceeds that of mere representation”;41 but it is unclear what the non-
representational aspect of the girl’s function might be.  This is an intentional ellipsis on 
Brown’s part: just as the reader is reminded that metaphors fail and are insufficient, so 
too Brown makes it impossible to read the novel as a straight allegory; it is too vague in 
its overall scope and too specific in its individual moments, too varied in its forms and 
too aware of its limitations for such a reading to be successful.   
This ending poem – in a late draft, the poem was in fact kept as a separate 
epilogue – which is itself clearly allegorical, even if it does not retroactively make the 
entire novel into an allegory, is interestingly contrasted with Eavan Boland’s 1974 poem 
“The War Horse”, from which Brown appears to take much of his imagery in the novel.  
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The poem concerns individual refusal to engage in larger political concerns and the desire 
of the individual to stay safe within community and avoid the threat of violence.  There is 
“nothing unusual” about the war horse, the “casual / Iron of his shoes as he stamps death / 
Like a mint on the innocent coinage of the earth”.42  The images here are markedly 
similar to Time in a Red Coat, where mint, coins and earth reappear in almost every 
chapter.  The image of violence and destruction as “nothing unusual” is also repeated in 
the novel and is indeed perhaps the fundamental thesis of the novel, but Boland uses it far 
more pointedly, as a way to illustrate how people can look away from war:  
But we, we are safe, our unformed fear  
Of fierce commitment gone; why should we care 
 
If a rose, a hedge, a crocus are uprooted 
Like corpses, remote, crushed, mutilated? 
 
[…] That rose he smashed frays 
Ribboned across our edge, recalling days 
 
Of burned countryside, illicit braid: 
A cause ruined before, a world betrayed.43 
 
In this relatively simple poem, Boland localises the destructive forces of violence in order 
to make them immediate to both the narrator and the reader and illustrate how they can be 
overlooked.  If more despairing than Brown’s poem, in which the separated elements are 
invited to “come back, follow the song” to “the lost garden” (TRC 248), Boland’s poem 
is also much clearer in its imagery and in its sense of the continuance of destruction and 
the human need to look away.  These themes, as well as the majority of images from 
“The War Horse”, are incorporated in Brown’s novel, but only form a small part of his 
larger project.  Brown is using the greater scope of a novel not only to make an 
allegorical point about the nature of violence, but also to explore how it is that literature 
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is made to serve these points.  His novel is to a great extent self-reflexive; it is finally a 
novel that explores the twin strains of myth and realism which have been present in all of 
Brown’s previous writings and attempts to find a synthesis between the two modes.  
Brown is also using the form of a novel to make a statement about the ways in which 
time and narrative are portrayed in fiction, and how these elements are constructed.  Time 
in a Red Coat is no less a meta-novel than the works of John Barth or Italo Calvino, 
despite its apparent simplicity and ideological focus.  It is, for all of its internal confusion, 
one of Brown’s most adamant statements on the value of story-telling. 
 Strangely, it is this very focus on story-telling within the novel that Douglas 
Gifford believes limits it.  For Gifford, in works such as this Brown “becomes a great 
exploiter of the past, a traditional storyteller, at the same time as he disqualifies himself 
from being taken as a valid commentator on his own day.  He believes in the superiority 
of the past.”44  It is this very reading of the novel, and of all of his works, which Brown is 
trying to undermine in his authorial intrusions.  It is not only that this meta-fictional 
device “dismantle[s] the sense of narrative time”,45 as Profumo argues, but that they exist 
in order to disrupt the too-familiar notion of Brown as a traditional storyteller who merely 
taps into a pre-existing cache of quasi-mythic material.  As Stephen Bann writes, in 
passages such as that concerning the metaphorical relevance of rivers, Brown “questions 
and undercuts his rhetorical effects” in order to “show us the contrasting process” 
between the poet and the storyteller.46  For Bann, it is Brown the primitive story-teller 
who uses rivers as a metaphor for life and forests as one for time, and Brown the modern 
poet who reflects on the inability of such worn and hackneyed images to carry their full 
weight.  Brown himself – or rather, the narrator – continually laments that his work is not 
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the equal of Dante or Tolstoy or Shakespeare, that he, who has “never seen a shot fired” 
(TRC 137), is unable to properly describe a battle or coin a new metaphor with the weight 
of the older ones he cites.  Indeed, his work seems opposed to the more positive reviews 
which followed, in which Brown’s metaphorical river is claimed to be used “with a 
sureness born of its poetic truth and aptness, as effectively as Eliot or Frost”.47  At the 
end of this long passage on the river of life, Brown writes, “It would be tedious to follow 
the river any further, though in the course of this tale – which is like a river too – we will 
have to go downstream a little” (TRC 32).  Within this context, in a discussion of how the 
metaphor of a river was once true but is now outworn, Brown is directly criticising his 
own storytelling.  “This tale” is like a river not only in the way it progresses from a small 
beginning to a potentially greater end, but in its very inability, like that metaphor, to 
strike the reader as new.  In Bann’s parsing, it is the poet who reveals this, a revelation 
which does not reduce the novel to pure irrelevance but instead foregrounds the 
mechanisms behind its creation towards a greater end. 
 What this greater end might be is the primary difficulty of the novel, for as much 
as Brown foregrounds its construction, he is rarely willing to hint at its purpose, if that 
purpose is larger than a statement against the threat of nuclear war.  However, the novel’s 
experimental edge and its teleological bent come into focus when the overall structure of 
each chapter is examined.  Almost every chapter in the final version is titled vaguely: 
“River”, “The Inn”, “Forest”, “The Mountain Village” and so on.  In each, Brown begins 
with a discussion of the metaphoric possibilities of such an object or location.  In “The 
Inn”, for example, Brown writes that: 
It is a worn metaphor, too, that sees life as an inn, a hostelry where we stay for a 
few nights, warming us at the fire with mulled wine, sitting at the broad table with 
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strangers that one will never see again – and yet Fate has drawn this assorted 
company together, for purposes that we delight to speculate on; or it was simply 
an accident, a fortuitous coming together, with little or no meaning: a grey 
congress. (TRC 42) 
 
There are a number of notable aspects to this opening.  Firstly, the style of writing in this 
passage, and in the novel as a whole, is markedly different from that of the bulk of 
Brown’s fiction, which (with the exception of his earliest work) is filled with single-
sentence paragraphs and a limited lexicon, pointing towards a simplicity of style which 
reflects the apparent simplicity of the lives being described.  Here Brown’s prose loops 
and flows, drawing on both the specific possibilities of the metaphor at hand (the “mulled 
wine”) and yet accepting that the metaphor itself is partially unsuitable, pointing neither 
to Fate nor Chance and ultimately inconclusive.  Seven types of humanity are to be 
viewed in this metaphoric inn, not because humanity is most easily divided into seven 
types, but because seven is “a number that is beautiful and mysterious in itself, and seems 
to be man’s favourite among the ten ciphers” (TRC 42).  Brown announces that this 
metaphor, both in its broad scope and its particularities, is ultimately arbitrary, no better 
or worse than any other comprehensive image of what life may be like.  It is a way to 
speak about the nature of humanity, but it is no better or worse than any other way; the 
Inn is as good, and as bad, a comprehensive image as a Forest or a River or a Mountain 
Village. 
 The narrative voice thus alerts the reader to the arbitrary nature of the project; if 
Brown himself admits that the metaphor of the Inn is imperfect, the reader cannot 
comfortably accept it, despite the fact that Brown unravels the metaphor over two pages.  
Brown then makes a surprising shift, however, in the transition from “the inn-keeper” to 
“the present inn-keeper”, who, while a minor character in the overall scheme of the 
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novel, is given a detailed personal history, a wife was a “constant joy and comfort” who 
is now dead, an old fear of a “locust-cloud” of an army. Brown then switches tone again 
to give a mystical view of the situation, in which, as in Magnus, the present is seen as an 
echo of the life of Christ: “in such a place as this had the new time begun, the Light and 
the Way and the Word” (TRC 48).  This Christological passage begins as a part of the 
inn-keeper’s imaginings, but then reverts back to the narrative voice seen at the beginning 
of the chapter: “It did not occur to the old man, whose hands were blue with cold, what 
an equivocal part in the story that other inn-keeper had played” (TRC 48).  The narrator 
takes this moment to retell the story of Christ’s birth, with a focus on the inn-keeper.  In 
six pages, then, Brown takes the reader through three readings of a given situation: the 
inn is poetic metaphor; it is an actual (realistic) inn; it is an echo of the life of Christ.  The 
remainder of the chapter, which is slightly more concerned with narrative movement than 
this first portion, places the heroine in the same range of possible interpretations: she is 
Mitzi, the inn-keeper’s dead wife; she is the snow princess of a child’s fairy-tale; she is a 
ghost; she is the bearer of news.  In this chapter Brown continually balances the vague 
with the specific, the metaphorical with the realistic, all the while calling the reader’s 
attention to the unsuitability of any one of these readings.    
In a recent article on Henry James’s difficulty in writing about modernity, 
Michael Wood claims that “James’s vagueness is in its way a tribute to the real, a sign he 
has not escaped into fable”.48  This is a troubling assertion: it runs counter to the basic 
intuition that reality is anchored in specificity, and that the more particular a given text 
may be, the more successful it is in establishing itself as realistic.  For both Wood and 
Brown, however, reality is itself far more fluid, anchored no less in vagueness than 
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specificity.  Brown’s purpose in a chapter such as this – and, to a certain extent, the novel 
is comprised of nothing but chapters such as this – is to make his own tribute to the real 
through the entire range of narrative and poetic possibilities.  By combining these myriad 
perspectives, yet foregrounding their faults, Brown is trying to find a new way to tell a 
story, one that is not worn, not by inventing a wholly new style but by telling the same 
story again and again in many different ways, so that, perhaps, one of them, or the 
combination of all of them, will approach the truth.  The girl in the red coat appears as all 
different things not out of a fault of perspective, or out of Brown’s inability to reduce her 
to a single metaphor, but because she is all things: if the reader is to take Brown’s 
statement that the girl is “all […] who hate war” (TRC 33) seriously, then Brown must 
demonstrate the completeness of that “all”, as he attempts to do throughout the novel.  
For Brown, then, the giant, vague metaphors of Inn and River are not insufficient because 
they are “worn” so much as because they are partial, because they only hint at a fullness 
and complexity that traditional narrative cannot encompass.  In writing Time in a Red 
Coat as a mixture of fable and realism, myth and history, Brown is attempting to find a 
new way of story-telling which is not confined by traditional modes of interpretation. 
 This is certainly a brave, if fool-hardy, project.  It is notable that Brown focuses 
his authorial interventions on metaphor for, from a Ricoeurian perspective, the “meaning-
effects” of both metaphor and narrative “belong to the same basic phenomenon of 
semantic innovation”.49  For Paul Ricoeur – whose work Schoene innovatively applies in 
his interpretation of the novel – metaphor and narrative both “invent the privileged means 
by which we re-configure our confused, unformed, and at the limit mute temporal 
experience”.50  That is, both metaphor and narrative (or plot) make, by means of 
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language, the virtually intangible experience of time more tangible.   For Ricoeur, as 
Sanford Schwartz points out, metaphor and narrative both exist not on the level of the 
word, but the sentence; both narrative and metaphor have “the referential function of 
redescribing reality by proposing connections that call into question the existing order of 
our semantic fields”.51  This calls into play the relationship between the specific and the 
vague described above; as in that instance, metaphor does not take the reader out of 
reality (in this case, into fable), but rather redescribes reality, or better reorients the reader 
in relation to reality, in order to convey a new perspective on past events.  Metaphor and 
narrative are ways of redescribing time, a phenomenon which cannot, for Ricoeur, be 
described simply or accurately without the palimpsest of textual innovation.  The purpose 
of this layering is to circumvent the Heideggerian suspicion, discussed above, that art is 
no longer a direct bearer of truth.  As Ricoeur argues, if “metaphor is that strategy of 
discourse by which language divests itself of its function of direct description in order to 
reach the mythic level where its function of discovery is free […] we can presume to 
speak of metaphorical truth in order to designate the ‘realistic’ intention that belongs to 
the redescriptive power of poetic language”.52  Metaphor is thus a way to approach more 
closely that which is real by combining it with the mythic.   
 Whether through metaphor or narrative, this structuring is centred around a 
central truth claim which, for Ricoeur, reflects the “temporal character of human 
experience”.53  Ricoeur is thus fundamentally interested in the second of Heidegger’s two 
senses of history, that which is concerned not with the objectified past but with lived 
experience, specifically lived experience as understood through time.  Time itself and, 
following it, human temporal experience, is for Ricoeur a necessarily inconclusive 
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experience/phenomenon which only narrative has the power to explain or make tangible.  
Narrative achieves this in part through artifice. Just as Heidegger and Lukács argued 
towards a notion of ahistorical history, Ricoeur finds that chronology is directly opposed 
to temporality and that it is “necessary to confess what is other than time in order to be in 
a position to give full justice to human temporality”.54  This initially appears to be a 
privileging of a mythic/metaphorical perspective on human experience which in some 
way surmounts that which is “real” or true.  For Ricoeur, however, this “confession” 
deepens the human experience of time: time becomes human – which is to say 
perceptible and tangible – through its encapsulation in narrative. Similarly, “narrative 
attains its full meaning when it becomes a condition of temporal existence”.55  This 
symbiotic relationship is required because without narrative (or more specifically, what 
Ricoeur terms “emplotment”, the understanding of time and history through narrative) the 
human experience of time is paradoxical.  Metaphor and narrative are thus seen as 
organising principles for the experience of time, without which time itself cannot be fully 
experienced. 
 Ricoeur’s argument in the first volume of Time and Narrative is largely 
concerned with the writing of history, rather than fiction.  White builds upon these ideas 
in order to argue that “history and literature speak indirectly about the aporetic 
experiences of temporality by means of and through signifiers that belong to different 
orders of being, real events on the one side, imaginary events on the other”.56  For White, 
the idea of narrative is basic to both history, as the study of the real, and myth or fiction, 
as the study of the imaginary: it is only recently that “storytelling [… has] come under the 
injunction to keep the two orders unmixed in discourse”.57  White goes on to argue that 
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narrative history has become a dominant, if discredited, mode of relating the real because 
historians desire to show that ‘real’ events have the fullness and coherence of imaginary 
ones.  There is no access to the past except through the imaginative or narratival process: 
any history which claims to represent the ‘real’ directly is misguided.  Narrative is thus 
suspect but still integral to an understanding of history.  As he writes: “How else [other 
than through narrative] can any past […] be represented in either consciousness or 
discourse except in an ‘imaginary’ way?”58 
Even as White and Ricoeur problematise the relation between history and 
narrative, they still elide the role of the storyteller or narrator, the constructor of the 
explanatory narrative.  As David Carr argues, narrative of any sort requires a storyteller, a 
narrator who knows what is upcoming and who is capable of organising the temporal 
sequences of experience into a plot.  Narrative is not only constitutive of history, but of 
“social time”; a community, for instance, can only be known through recognition of its 
own narrative.  For Carr, this storyteller achieves full potential in his interaction with 
both audience and protagonist: this combination is, for Carr, constitutive of community.59  
Carr removes much of the force of White and Ricoeur’s arguments in his apparent 
assumption that narrative, history and community can all be approached as undivided, 
nonsuspect wholes.  As has been repeatedly shown above, from Hegel on, history and art 
cannot be approached unproblematically, but must always be read against and through 
each other.  However, Carr’s focus on the role of the storyteller in the framework of 
narrative creation offers significant insights into Brown’s project.  A combination of 
Ricoeur, White and Carr’s views on narrative history has enormous explanatory power 
for a project such as Time in a Red Coat. 
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 Brown foregrounds the authorial structuring of events through his mixture of 
narrative and metaphor.   In a chapter such as “The Inn” Brown highlights the limitless 
ways in which a story could be told, or in which the events could be made a story.  The 
girl herself can also be seen as a story-telling figure, insofar as her journey organises the 
narratives of the lives of the people whom she encounters.  Just as in Carr’s paradigm a 
story-teller is set off from the community, the girl is individualised by the authorial 
influence she exerts on the people around her.  As in Carr’s reading of narrative social 
history, a community is formed by the commonality of being in the story; the function of 
a storyteller is to make communal everything that is not the storyteller.  The conflation of 
myth and history through narrative thus allows a mythic view of a whole and unified 
community.  Brown introduces a layer of self-reflexivity here in order to heighten the 
reader’s conception of this outside structuring.  Brown’s metaphorical intrusions – both 
his comments on the nature of the metaphor and the metaphors themselves – cannot be 
seen as an anti-realist cloaking or a way for Brown to shape history unconsciously for his 
own convenience, as many critics have read them.  Instead, somewhat like Ricoeur, he is 
using metaphor as a way of approaching reality more closely and “redescribing” events in 
order to bring them closer to some notion of truth in order to create a common identity 
for those things he is describing.  For Brown, the shaping of history is what makes it real 
or true and is what makes tangible the human experience of temporality.  Far from using 
myth and metaphor as an escape from history and time, Brown is using these literary 
tropes to approach a discordant reality more fully and perhaps more honestly.  Brown’s 
foregrounding of his own interference is completely necessary for this project to succeed; 
if he were to use the metaphor of the river unchecked, the reader would be lulled into 
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thinking this merely an historical novel with extravagant mythical and metaphorical 
elements, or an equally extravagant myth based in history.  Instead, Brown introduces 
himself as a shaper and narrator who is forced to rely on outworn metaphors.  He does so 
in order to stress that these myths and metaphors are but an approach to reality and that 
history, as read in a novel such as this, is every bit as constructed as the more obvious 
metaphors.  For Brown, no single myth or metaphor or fairytale or historical account is 
capable of conveying the truth; it is in their combination and interaction that some sort of 
truth begins to emerge. 
 Brown most fully conveys this notion in the truly odd chapter “The Magus”, in 
which a secondary author, of a sort, is introduced.  The author in this case is a servant 
known as Erasmus (probably the Erasmus, although this is never clarified) who serves a 
wealthy modern lord (the Magus of the title).  The Magus is a man who finds solace in 
literature, specifically in Blake, Tennyson, Wordsworth, Dryden, Aristophanes, 
Shakespeare and Homer, as well as from the dual threats of his daughter’s death and the 
end of the world.  The Magus, who is almost as ageless, or as old, as the girl (and who, 
like the girl, is on the verge of death), is the defender of war, its archivist and chronicler, 
and keeps a museum of war that goes far into the future as well as the past.  Although this 
chapter is the most grounded in a specific time (the 1870s) of any in the novel, its 
primary characters all live outside of time, watching the ways in which the world turns 
towards war.  The Magus is clearly set up as the heroine’s counterpart: he is a man who 
aestheticises violence, even as he abhors it.  The horrors of nuclear war, for instance, 
“‘are matters that our children and children’s children will have to endure, come what 
may – and who are you, or I, that we should shrink from the terror and the beauty?’” 
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(TRC 187).  The Magus is both a believer in poetry and a doubter of myth.  He believes 
the girl to be mad, “‘judging from her letter, with her talk of being fifteen centuries old, 
and of her mission to reconcile dragon with bird and fish and horse’”, yet, in showing her 
the museum, he sets out to determine if she “‘proves to be a Cordelia or a crazy 
Cassandra’” (TRC 194-5).  The Magus reduces the girl’s story itself to the tropes of 
literature: “‘I think it may be that you see yourself as a symbol for all the world’s 
women’”, he says, and goes on to congratulate the girl on her apt choice of symbol and 
metaphor (TRC 207).  The Magus here stands in for the reader, both in knowledge of the 
wars of the twentieth century and in a desire to compare the plight of the heroine of Time 
in a Red Coat to other fictional characters and to see this story as part of a poetic 
continuum.  His Whiggish friends, however, see the Magus as “a hindrance to the 
resistless course of history, whose end is some Elysium or Tir-Nan-Og or Eden” (TRC 
213).  He is a man who (accurately, as the reader is continually reminded) forecasts 
doom.  The Magus is thus what could be termed a rational thinker, a man who has an 
appreciation for poetry and the workings of myth, and yet sees them as being wholly 
irrelevant to “real” history or to the workings of violence and technology.  The Magus is 
a sceptic, then, not only of the girl but of the novel in which he plays a part, a man who 
believes that myth and history can only dimly and irrelevantly interrelate. 
 The perspective of the Magus is thus layered on top of the girl’s story, offering a 
rational respite from Brown’s myth-making.  The Magus himself, however, is only an 
intermediate layer, for the reader is told his story through the eyes of Erasmus, an even 
more sceptical and disinterested narrator.  Erasmus is “weary” of the war museum, 
“‘though I know that such things must be, and that I may even live […] to suffer them in 
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my own flesh and spirit’” (TRC 213).  “The Magus and his symbols endure” (TRC 214), 
writes Erasmus, but as a narrator he remains disinterested, for the symbols do not 
ultimately intrude on his conception of real life.  For Erasmus, war is too real to be 
symbolised or to be limited in representation to poetry or myth; he is willing to base his 
work upon that of Aldous Huxley, “not yet born” (TRC 225), but cannot see anything 
miraculous in this museum set outside of the time, an amassing of the artefacts of past 
and future.  Erasmus is unwilling to accept the idea, contained within the museum, of 
history as narrative, but is instead only interested in the ways in which it will effect 
individual lives.  Brown thus sets up a three-fold perspective on history: there is Erasmus, 
who sees history as a series of unconnected events; the Magus, who looks to poetry and 
symbols as a respite from the demands of history; and the heroine, who looks at history 
as being in no way separate from myth.  The heroine is only able to achieve this 
perspective because she herself is kept separate from history: she is an observer, rather 
than an active participant.  In the play-script version of this theme – titled alternately 
“She Watches: The Pageant Goes Past Her, Scene after Scene” and “She Lingers, The 
Loom of War Gathers Her In, Scene by Shuttle by Scene” – the girl is kept at a physical 
remove from the events described: “The girl at the side of the stage.  She is compelled to 
witness scenes of war from later times.  Immense shadows, they flicker as on a cinema 
screen.”60  The girl’s perspective thus mirrors that of the reader: rather than being 
involved in the events of history, she only perceives them through an art-like medium.  In 
this contrasting series of perspectives, Brown calls attention to his narrative project in the 
same way that he foregrounds his use of familiar metaphors in earlier chapters: he is 
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pointing to the inability of the novel to offer a definite answer to the questions raised by 
history and violence. 
 His introduction of the Magus and Erasmus allows Brown to state most clearly his 
case against nuclear war (it is not accidental that the final exhibit in the museum is a 
lump of uranium ore, the use of which, presumably, ends history61); it also comes close to 
undermining Brown’s entire project, for it can be seen as the introduction of a certain 
relativism in which myth and symbol can be used as much, or as little, as the reader 
desires.   And yet, as shown repeatedly above, the novel as a whole works towards the 
opposite perspective: in Time in a Red Coat Brown demonstrates the continued relevance 
of myth and symbol in the study of history and their usefulness even for a modern, 
rational mind.   The questions Brown asks in this chapter are much the same as those 
Tolstoy raises at the end of War and Peace (a constant referent throughout the novel), in 
which the movement of history is compared to that of a train: 
A locomotive is moving.  Someone asks: ‘What makes it move?’ The peasant 
answers, ‘’Tis the devil moves it.’  Another man says the locomotive moves 
because its wheels are going round.  A third maintains that the cause of the 
motion lies in the smoke being carried away by the wind.62 
 
For Tolstoy, the movement of both the train and history can only be explained by the 
forces of power.  His three-part interpretation quoted here illustrates the inability of any 
given man, without a broader perspective, to fully understand the movement of history.  
In his own three-part perspective in “The Magus” Brown is offering the wealth of varied 
interpretation without the final solution which Tolstoy gives.   For Brown, the modern 
author cannot, like Tolstoy, ascribe cause and effect, but can only watch the events of 
history and offer possible interpretations.  This is why the end of “The Magus” is both 
frustrating and necessary.  In it, the reader is invited to “imagine three people standing in 
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a group at the door of the ultimate gallery” (TRC 226), the gallery, it is assumed, in which 
the future and the end of humanity are revealed.  The Magus is terrified, for he has seen 
this room before, and Erasmus is disinterested, but the girl enters and locks the door (and 
will emerge, finally, unknown to the other two, in modern-day Orkney).  Erasmus listens 
at the door: 
What I heard after – it may be – an hour, after a bird and flower and bee pause, 
was the sound of the laughter of many children. […] And then I found I had fallen 
into a drowse, on my knees, stooped there outside the door, and the thread of a 
pleasant pastoral dream had passed through me. (TRC 228) 
 
Both in style and sense, this passage is distinct from anything Erasmus has written before, 
and the reader is left not knowing if the future is indeed utopian or if the idea of utopia 
itself is only a shielding dream.  Throughout the passage, both the Magus and the reader 
have mocked those secondary characters who argue that progress will lead to peace and 
that the future holds an end to violence; here, in “the laughter of many children”, that is 
exactly what the future seems to contain.  Thus as much as Brown forecasts a nuclear 
destruction and as much as he stresses the intrinsic nature of violence, there is still hope 
for peace within the novel, even if it is only in a dream.  For Brown, the individual cannot 
know, cannot truly perceive the forces of history, but can only hint at them, through 
narrative and myth find some close approximation of the truth. 
 This ultimate ambiguity concerning history, and even the value of art in the 
interpretation of that history, is something towards which Brown was working in the 
stories published shortly before Time in a Red Coat.   Schoene highlights two stories 
from Andrina and Other Stories which are closely related to the events of Time in a Red 
Coat: “Kings and Shepherds” and “Magi”.  In the first, the great-grandfather of Genghis 
Kahn, here called “the desert king”, is halted in his destruction by a shepherd who 
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reminds the king of his own joy in pastoral life.  For Schoene, the moral of the story is 
“that if people concentrated more on their pristine bond with nature and remembered 
their true identities as shepherds or […] as fisherman, there would be few soldiers left”.63  
This simple allegorical interpretation is born out by the penultimate passage, in which the 
desert king tells his army to turn back because, “‘If we venture too far we will cut off and 
be destroyed.  We will not see our hills or sheep again.’”64  There are two crucial 
elements on which Schoene does not comment, however, which prove the story to be far 
more complicated and subtle than this interpretation suggests.  Firstly, Brown points to 
the delight the soldiers take in war:  
Spectacular things – like dismemberments, impalings, decapitations, the burning 
of cities – that was what delighted the tent-dwellers and hillmen of the east.  That 
was why they followed their king, who had once been a poor man like 
themselves: those amazing carnivals of destruction […] and the sheer joy of 
storming into the dangerous unknown.65 
 
As in Time in a Red Coat, Brown is here making the point that, although there are those, 
such as the girl in the novel or the shepherd in this story, who deplore violence, there are 
also those who enjoy it, and that violence or war cannot be willed away.  Even if these 
soldiers were to concentrate on their bond with nature, it is unlikely that all of them 
would prefer the simple life which Brown is advocating, and in his stories of the glories 
of war and the excitement of violence and destruction, Brown is accepting that violence 
is a necessary counterpart to the pastoral.  The second crucial element follows from this, 
a simple coda: “About a century later the great-grandson of the desert king led his hosts 
into the west.  His name was Genghis Kahn, and he rode further than his simple 
ancestor.”66  Stylistically this passage is far different from the grandeur of the rest of the 
story, the quasi-mythic “armies of the desert king”.  In this almost cinematic revelation, 
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Brown changes the reader’s interpretation of the story entirely: what has just been read is 
not myth or allegory, but a prelude to real historical events.  Brown is thus forcing the 
reader to go back over the story and read it, or reimagine it, not as myth but as history, 
with all of the cultural preconceptions and received knowledge about the life of Kahn.  
Without this coda, the story invites the reading Schoene gives it, a reading which 
highlights its mythic or allegorical elements, and thus keeps it at a remove.  With the 
introduction of familiar historical personages and events at the end, Brown is insisting 
that neither straight history nor straight myth provide an adequate understanding of the 
world: instead, narratives must be read simultaneously as myth and history in order to be 
more completely understood. 
 Brown’s work in both “King and Shepherd” and Time in a Red Coat focuses 
primarily on non-Western cultures, perhaps as a way of making the material appear more 
distant from contemporary life and more limned between myth and history.  Regardless 
of the political inferences which could be drawn from this move, it is a device which 
Brown also uses in stories such as “Magi”, in which heralds of destruction are seen in 
Asian, Africa and Inuit cultures.  “Magi” is too far given to pure pronouncements of the 
nature of violence and history to be fully successful as a story – “‘The same old blood-
stained tear-stained page is read, over and over and over, and re-enacted.  Some day the 
finger of history may turn the page.  On the next page, it may be, there will be a beautiful 
thing written.’”67 – but Brown is here again asserting both the cyclical nature of history 
and the impossibility of understanding it fully either as myth or pure reality, but only as a 
force shaped by narrative.  Oddly, in a description of a culture in which writing is done 
on sheets of silk, as seen at the beginning of the story, Brown uses an anachronistic and 
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acultural metaphor, that of a book, to describe history.  History is wrapped up in written 
narrative, and, for Brown, cannot be understood outside those narrative forces.  This 
becomes more clear in a third story from the same volume, “The Chamber of Poetry”.  
The story is built on a rather contrived conceit: an inn, like the inn in Time in a Red Coat 
both mythic and particular, in which dozens of poets, ranging from Li Po to Hugh 
MacDiarmid, rest and work.  The story is most easily seen as a convenient way for 
Brown to list his influences – rather cheekily, one of the poets featured in the story is 
Terence, the central figure of A Shropshire Lad.  Brown is here further mixing the fabular 
with the authentic; but it is also a statement on the way in which literature affects the 
perception of time and history.  Although the innkeeper burns the leftover poems he 
follows, and leaves the room with a dusty bottle and broken quill, the litany of poets at 
the end indicates, as Douglas Dunn argues, “a belief in poets and poetry which many 
readers will find unreal or sentimental”.68  Surely Brown’s depiction of Wordsworth 
weeping at the sight of a daisy strikes almost any reader as far too sentimental and 
contrived.  Yet this is Brown’s very point: the lives of the poets and their actual histories 
are unconvincing to us; it is instead the narratives they have constructed, the written 
work, which endures and which shapes their world for later readers.  It is literature that 
defines history for the reader. 
 Brown’s focus on the uses of history and the ways in which history is revealed 
through literature are crucial because they inform all of his work, although rarely as 
explicitly as in Time in a Red Coat and Vinland.  If Brown, as examined at greater length 
elsewhere, is primarily a writer of community, then Nancy’s claim that “community itself 
is something historical” must be taken into account.69 There are two ways to read this 
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statement.  The first is the sense found throughout Brown’s work that community is 
predicated on its own history: in his autobiography, for instance, he repeatedly turns to 
the Orkneyinga Saga for its explanatory power.  Tradition, literature and historico-
geographical rootedness comprise a community in this first understanding.  But 
community is also history as happening.  Nancy draws on both Ricoeur and Heidegger in 
this argument: for the latter, “history has its essential importance neither in what is past 
nor in the ‘today’ and its ‘connection’ with what is past, but in that authentic historising 
of existence which arises from Dasein’s future”.70  For Nancy: 
history is community, that is, the happening of a certain space of time – as a 
certain spacing of time, which is the spacing of a “we.”  This spacing gives space 
to community and spaces it, which means that it exposes it to it(self).  And this is 
the explanation for this very simple and obvious fact: for why history was never 
thought as the compilation of individual stories but always as the proper and 
singular mode of common existence, which is itself the proper mode of 
existence.71 
 
History then is important not because of its factual relation to the past, nor for its ability 
to illuminate the present, but because history is the way in which communities exist.  
History is the way in which people live in common.  This is thoroughly illustrated in 
Time in a Red Coat, in which the girl who is freed from history is also freed from 
community: without history, there is only the individual.  Thus, while a novel such as 
Time in a Red Coat initially seems as distant as possible from Greenvoe or the early 
stories, the themes addressed are identical, only addressed from opposite directions.  In 
all of his work, Brown is attempting to explain how it is that people co-exist.  In these 
two later novels, he looks to history as a way of explaining what Nancy calls the spacing 
of community, or the way in which a community is revealed to itself, as itself and for 
itself.  Without history, there is no self-understanding.   
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B. Myth and History in Vinland 
 Brown returned to his exploration of the nature of history in his later novel 
Vinland.  Unlike Time in a Red Coat, Vinland is not constructed around an argument on 
the uses of narrative, but is instead, according to Brown, intended to be read as “a boys’ 
story”,72 a simple, conventional historical adventure.73  Yet the traces of narrative 
emplotment and of the interaction of myth and history continue.  Vinland initially strikes 
the reader as the most linear of Brown’s novels and the work which seems least like a 
collection of short stories.  Like Beside the Ocean of Time, it is centred on the life of one 
man, Ranald Sigmundson, from early boyhood until death, but unlike that novel, Vinland 
moves straightforwardly through time, chronicling Ranald’s adventures in a linear 
progression.  It is thus tempting to see Vinland as Brown’s least experimental novel, no 
more, really, than an adventure story.  Yet the novel quickly begins to strike the reader as 
strange: Ranald’s life not only encompasses the change from Viking to Christian culture 
in the Orkneys, but seemingly every important event in the medieval north, from Leif 
Ericson’s discovery of America to the events described in the Orkneyinga Saga.  As 
shown in the previous chapter, the events in Vinland prefigure not only Magnus the saint, 
but Magnus the novel.  (Indeed, Jonathan Coe has argued that the symbolic use of 
Vinland is “a natural equivalent of the ‘seamless coat’ after which St Magnus was 
searching in the earlier novel”.74)  Although it is not impossible to interpret the novel as a 
sequence of exciting adventures, Brown is also experimenting with the ways in which 
literature conveys the perception of time and event. 
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 As Julian D’Arcy points out, it is surprising, in reflection on the novel, that the 
sequence detailing the settlement of America only occupies eleven pages.75  Just as Time 
in a Red Coat can be seen as an argument against nuclear armament, largely through the 
chapter “The Magus”, the “Vinland” chapter of the later novel forms one of Brown’s 
most direct arguments for the value of environmental preservation.  This argument is 
made, in a way which echoes Lukács’s reading of Scott, by allowing characters to 
express themselves in wholly anachronistic ways.  Leif Ericson points towards the 
Indians’ (“skraelings”) ecologically sound lifestyle, and forecasts that coming generations 
will fail to continue such a lifestyle: 
‘But I think it will come to this in the end’, said Leif later, ‘that men will devise 
weapons to kill even the greatest whale.  The skraelings, that we thought so 
savage and ignorant, were wiser than us in this respect. […] Did you not see what 
reverence the Vinlanders had for the animals and the trees and for all living 
things?  It seemed to me that the Vinlanders had entered into a kind of sacred 
bond with all the creatures, and there was a fruitful exchange between them, both 
in matters of life and death.’ (V 24) 
 
This is clearly not a statement which could have been made by the real Leif Ericson, but 
instead relies on the reader’s knowledge of contemporary events, and the reader’s 
sympathies towards a certain environmental politics.  Ericson’s speech here is predicated 
on the literature of environmental apocalypse which came into being, following the work 
of Rachel Carson, largely in the 1970s and 80s, as well as what Greg Garrard terms the 
“biocentric inhumanism” of novelists such as D.H. Lawrence.76  Brown is here 
foregrounding a necessary irony in this sort of historical fiction, in which the truth value 
of Ericson’s words is necessarily unknown to the speaker but is known to the reader and 
can be applied by the reader to contemporary life.  This anachronism could be said to 
take the reader out of the novel, because it requires an ability to look at the historical 
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events described therein both as set in the past and interpretable by the present, but it also 
stresses the symbolic nature of this first episode, in which Vinland is seen not as, 
necessarily, a real place (for throughout the remainder of the novel, many of the people 
Ranald encounters do not entirely believe his stories) but as a symbol.  For D’Arcy, 
Vinland is symbol of “promise” and “possibility”, as well as of “Ranald’s aspirations and 
the duality of man’s nature”.77  It is also, in the light of the experiments Brown worked 
into Time in a Red Coat, a symbol of history itself, a history that remains isolated and 
untouched and which does not need the layering of fiction to bear truth. 
 Brown begins to accomplish the second symbolic layering of Vinland through the 
presence of a bard (Ard, the rhyme making the name an unmistakable pun) as the Vikings 
leave Vinland, so that the reader’s final glimpse of these events comes through a 
secondary filter of literature.  The poem composed for the Norsemen as they leave is one 
of mourning, both for Bjorn, a man killed by the natives (“Now, Bjorn, may the savages / 
Keep your bright hair”) and for a primitive way of life which he represents (“Your heart, 
your hands strong / For tree-hewing, oar-hauling / Sowing barley in broken sillions”) (V 
22).  Bjorn is here being used to represent a pastoral form of life, a lifestyle which 
informs almost all of Brown’s works.  With his death, however, coupled with Ericson’s 
speech discussed above, Brown is indicating that the life of the Vikings is necessarily 
doomed as much as the life of the Indians.  Ard’s poem functions as an elegy for a 
lifestyle the fate of which Brown will continue to explore for the remainder of the novel.  
Although Brown does not appear in the novel as a foregrounded narrator, as he does in 
Time in a Red Coat, or even through the authorial introductions of philosophy and 
anthropology in Magnus, there is nevertheless a trace here of what Bakhtin would call a 
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“polyphonic novel”, a novel in which “the dialogical relation between the characters is, in 
effect, developed to the point of including the relation between the narrator and his/her 
characters.”78  Brown, in his depiction of two vanishing cultures, engages with the reader 
(and possibly the characters) through issues about which the characters know nothing; he 
is writing from a necessarily foreign and ahistorical perspective in order to make the 
symbolic world of Vinland as present to the reader as the more literal configuration of 
that world.  As Ricoeur argues: “Only the confrontation between the world of the text and 
the life-world of the reader will make the problematic of narrative configuration tip over 
into that of the refiguration of time by narrative”.79  That is, Brown is willing to show the 
difficulties of the layering of history within the text by engaging the reader with that 
which is not in the text, with a knowledge of historical events that follow on from what is 
presented here.  There is no way for the reader to approach this novel without a 
knowledge of the death of agrarian societies and of the claims made upon the Americas 
by European society.  In passages such as Ard’s poem and Ericson’s speech, Brown is 
forcing the reader to engage with her knowledge of events outside the sphere of the novel 
in order to understand more fully the way in which time and history, as well as myth, are 
presented within the novel. 
 In the above-quoted passage, Ricoeur is drawing on Lukács, transferring his 
theories about the ways in which the novel portrays the interaction between individual 
and society to the ways in which the individual interacts with time.  For Lukács, given the 
impossibility of any novel actually approaching a total representation of the world, 
objective representation becomes impossible: “if this world is to evoke a totality […] 
then some form of artistic concentration is again necessary and any straightforward 
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copying of reality must be resolutely abandoned”.80  For Ricoeur, this impossibility 
extends to time as well; time within the novel cannot be a mirror of time outside the 
novel, the “time of narration” and “narrated time” are not the same, but exist in a 
complex relation.81  While Brown does not reflect on these questions within the course of 
the novel, as he does in Time in a Red Coat, he nevertheless proposes a solution, a bridge 
between the time presented in the novel and the necessity of accepting an outside time in 
which both Brown and the readers exist.  Brown’s bridge is, not surprisingly, myth, 
specifically the power of myth to make the particular vague and, in so doing, to make it 
more closely related to the truth.    This is undoubtedly an initially contradictory impulse: 
most readers (and writers) might assume that the work of an historical novel is to invest 
the broad scope of past time with insight into particular moments and individuals.  For 
Brown, though, the very opposite is true: just as the individual is most fully revealed 
through the community in which he dwells, history is most truthfully told when it merges 
with myth.  And yet this solution raises more problems than it answers, for Brown rarely 
wrote pure mythology or fairy-tale.82  Here, however, he is more interested in the way 
that literature interprets past events and in the layering of myth and actuality which 
constitutes art.  As in Time in a Red Coat, Brown’s interest in Vinland is not so much on 
historical events but on modern conceptualisations of those events, including the ones 
formed through the reading of this novel.  Vinland is, in parts, a meditation on the 
responsibility of an author to historical fact and to greater, if more vague, truths. 
 This somewhat meta-fictional focus is most clearly showcased at the start of the 
chapter “Breckness”.  The preceding chapter, “Ireland”, is a brief depiction of a battle 
fought between Sigtrygg, the King of Dublin and ultimately victorious Brian Boru, the 
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King of Ireland.  Even in this setting, Ranald looks back to Vinland not as a lived 
experience, but as an informing myth.  He reflects that:  
The skraelings in Vinland had seemed, of all men, to be a part of that most 
intricate delicate web that ‘the great spirit’ had made, in the beginning, for the 
delight of all his creatures. 
‘And yet,’ thought Ranald, ‘it is possible to be made one with nature now, in the 
time of youth, on an Irish hillside, with battle horns blorting around, and the clash 
of swords and the shouts of victory and the groans of dying men…’ Again it came 
to him, the image of the plough and the cornstalk at Breckness in Orkney, and a 
girl sewing a patch on a homespun coat. (V 96) 
 
Vinland is relevant to Ranald’s life, then, not as a moment in his past, but as a 
representation of an ideal life which he hopes to replicate in another place, at another 
time.  Here the reader can see how the concept of history has shifted in Ranald’s 
imagination from lived experience to the objectified, or aestheticised (in the form of a 
self-consciously mythologized) past.  The actual relation of the Indians with nature is less 
important than their idealised relation, and the moment of Ranald’s encounter with 
another race is less lasting than the conceptualisations of them he brings forth from it.  
Memory here trumps reality; myth trumps the actual.  As Brown takes pains to 
demonstrate, however, the relation between history and history-based myth works 
simultaneously in two directions.  Ranald’s experience in Vinland has become a present 
myth, an ideological stance based on, but also removed from, his actual lived experience.  
The idealised, quasi-mythic Vinland, however, has the ability to affect the character’s 
future, as Ranald looks to incorporate not the actual elements of Vinland into his life in 
the Orkneys, but those elements more closely related to his mythic interpretation of the 
past.  This myth even influences Ranald’s perspective on the events surrounding him at 
the given moment, a battle in Ireland, improbable as that may be.  For Brown (through 
Ranald), the past becomes instantly transformed into myth in order that it may offer a 
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mythic gloss on the present, an ability for the individual to distance himself from 
surrounding events and reflect on them through an almost novelistic, authorial stance.   
 A few years later, back in the Orkneys, Ranald hears a poet’s rendition of the Irish 
battle in which he fought.  The poet himself is a spectral figure, unfixed to any particular 
location: “‘I don’t belong anywhere,’ he said.  ‘I go here and there, and I’m not beholden 
to anyone for food or drink or shelter.  The poem is everything’” (V 113-4).  The poet is 
thus fully objective insofar as he speaks not out of experience but out of the needs of art, 
but he is also fully subjective, in that his art pays his way through society.  Although he 
speaks of being merely a bearer of the truth that is encapsulated in the poem, he also 
relies upon his storytelling abilities for his livelihood.  For Brown, the poet has an 
especial ability to abstract the concrete, to give meaning to events outside of the way they 
have impacted upon individual lives.  Even Ranald, whose life story is centred on the 
abstraction and mythologization of his own past, cannot speak the abstracted truth about 
the event.  When he offers to evaluate the validity of the poem, the nameless poet says: 
‘I know that you were at Contarf. […] But for all you knew about it, about the 
true essential meaning of the event, you might as well have been at the horsefair 
in Dounby.   You are as ignorant of the meaning of war as old Sverr the smith 
who stayed at home beside the forge and anvil. […]  What concerns me […] is 
not only this battle in Ireland that was fought between the river and the headland.  
It is about every battle that was ever fought or that ever will be fought.  It has 
nothing to do with glory or heroism, my poem.  It is a very black ballad.’ (V 114) 
 
Here the poet unites the authorial perspective of Time in a Red Coat and Vinland; the 
perspective of the outsider and the will to abstraction are more closely aligned with the 
truth than individual experience can be.  Rather than seeing a given event as such, such a 
battle is seen as part of a larger scheme, each battle is any or every battle.  For Brown, 
truth is not entrusted to pure historical recountings, but to their layered versions that 
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come through literature.  The poem the poet recites is far different from that of Ard, 
quoted above.  It is not only less heroic, less elegiac, less concerned with the 
particularities of the moment on which it reflects, but it also blends a visceral vision of 
warfare (“The guts hot with gore, /  Slimed with death-silver.”) with a more mythic, even 
religious, view (“I saw the death-sisters, / War-maidens, at their weaving / Of the war-
web”) (V 115, 114).  The language Brown uses here, with its heavy reliance on 
compounds and alliteration, is in keeping with poetry of the period, but the effect is far 
more contemporary; not only is the poet an outsider to the events described, but he is also 
outside the time and culture of the novel’s setting, standing in, as it seems, for Brown 
himself.  Brown in this passage highlights both a given poet in a given hall and also his 
own project in writing an historical novel which sidesteps the majority of that tradition. 
In the voice of the poet, Brown is advancing an argument that it is only from the outside 
and only through a limn of reflection which incorporates fact and myth equally that the 
truth can be approached.  The task of this unnamed poet is that of Brown himself: to 
reinterpret the past in such a way that it is relevant to the present, both in its particularity 
and its abstracted symbols. 
 Continuing this theme of a truth which is mediated through art rather than being 
based on personal experience, Brown makes the Edenic symbolism of Vinland most 
explicit through the same nameless poet.  Although this conceptualisation of Vinland as 
“an earthly emanation of some divine harmony”83 has been building since the beginning 
of the novel, it is only through the poet that the mythic significance of this image is fully 
realised, as the poet sings at length “of that land in the western ocean where is no winter 
or sickness, no hunger or withering, no battle or black whispers” (V 116).  The poet is 
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singing explicitly of Tir-nan-og, but yet, in the imagination of Ranald (and perhaps the 
reader), this vision takes shape as an idealised version of Vinland, another western land, 
already somewhat mythic, in which: 
There is no work to be done, for the orchard trees are heavy with fruit always and 
the fields – innocent of plough or harrows or scarecrow – are forever ripe towards 
harvest.  And then the immortal young in that blessed place move along together 
in small groups, wisdom and beauty come from their lips, a courteous and most 
live exchange of utterance, so that their language is nearer to song than speech. (V 
116) 
 
If one takes into account the early-twentieth-century theory that “Vinland” was derived 
from Ireland,84 the interflux between Vinland and Celtic myth becomes inescapable.  The 
point for Brown is not that Vinland itself was an Edenic place, despoiled by Viking 
invasion, but that its true significance lies in its symbolic use rather than in its reality.  
Vinland as a myth or symbol shapes the rest of Ranald’s life, because the myth is 
stronger than lived experience.  For Brown abstraction and the myth unconceal the truth 
even as in their layerings they initially appear to conceal it.  In making historical events 
something more than what they actually were they reveal their inner nature. 
 The use of mythic images, especially those of the loom and the garden which 
reappear in so much of Brown’s work, symbolising unity with God and unity with the 
land respectively, is most forcefully stated towards the end of the novel in a long speech 
by Peter the abbot on the novel’s stated themes of fate and free will.  The abbot speaks of 
a symbolic garden through which all humanity passes, and in which they are “possessed 
with a joy that [they] cannot explain or comprehend […] the whole of a man’s life is 
pervaded by sweetnesses that have no physical or mental source, they touch his mind and 
heart and spirit even in places of stone and thorn” (V 186).  This notion, which owes a 
great deal to the Heidegger’s concept of Ereignis, serves to make what once was tangible 
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in Ranald’s life wholly into something ethereal.  From this avowedly Christian 
perspective, the actual Vinland towards which Ranald has been struggling to return is 
quite literally immaterial; it instead only represents “joy” and “sweetness”.  Here the 
reader sees another instance of the concept expressed in Time in a Red Coat that the 
larger use of symbolism is to express joy.  As in the previous novel, it remains an 
unsatisfactory explanation of Brown’s literary motivations, but through these two novels 
he has more fully explicated the ways in which symbol and history are necessarily 
interconnected.  For Brown, then, symbols are worth no more on their own than history; 
it is only in their relation that both achieve meaning and become more accurate bearers of 
truth.  Thus, at his death, Ranald speaks of returning to Vinland, as he has throughout the 
novel, but then says: “‘But I’m not sailing to Vinland.  The island lies away beyond 
Vinland.  I have it all mapped in my head’” (V 230).  The imaginary mental destination 
has at this point become as real and as plausible as the physical one, in part because that 
physical destination has itself rescinded into myth.  Ranald has followed the abbot’s 
advice about believing in a garden, an Eden, and thus even at the point where his Edenic 
past is far removed, he still makes it his destination. 
 Clearly Brown’s thesis in this latter portion of the novel is primarily concerned 
with Christian ideas of faith and free will; as much as it traces the life of one man, it is 
also the story of a spiritual journey from a belief in fate to a trust in free will.  However, 
given all that has come before, it is difficult not to see the novel as being concerned with 
the uses of literature and myth in daily life.  It is extremely tempting to argue that in these 
two novels (and by extension the majority of his fiction), Brown is arguing in favour of 
this mythic, symbolic level of being: that the transformation of the physical Vinland into 
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a spiritual ideal is right and proper; that war is best seen not as individual conflict but as a 
dragon.  The mythic is a way to approach a comprehensive truth of being which cannot 
be grasped in its totality.  In an early version of the passage cited above, Peter the abbot 
argues that: “The whole totality of early existance (sic) can only be weighed and 
estimated by the wisdom and lore that is before the beginning and after the end.  We see, 
as it were through the slit window of a little cell, and we make guesses at where the 
whole truth might reside – a very prideful and stupid presumption on our part.”85  The 
mythic may not be empirically validated, but it allows the individual to be “made aware 
[of] a great circumambient glory”; the value of the mythic is not in itself, but in the way 
in which it points to an invisible whole.  This explanatory function of myth has to a 
certain extent been placed at the centre of the predominant critical and popular view of 
Brown’s work, as will be shown in the next chapter’s discussion of Greenvoe and 
mythologies of community.  However, as in Magnus, Brown is careful always to keep 
present the rude actualities of lived experience, especially political experience, in order to 
demonstrate that this heightened symbolic life is not in itself complete.  In this final 
chapter, for instance, when the reader would expect a conventional spiritual journey to 
end with some sort of revelation of enlightenment, Brown almost completely leaves 
Ranald’s narrative in order to focus on Earl Thorfinn and his nephew, Earl Rognvald.  
The account closely follows that of the Orkneyinga Saga and is largely inserted to 
demonstrate that, just as the earl who is in power makes “little difference at Breckness or 
the crofts” (V 201), the spiritual journey Ranald is undergoing is equally unimportant to 
those in power, or in fact any besides himself.  If Vinland is a constant diminuendo, a 
continual minimalising of the story’s scope from its opening intercontinental adventure to 
 200 
the final small and almost irrelevant death of the protagonist, Brown continues to 
emphasise that the larger world outside Ranald continues to move on, that as his life has 
less and less impact on the world around him, others rise to take his place.   
 Brown does not insert material from the Saga here purely for historical 
grounding, but again to show the role of the literary narrative in the formulation of 
historical understanding.  This portion of the Saga is filled with the work of the poet 
Arnor; each episode is retold in verse after its straightforward prose rendition (a trope 
repeated later in the Saga when the next Earl Rognvald makes verses about his own life).  
The work of Arnor is used as a reference point throughout: virtually every passage of 
battle ends with a linking phrase such as “In the words of Arnor” or “as Arnor the Earl’s-
Poet says”, and is followed by the relevant verse.86  This mixture of historical narrative 
and its retelling is of primary concern to Brown:  
All these forays and raids deep into Scotland – they could scarcely be called 
skirmishes, far less battles – were celebrated resoundingly by Earl Thorfinn’s 
poet, Arnor the laureate, in the hall of a captured keep, while the clan chief sought 
shelter in some corrie from the snow. (V 195) 
 
Just as Brown has included similar heroic verses in his own novel, he points to Arnor’s 
work as a mythologization of rather mundane events in peacetime, in a place of refuge.  
The literary retelling of history is thus both an elevated approach to history and one 
which incorporates deceit, for Arnor magnifies the events at hand past the point of 
accuracy.  Literature must thus be looked at with suspicion, for while these myths and 
symbols can be used as a path towards a truer account of given events than what might be 
apparent from an eyewitness, as in the nameless poet’s version of the battle at Clontarf, 
they can also distract the listener from the truth by making resounding victories of battles 
which were barely worth recounting.  Literature’s tropes are thus simultaneously 
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necessary and misleading; in Brown’s search in these two novels for a way in which to 
depict historical truth properly (and to make it relevant to a contemporary audience), he 
remains constantly self-aware of the difficulty of advancing an argument in favour of this 
mythic view of the past.  The discussion of Arnor’s work in Vinland is a mirror to the 
discussions of worn metaphors in Time in a Red Coat: both point to the ultimate 
impossibility of honest and new literature without abandoning the effort to make it 
truthful all the same. 
 Some of Brown’s dilemma can be seen in an earlier account of Viking life in the 
Orkneys, Eric Linklater’s Men of Ness, which Brown heralded as giving him “great 
delight” (FI 63).  Linklater’s vision of Orkney’s past initially appears to be completely at 
odds with Brown’s: his Vikings are rough men, unconcerned with pastoral life but only 
with action and revenge.  Indeed, like the depiction of Vikings in Neil M. Gunn’s 1933 
novel Sun Circle, Linklater’s focus is almost entirely on the visceral thrill of violent life.  
The larger political mechanisms with which Brown is concerned in Vinland and Magnus 
do not interest Linklater: it is enough to say that “There was no law [in the Orkneys], and 
he who was strongest was commonly held to have the best chance in any dispute that 
arose”.87  As D’Arcy demonstrates, many of the themes and events in the novel are 
borrowed from various Icelandic sagas;88 the novel is in many ways an attempt to create 
an unmitigated version of Orkney’s past, without Brown’s narrative intrusions and 
explanations.  The reader must assume, as in a reading of the sagas from which the novel 
is drawn, that the revenge motif is enough in itself to drive the story, and rather than 
attempting to understand the story’s relevance to contemporary life, see it as a 
straightforward account of an earlier age.  Linklater is certainly successful in this regard: 
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Men of Ness is more of a “boy’s story” than Vinland.  However, in the secondary 
character of Gauk, larger concerns about the value of storytelling begin to creep into the 
novel.  Gauk is the character most engaged with the supernatural (a significant portion of 
the novel is concerned with Kol’s (the novel’s primary hero) helping of Gauk in the re-
killing of his trollish, dead first wife); the most homesick (“‘I wish I were there [in 
Calfskin] now,’ he said, ‘with my wife setting a dish of bacon before me, a bowl of ale, 
and a cheese of Blackie’s milk.  Calfskin is a fine place, and I have a good wife.’”89); 
and, most importantly, the only one of the heroes to survive the attack on Ivar the 
Boneless, revenge of whom forms the thrust of the novel.  The end of the book shows 
Gauk at home, at peace, a very poor Viking but a much better storyteller. 
 One of the recurring phrases in the novel is that “only the nameless man lives out 
his life”.  In the character of Gauk, however,  Linklater presents the reader with a man 
who will indeed live out his life and retain his name, although he is neither witty nor 
brave, neither a good farmer, fisherman nor warrior:  “Gauk lived out his life in Calfskin, 
and did no more fighting.  But he told many stories of what he had seen, and broke 
several notches in Leg-biter [his sword] to show how heavy had been his blows.”90  Gauk 
thus becomes a storyteller and a liar and is rewarded with a much longer, and possibly 
happier, life than the novel’s purported heroes.  This transformation of a character the 
reader has hitherto only seen as a comic foil into both a survivor and, in his embrace of a 
more sedate existence, the most modern of the characters presented, retroactively creates 
an elegiac tone for the entire novel.  As much as Linklater is celebrating Viking life –  
D’Arcy, indeed, calls the novel “a personal tribute” to both the Vikings and the saga 
tradition itself91 – the emergence of Gauk as a storyteller casts a fictive light over the 
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preceding pages.  The Viking life can only be understood through the prism of 
storytelling, rather than through a continued lived experience.  The reader is already 
aware that Gauk is given to the manipulation of events in order to increase his own 
stature; with the knowledge that he, by virtue of being the only survivor, is the palimpsest 
through which the reader receives the story heightens the awareness that the story is itself 
constructed.  The Vikings are presented as living in a less stable world, where even 
names are transitory: Thorlief Coalbiter is called “‘Thorlief Bed-presser, Thorlief 
Blanket-warm, Thorlief Mattress-mate, or what you will’” by his son (as part of a ruse to 
defeat invaders).92  Insofar as the names in the novel reflect action rather than, as in 
Vinland, heredity, Linklater leads the reader to understand, if only retroactively, that the 
entire novel has been an attempt to view these characters both as historical figures, 
emblematic of a given era, but also as figures within a story whose identity is formed by 
intervening authorship.  It is the storyteller who survives, not the characters within the 
story.  And so Linklater’s novel, while far less immediately self-reflexive than Brown’s, 
introduces a similar idea in the understanding of the historical novel: the past cannot be 
understood without recourse to the fictional and, in the reading of these works as novels 
qua novels, the fictional cannot properly be understood without being grounded in the 
past. 
 The two authors also unite in their conception of stories as granting their heroes 
entrance to Valhalla.  Arnor, who emerges as one of the major characters in Vinland, is 
praised for his bravery in battle as well as his poetry, but it is further given to be 
understood that the battle, in a certain sense, does not exist without the documentation of 
it: 
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if Thorfinn didn’t allow him into the heart of the action, it was because he 
considered that, in reality, any battle was a charade and a shadow-play unless a 
poet carved the action deeply upon the granite, so that men would remember the 
hero’s achievements for many generations.  These verses were a kind of passport 
to Valhalla. (V 167) 
 
Within the context of the novel, such statements are clearly a voicing of an ancient 
conceit of heroism.  Yet, for all his subtle exploration within these two novels of the ways 
in which myth and history enrich each other, Brown occasionally argues too forcefully in 
favour of the former.  As much as a passage such as that above demands examination 
within a given historical context, and not to serve as an expression of Brown’s own 
philosophy, there are similar passages sprinkled throughout Brown’s fiction in which he 
makes similar claims to the fundamentally spiritual nature of art.  In “The Sea-King’s 
Daughter”, another story of the medieval north, Brown claims that: “a story is a treaty 
between us and all the creatures.  That we belong to one another.  That we’re parts of a 
single web, most subtle and delicate.  Who strikes the seal on the rock makes a gash in 
the world.  Who puts an axe to a tree wounds stone and star and himself.”93  Here Brown 
uses almost identical language to describe story-telling itself to that used in Vinland as 
Ranald reflects on Indian life prior to the battle at Clontarf.  Literature, in this 
perspective, becomes not a means through which one can better approach history, but in 
itself an echo of some Edenic, non-human truth.   To follow this argument would lead to 
the expression that myth is indeed of a different or higher order than history and that the 
truths expressed in art and nature are separate from those learned through lived 
experience.  This is a disquieting interpretation, and one which surfaces often in Brown’s 
work.  The story-telling explained here is not that of the nameless poet who writes about 
Clontarf, in which abstracted poem and narrated individual experience are contrasted as 
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different approaches to the same truth, but is now something ethereal, removed.  There is 
an implicit argument contained here that stories can function as a passport to Valhalla 
because they are, in some sense, already otherworldly. 
 It is almost impossible to simply rectify the apparent contradiction between a 
work such as “The Sea-King’s Daughter” and parts of Vinland, in which myth, story and 
symbol (for, again, despite the great differences between these concepts, Brown seems to 
use them interchangeably) are glorified, and a novel such as Time in a Red Coat, in which 
the ultimate impossibility of these myths and stories is examined.  In the next chapters the 
dangers of the former view will be more closely examined; for the moment, it will have 
to suffice to argue that, in Brown’s later fiction, his views on the interrelation of myth 
and history lie somewhere between complicated and confused. Brown frequently can be 
seen to argue that the symbolic element, conveyed through the means of narrative, is that 
which is used to shape our understanding of the world and to give order to what might 
not ordinarily possess it.  At the same time, Brown also attempts to undermine this 
reading of the value of art, especially in works such as Time in a Red Coat, through his 
insistence on the ambiguity of artistic interpretation.   
 Brown’s work can be read as a privileging of an aestheticised, neo-Hegelian view 
of art, and the perils of this view must be more closely examined.  For Hegel, as 
mentioned above, “art no longer affords that satisfaction of spiritual needs [that is, to be 
the bearer of truth] which earlier ages and nations sought in it”,94 but at the same time art 
“only fulfils its supreme task when it has placed itself in the same sphere as religion and 
philosophy, and when it is simply one way of bringing to our minds and expressing the 
Divine”.95  For Hegel, then, a true work of art is something removed from the natural, 
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something that “now belongs to the territory of the spirit […] for everything spiritual is 
better than any product of nature”.96  Art, in its spiritual sense, is that which remedies the 
inherent deficiencies of nature.  In the case of Brown, the Hegelian view of “nature” must 
be expanded to include human history as well; while Hegel never makes this comparison 
explicit, it is clear that, for him, the natural encompasses all that is tangible or actual, 
while spiritual lives in the realm of the ideal, and it is only art which can approach the 
ideal.  For Brown, in Vinland, the idealised form of Vinland remedies the flaws which are 
found in the actual physicohistorical conceptualisation of that land. The damage which is 
inflicted by the West on the land itself becomes less meaningful when it is still possible 
to maintain this ideal form which is forever untouched by despoilers.  Here he again 
follows from Hegel, for whom art in its purest form is not used to reflect on the actual, or 
to give better understanding to the actual, but to express the ideal.  This creates a 
dichotomy between the human and art.   
Brown also adopts a more conventionally eco-poetic view, in which the “natural” 
itself is made ideal.  When Brown speaks of “nature” he focuses on the idyllic pastoral, 
embodied in Vinland.  Brown thus, in certain passages in Vinland and in some of his 
stories, elevates both art and nature to the level of the spiritual, and is content to work 
with them on that elevated level.  This is a firm rebuttal to much of Time in a Red Coat, 
in which he explores not only how art can be used to understand human life, but also how 
human life can be used to understand art, an exploration which both follows from  and 
runs counter to Hegel’s writings on symbolism.  For Hegel, the symbolic order is the way 
through which: 
art has reached its own essential nature by bringing the Idea, as spiritual 
individuality, directly into harmony with its bodily reality in such a perfect way 
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that external existence now for the first time no longer preserves any 
independence in contrast with the meaning which it is to express.97 
 
This chapter’s reading of Brown has focused on the ways in which he both embraces this 
view, using myth (for Brown, the clearest expression of artistic sensibility) in order to 
comment on the actual world, but also explores the difficulties of that mythic view.  
Certainly there is a divide between Vinland, which is largely concerned with the former 
elevation of the artistic sensibility over the observance of the physicohistorical universe, 
and Time in a Red Coat, which remains far more ambiguous, largely arguing that neither 
art nor, for want a better word to describe its counter, empirical observation are capable 
in themselves of actually approaching any sort of truth or ideal, but only approach that 
end through their intermingling. 
 A retort to this paradoxical view can be found in Adorno’s Aesthetic Theory.  For 
Hegel, Adorno argues, “natural beauty gains legitimacy only by its decline, in such a way 
that its deficiency becomes the raison d’être of art beauty”.98  As follows from the 
preceding discussion of Adorno’s dialectics in Beside the Ocean of Time, Adorno is here 
concerned with the will to domination.  What he finds notable in natural beauty is its very 
“characteristic of escaping from fixed concept”99 and the way in which natural beauty is 
not defined or dominated by the spirit.  If Hegel sees art as a way in which to overcome 
the otherness of nature (and what he perceives as nature’s deficiency in not being wholly 
spiritual), this otherness is for Adorno the very substance of natural beauty.  The beauty 
of the world resides in its resistance to domination, either by humans or by 
conceptualisations of what beauty should ultimately be.  Adorno follows this argument 
with the surprising assertion that if nature is not wholly spiritual, neither is art: the 
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spiritual in art only emerges through development and formation.100  It is in this notion of 
the spiritual arising through development and formation that we can reapproach Time in a 
Red Coat and, to a lesser extent, Vinland.  Brown initially foregrounds the ways in which 
natural beauty is put into decline by the very people who create the art which celebrates 
it.  The Masquer, at the opening of Time in a Red Coat, creates an artform that will 
“celebrate the beauty and terror of death” (TRC 6) even as real death, in the form of 
invasion, cuts off the work of art.  Art is thus, in a Hegelian sense, pointing to the 
deficiency in nature even as it forms those deficiencies.  And yet in his discussions of 
metaphor and symbol Brown is following an Adornian paradigm, arguing here that the 
novel as a work of art is not automatically elevated to a spiritual level, but is instead only 
capable of attaining that level through the formation of these aesthetics.  This notion of 
development is what finally ties Time in a Red Coat to seemingly divergent artistic 
impulses in Vinland; Brown is interested not in the inherent spirituality of art, but in the 
way in which that spirituality is formed.  This is why Vinland takes so many different 
forms throughout the novel, from physicohistorical actuality to being the subject of the 
stories Ranald tells the king of Norway to serving as a reflection of the stories of Tir-nan-
og told around the banquet hall to, finally, in conversation with Peter the abbot, seeming 
to serve as a symbol of heaven.  As Adorno writes, “Precisely through its progressive 
spiritualization, through its division from nature, art wants to revoke this division from 
which it suffers and which inspires it”.101  It is this division which primarily interests 
Brown, and in the interplay of these two novels that he attempts to both address the 
division and, to a certain extent, heal it, without losing the inspiration that the division 
allows. 
 209 
 It is thus possible to see in these two novels the formation of a complex, if often 
inconsistent, theory about the relation between nature and art and, more specifically, 
between the actualities of history and their subsumption or reflection in myth and symbol.  
In Time in a Red Coat Brown attempts to avoid the privileging of myth and symbol as 
myth and symbol, but instead uses them to understand the actualities of human existence.  
To a certain extent the novel here echoes Magnus, in which Brown argues that the way to 
understand the death of Magnus is both through its symbolism and its very real historical 
and political implications.  In  Vinland he attempts to trace the development of an idea 
from historical observation to symbolic import in order to stress upon the reader that 
symbols are not born out of nothing or emergent from some abstracted spiritual realm, 
but that the very reason they can be used to lend order to a natural/historical/physical 
existence is because they are themselves drawn from such an existence, and that it is in 
their development in art that they achieve any sort of special level of meaning.  Following 
Hegel, then, Brown is in these two novels attempting to show the way in which art, 
through the mediation of the symbolic order, can illuminate the natural, with a focus in 
this instance on the historical, a surprising conflation which becomes apparent throughout 
the body of Brown’s work, in which the events of history, whether in Vinland or the 
Orkneys, are specifically tied to a natural existence and seen as being emergent from 
nature.  This project has echoes throughout Brown’s work, whether in novels such as 
Magnus or short stories such as “Magi”.  In these two novels, however, Brown is 
engaging with those themes that an Adornian reading of Hegel makes explicit, in which 
any privileging of the artistic comes through its formation, rather than through an 
automatic unity with the spiritual.  In this ultimately bold project, Brown is reflecting on 
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the ultimate goals of art, and the different ways in which art can be used to illuminate 
nature in all of its forms.  Here there is a reconciliation between the pronouncements of 
such works as “The Sea-King’s Daughter”, in which art is presented as a means towards 
understanding because of its ethereal nature, and Time in a Red Coat, in which the 
honesty of art is continually questioned.  Art, finally, only comes to approach truth 
because it is grounded in the natural and the historical, but yet the natural and historical 
cannot be understood without recourse to art. 
 Before leaving these two novels, a final Hegelian coda must be added about the 
ways in which this interplay of the natural, the artistic and the spiritual is formative of 
community.  As detailed above, for Hegel art is the sensuous revelation of the spiritual, 
and through the symbolic, the way in which the spiritual is able to reflect upon and react 
to the physical.  This becomes a reflection, too, about the nature of the individual in 
relation to the community.  For Hegel: 
The community is the spiritual reflection into itself of this sensuous existent, and 
is animating subjectivity and inwardness.  With these, therefore, it comes about 
that the determining principle, alike for the content of art and for the material that 
represents it outwardly, is particularization and individualization and their 
requisite subjective apprehension.102 
 
Hegel is here specifically writing about architecture, but his theory applies to all art.  The 
community makes manifest the spiritual, or rather, becomes the physical reflection of the 
spiritual, but only insofar as it makes the spiritual particular.  In order to reflect the 
communal and spiritual, “art has likewise to show itself particularized in itself and 
appropriate to subjective inwardness”.103  Art can thus only become relevant to the 
community when it is made individual.  Or, to follow from Nancy’s view of community: 
art is most relevant to a community when it is least like history.  Here we see an echo of 
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the theory expressed above that the storyteller forms a community through the telling of 
the story; the individual author, and the individual story, are through this interplay of the 
natural and the spiritual able to express themselves fully to the community at large and, in 
effect, create that community through the telling.  Here, then, there is something of a 
counter-argument to the Heideggerian notion discussed above that as art is made 
subjective nature and history are objectified.  The subjectivisation of art is, for Hegel, a 
means towards a great expression of community, for in its particularisation, it becomes 
more fully integrated with that community. 
 This is clearly only a cursory discussion of the interplay between individual and 
community.  However, following the above notion that Brown in these novels is 
attempting to reflect not an ordering of nature and spirit, but rather their interplay as 
expressed through history and literature, it becomes clear that, for Brown, it is literature 
in its particularities which both creates and reflects the community.  This serves as a basis 
for the wide-ranging and almost impossible scope of these two novels, whether it be the 
temporal scope of Time in a Red Coat or the geographical range of Vinland.  In making 
these novels so broad and yet still particular, Brown begins to explain his project in his 
more localised, parochial fictions, as will be examined in the next two chapters.  
Literature, specifically literature that reflects upon history, is here used to create a dual 
community of those it describes and its readers.  In taking on such ambitious themes, 
Brown occasionally falters, but his overall purpose remains clear: in both of these novels, 
an improbable or even impossible community is created, whether it is that of those who 
observe war in the former novel or those who yearn for peace in the latter.  This is 
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ultimately no different than the communities Brown creates in his Orkney-based fiction: 
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The Fictive Community: Greenvoe 
 
“Community is what takes place always through others and for others.  It is not 
the space of the egos – subjects and substances that are at bottom immortal – but 
of the I’s, who are always others (or else are nothing).”1 – Jean-Luc Nancy 
 
The preceding three chapters have demonstrated the centrality of community in 
George Mackay Brown’s novels.  Even though I have been arguing for the resonance of 
the concept of community throughout Brown’s work, it is in Greenvoe that he most 
consistently focuses on the community as that which is immediate and immanent.  
Greenvoe offers a discussion of community as the local.  It is Brown’s use of this 
commonplace understanding of community – for, as William Corlett argues, the most 
commonly agreed upon definition of community within political theory is that 
“community names a geographical location”2 – that allows him to offer his most 
penetrating analysis of the modern community as impossible or inoperative.   
An understanding of community as the locus of a regional or political identity 
underpinned many contemporary political and social theories of community.  The 
anthropologist Susan Love Brown, for instance, has argued that communities, understood 
as microcosmic societies in themselves, constitute “a powerful means of integrating the 
individual and society”.3  Studies in the literature of place have built upon this notion of 
the community, in particular the rural community, as a locus of unity and integration 
which cannot be found in the context of a larger culture.  As Robert M. Dainotto has 
recently argued, it is a commonplace thought to believe that: “the old nationalistic dream 
of cultural unity […] today finds in the rural areas of regionalism its sole possibility to 
survive”.4  These theories follow in part from Charles Taylor’s seminal work on plurality 
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and political fragmentation, which he sees as yielding an individual focus on the singular 
community as opposed to a world, or even national, culture.  There is thus a two-fold 
tradition of regarding the community, both in the world and in literary representation, as a 
microcosmic exemplar of society and as that which replaces and resists fragmentation.  
This perspective on the value of community has been assumed in the majority of critical 
work on Brown, whom David Annwn calls: “A poet of an island community who, 
through his work, has been committed to identify himself with that community”.5 In 
Annwn’s reading, Brown makes use of the real community in which he was born as a 
“significant microcosm” which sheds light on human behaviour.6  As will be shown in 
the next chapter, the Orkney community about which Brown writes is, for Annwn and 
numerous additional commentators, both a microcosmic representation of the interaction 
of individuals and society and an attempt to present a unified whole in a fragmented 
world.  Yet Brown’s represented community is itself fragmented. 
In Greenvoe, Brown is most interested in seeing what happens when a community 
does not cohere: he details the effects on a community when it becomes nothing more 
than a group of individuals who are concerned not with their relation to others, nor their 
own otherness, but with the construction of their own individual narratives.  At the same 
time, Brown advances a modern notion of the plural community, where the community is 
viewed as an impossible whole which cannot be understood as a totality, but only through 
the differences between the singularities it encompasses.  As shown in previous chapters, 
in his later novels Brown focuses on the construction of community through shared 
history and myth and through the embrace and vilification of progress.  Here, however, 
he is primarily concerned with the community of individuals, a community which will 
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necessarily fail, but is also the only possibility of community in modern life.  What is 
most striking about the novel is not the way in which its various narratives coalesce, but 
the way in which they finally fail to form a whole.  In sharp contrast to Magnus, in which 
the variety of registers and voicings is used to create a unified picture of both a given 
individual and the community which surrounds him, or Beside the Ocean of Time, in 
which a dying community is given renewed life through recourse to its past, Greenvoe is 
perhaps the least redemptive of Brown’s novels, a story of the ways in which it is not 
progress, or outside influence, which damn a community, but its inhabitants themselves.  
Black Star, a Cold War operation as vague in purpose as the occupying power which 
comes to Norday at the end of Beside the Ocean of Time, is the ready-made villain of the 
novel, and its eviction of the residents provides the basis for Francis Russell Hart’s claim 
that Greenvoe is “the serious novel of latter-day Clearances.”7  However, the novel also 
functions as a refutation of the very idea of community in the modern age. Despite 
Brown’s avowed yearnings for community, in Greenvoe he suggests that community 
itself might be essentially impossible, an idea made explicit in Nancy’s claim that “it is 
precisely the immanence of man to man […] that constitutes the stumbling block to a 
thinking of community”.8 
The novel’s first chapter initially supports Schoene’s claim that “Greenvoe 
reflects Brown’s desire to present Orkney’s communal identity in all its individual and 
communal, historical and contemporary aspects”.9  Indeed, close to a third of Murray and 
Tait’s pivotal discussion of the novel is centred on this first section, the portion of the 
novel most easily related to Brown’s prior works, as well as to those of Dylan Thomas, 
D. H. Lawrence and other avowed influences.10  Early reviews were quick to note 
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Brown’s debt to Under Milk Wood.  Derek Stanford, in a moderately favourable review 
in the Scotsman, wrote that “Greenvoe is clearly Milkwood transplanted far northward.”11 
Many other notices focused on the redundancies of the novel, especially in its echoes of 
Brown’s earlier work, which is almost entirely centred on small Orkney communities.  
“How much longer can [Brown] beat over the same territory?” asked Michael Scott-
Moncrieff in the Glasgow Herald.12  The novel has thus been traditionally read as one of 
avowed community, in which the ideas of human interaction established in the opening 
chapter are sustained throughout.  The often begrudging tone of these reviews arises from 
the novel’s failure to maintain a consistent tone that is in keeping with the first chapter: 
what begins as a humorous, realist work ultimately becomes something much more 
strange.   
 The tension between the ideal of community and the difficulty of 
understanding any grouping of individuals as a collective whole is presented from the 
first page.  The first five chapters of the novel are formally constructed around the course 
of a day, beginning at dawn and ending after dark.  Brown here nods to a classical unity 
of time and space which he will for the remainder of the novel continually disrupt.  The 
natural world, signified not according to seasons, as in so much of his work, but in values 
of light and dark, is thus presented as a unifying force which is alternately embraced or 
disrupted by the people in it, but is not in any way transcendent.  In his first three 
sentences, Brown depicts first the natural world, then the village, then the individual 
inhabitants, a sequence which initially appears to prescribe a natural order of 
understanding: “Slowly the night shadow passed from the island and the Sound.  In the 
village of Greenvoe lights burned in the windows of three fishermen’s cottages above the 
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pier.  A small dark knotted man came out of one of the doors” (G 9).  This pattern is 
familiar from Brown’s early stories, such as “A Calendar of Love”, in which the life of 
the individual is presented as being best understood with regards to the natural world, to 
the seasons and weather and landscape.  The first chapter, largely concerned with 
introducing the townsfolk and their landscape, is indeed closely tied to much of the prose 
Brown had published thus far: it is an explication of what Raymond Williams calls the 
“many meanings” of country life,13 given to direct statements of pastoral calm:  
Afternoon was always the quietest time in the village.  The fishermen were still at 
sea. The crofters had not yet unyoked. There was little sound in Greenvoe on a 
summer afternoon but the murmur of multiplication tables through the tall school 
window, and the drone of bluebottles among Mr Joseph Evie’s confectionery, and 
the lapping of water against the pier. (G 17) 
 
These idyllic passages are interspersed with the essentially comic dialogue that takes 
place at the general store.  The community of Greenvoe exists in the juxtaposition of the 
natural and the man-made and in the tension between interactions with the land and those 
with other people.  The Skarf, the self-appointed town historian, speaks in an 
uncommonly poetic register which initially appears to mark him out as an individual who 
does not fully engage with the community: “‘And this is all we know about the first 
dwellers in the island: the solemn state in which they passed into the kingdom of death, 
as if life was a shadow and death the hard reality.  Of the villages where they passed their 
days nothing remains’” (G 28).  He is, all the same, a type familiar from Brown’s 
previous (and, indeed, later) works.  As a chronicler of the community, he necessarily 




A. The Writing of the Disaster 
The final passage in this chapter, however, hints at what will become Brown’s 
dominant theme in the remainder of the novel: the desire of the characters to see 
themselves in a larger, perhaps fictional, drama than that of the given island community.  
Six men and a boy gather in a farm for the “first of six initiation rites into the Ancient 
Mystery of The Horsemen” (G 33).  Solemnity and sobriety are encouraged, and the rite 
itself concerns the novice’s desire to return to a kingdom from which he has been outcast.  
As Murray and Tait point out, the ritual enacted here is a combination of an ancient 
Scottish cult, the Horseman’s Word, and the Catholic Stations of the Cross.14  The 
characters are thus reaching out across traditions to be a part of something larger.  While 
this passage does not depart from the realism of the rest of the chapter, it hints towards a 
denial of realism which permeates the remainder of the novel.  Ultimately, Greenvoe is 
not a “denial of […] history”,15 as Craig argues, but an exploration of an endemic denial 
of the complexity of life itself.  If anything, the characters fall prey to a desire to appeal 
too directly to history, to see themselves nostalgically as part of a unified community 
which can no longer exist.  The farmer’s desire to make themselves part of an external, 
intangible community comes at the expense of their engagement in the present physical 
community around them.  It is the desire for something immortal that dooms the 
community, and it is the individuals’ attempts to place themselves within grand narratives 
that displaces them. 
More than in any other of Brown’s works, the characters in Greenvoe learn who 
they are through books.  Inga Fortin-Bell, the laird’s granddaughter, is introduced with a 
copy of Women in Love in her hands; Ivan Westray comforts and torments himself with 
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the Orkneyinga Saga and a book of sermons, On Love Carnal and Divine; the Whaness 
family read nightly from Foxe’s Book of Martyrs, Grace Abiding, Meditations Among the 
Tombs, and The Pilgrim’s Progress; Timmy Folster, the impoverished meth addict, is 
fond of quoting Burns and cheap romances; Johnny, the Sikh peddler, enjoys Hopkins’s 
dark sonnets: the entire community is filled with readers.  In a work which begins as 
something of an agricultural romance, this is initially somewhat surprising; the repeated 
mentions of books point to a rare inwardness among the characters.  Throughout the 
novel, Brown demonstrates that virtually all of the characters measure their lives not by 
what is around them, but according to what they have read.  This is most clearly seen in 
the stilted romance between Inga and Ivan, born of her desire to be a character out of 
Lawrence: 
Inga turned over on her belly on the warm rock and cradled her head on her 
forearms.  She would like to be utterly naked under the sun.  She remembered the 
story by D. H. Lawrence called Sun.  A super story, that.  The mindless peasant 
watching the golden-skinned woman.  That was the way Inga would like it to be. 
[…]  But why had Ivan Westray not kissed her last night at the crossroads, when 
he must have known her whole body was crying out for it?  He did not behave 
like a D. H. Lawrence peasant at all. (G 125, 127) 
 
Inga finds fault in her life for its failure to live up to the expectations created by her 
reading, or rather her mis-reading.  “Sun” is, after all, about the “fatal chain of 
continuity”;16 the heroine may desire a peasant, but she is finally forced to settle for her 
grey-faced New Yorker husband.  The story’s opening fairy-tale tone is slowly eroded 
into language as dull as the central marriage; it is altogether a strange story on which to 
base one’s romantic longing.  When Inga, towards the end of the novel, is raped by Ivan, 
it is quite literally underneath his falling copies of the Orkneyinga Saga and On Love 
Carnal and Divine.  She is punished for her love of books: Ivan’s excuse for his actions, 
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as it were, is that she is “‘too full of bullshit out of books’” (G 231) and needs to be 
taught a lesson about the workings of the world.  Her desire to live a life suitable for a 
fictional heroine is ultimately self-destructive. Inga is finally a sort of upper-class 
Leonard Bast, punished for her desire to enter into a culture from which she does not 
originate, but only knows through the written word.  Murray and Tait dismiss the 
implications of this passage, arguing only that “the relish of the scene is in the ironic 
interplay of the three voices, seventeenth-century, twentieth-century and saga”,17 but this 
is an insufficient excuse for one of the cruellest moments in all of Brown’s fiction.  For 
Brown’s aim does not appear to be, as in E.M. Forster’s Howards End, to highlight 
insurmountable social hierarchies, but to reprimand a character for an inward turn which 
is in fact present in almost every character in the novel.  The text itself is mocking. The 
final passage of the scene is a recapitulation of all that has happened in saga-style:  
The granddaughter of the chief man in Hellya asked a certain boatman to take her 
to the sea tower.  There was much fog on the way back.  The boatman whose 
name was Ivan forced Inga to lie with him in the cabin of the boat called Skua.  
Inga said he had done her a great wrong that day and that he would suffer for it.  
Ivan laughed.  He said they would see about that. (G 231-2) 
 
What makes this passage so oddly disturbing is that, in the turn towards a new style, Inga 
has had her wish fulfilled: she is now a character in a story. 
 The significance of the rape is revealed in the following scene, where the men of 
the town gather at the hotel as they have at the close of each preceding chapter.  They are 
concerned with the death of Ben Budge – earlier in the novel, Ivan has recommended 
Budge for “‘good stuff to put in [a] book’” (G 158) – and the rescue of Samuel Whaness 
by Bert Kerston, for which he has been paid a five pound note from “‘that book in the 
window.  It smelt sort of damp, mildewy’” (G 233).  At this final congress, The Skarf 
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refuses to read aloud from the history of the Orkneys he has been writing, for: “‘What’s 
coming to this island is beyond prose’” (G 234).  While The Skarf’s argument is that the 
future of the island can only be captured in poetry – a sentiment which will be echoed 
and embellished at the close of Beside the Ocean of Time – Brown’s denial of poetry 
elsewhere in the novel indicates that perhaps The Skarf’s words may be taken at face-
value: prose is inadequately equipped to explain either the present or future of the island.  
Inga’s attempt to understand her life according to what she has read is thus ultimately 
futile, because prose does not, in this view, allow for the actual future.  Prose is a way of 
measuring the past, but it is finally static.  To highlight this, Brown here includes a scene 
of the unnamed government official who has been writing files on all of the characters 
throughout the course of the novel, quite literally writing them all out of existence in an 
act of de-scription (or, in Nancy’s term, exscription).  The official visits each house and 
then makes a mark in his notebook, and, like Pontius Pilate, “what he had written, he had 
written” (G 237).  The death or inefficacy of prose is most effectively shown at The 
Skarf’s house: 
The guest stood at The Skarf’s window.  Pale sheets of paper scattered on the 
table inside, every sheet a scarred and clotted battlefield; and the cocoa-lid beside 
the ball-point pen overflowing with cigarette ends; and six warping creels in the 
rafters.  Books in tea-boxes all over the room, hundreds of them, a few lying open 
and marked beside the manuscript where The Children of the Sun with many a 
glorious wound on them held a hard-worn ridge of history against trolls and priest 
and lairds; until the day come.  A war on paper. 
The guest made a sign of cancellation with his pen. (G 235-6) 
 
The Skarf’s writings encapsulate all the violence of the past, but cannot stand against the 
violence of modernity itself; what is written can be destroyed.  In Greenvoe the forces of 
modernity unwrite all that has been written, and in doing so prove the inefficacy of the 
written word.  Prose is not a sufficient medium with which to record a life; at the end of 
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the novel, each character is undermined by what has been written about him or her, 
whether in the form of the official’s notes or, in the case of Inga, in the form of an 
attachment to an outside text.  The characters’ attachment to books is both what 
individualises them and makes them vulnerable; their desire to see themselves prosaically 
lets them be unwritten by outside forces. 
 These passages initially point to a simple condemnation of reading and writing, 
similar to that seen in “The Eye of the Hurricane” from A Time to Keep.  In that story, a 
novelist, Barclay, comes to Hamnavoe to write on Earl Rognvald18 and surrounds himself 
with the works of high culture: Ionescu, Chaucer, Cervantes, Tolstoy, Proust, Alain-
Fournier and the like.  The novelist sees himself as something apart from the community: 
“I had come to live, then, among simple uncomplicated people.  I worked to the easy 
regular rhythm of fishermen and crofters. My imagination nourished itself at primitive 
wholesome sources, the sea and the land.”19  His actions, and his obliviousness to that 
which actually surrounds him in favour of the works of dead authors, however, contribute 
to the death of his landlord and rejection by the woman for whom he yearns; the “simple 
uncomplicated people” are ultimately far more complicated than he allows himself to 
recognise, and his desire to use a living community as the backdrop for the creation of a 
solitary art ends with his necessary abandonment of the town.  Brown’s clear moral in 
this story is that in order to live in a community, one must enter it fully in a way that 
reading and writing by themselves do not allow.  While he is presumably not advocating 
a return to illiteracy as such, given his praise of poetry in many other works, Brown is at 
the very least advising caution when dealing with books: those who spend their time 
reading, writing and mythologizing that around them ultimately destroy it by making it 
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other than that which it is.  This would initially seem to be the moral of Greenvoe as well; 
the characters’ desire to make turn themselves into individual types, of the sort found in 
their reading, is what makes the community unable to function as such. 
 Brown’s aim in the novel is not so simple, however.  If the characters “have too 
much the air of exhibits”,20 if “the island is too much of a brightly lit cyclorama for the 
action”,21 as contemporary critics argued, this cannot be only ascribed to the sort of 
willed primitivism with which Brown is often charged.  As Ali Smith argues in her recent 
introduction to the novel, what Brown “seems to want is for his readers to be aware of the 
workings of artifice. […] He wants his readers to wonder about how things go together, 
and how they unravel, too.”22  As Schoene points out, Brown crucially does not focus on 
the entire community, leaving out the lives of crofters one would expect him to 
foreground if the novel were a pastoral idyll in favour of depicting the lives of the 
villagers, those whose lives are most directly affected by the outside world.23  Equally 
unexpectedly, as Tom Scott notes, Brown does not centre the novel on an individual hero, 
as is seen in the modern Scottish tradition of Gibbon, Douglas Brown and many others, 
instead focusing on a story in which “the community is the hero”.24  By confounding the 
reader’s expectations for a novel which either uses community as a backdrop for the story 
of an individual or details the life of the community as a comprehensive whole, Brown 
reveals that his project is something different and new.  In Greenvoe, Brown is interested 
in the nature of a very specific sort of community, one which is based on the individual 
rather than the whole, and in the way in which such a community will ultimately reveal 
itself to lack cohesion.  The community comprised of such individuals is no community 
at all.  In his autobiography, Brown repeatedly refers to the characters in Greenvoe as 
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“flat” (FI 172-174); not only, perhaps, to indicate the ways in which they conform to 
types, but also in their inability to interact, to engage in each other’s narratives, or to 
create a whole, complex, communal narrative.  The collapse of community is brought 
about not only by outside forces such as Black Star, or by internal difficulties arising 
from literacy (and other artefacts of modernity), but is an outgrowth of the intrinsic 
nature of communities in the modern age.  In Brown’s view, the modern community is 
unsustainable: in Greenvoe he is not advocating a return to a purer communal past, but 
instead pointing to the impossibility of such a return.   
Perhaps the best indication of his greater purpose in the novel is found in an essay 
on Edwin Muir written concurrently with Greenvoe, “The Broken Heraldry.”  The essay 
is as strongly opposed to progress and modernity as any of the more strident passages in 
An Orkney Tapestry, but instead of blaming the arrival of tractors and automobiles, 
Brown here looks at the dissolving community as a greater cultural reality: 
Formerly a people of strongly-marked individuality, the Orcadians are gradually 
losing their identity – or rather they have willingly merged their identity with the 
rest of the western world.  Many things contribute to this loss: wireless and 
television, compulsory education, newspapers, the insidious notion that urban 
ways of life are necessarily superior to rural ways. […] One senses a growing 
coldness – the coldness of people who have received the fatal blessing of 
prosperity.25 
 
While Brown’s examples point to particularly twentieth-century sources of change, he 
goes on to argue that it was in fact the Reformation that brought about the “break-up” of 
community: “It was then that the old heraldry began to crack, that the idea of ‘progress’ 
took root in men’s minds.  What was broken, irremediably, in the 16th century was the 
fullness of life of a community, its single interwoven identity.”26  It is not then, that 
newspapers and novels have corrupted the individual members of the community, making 
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it impossible to engage in communal life in a way that would be possible without modern 
mass media, but that the entire notion of modern community is an impossibility.  The 
community has been eradicated for so long that one cannot return to it, for it is already a 
distant myth.  Schoene sees this focus as a way for Brown to highlight the worth of the 
individual: “Only rarely does Brown speak of the people of Hellya in collective terms, 
probably because such a presentation would reduce our awareness of each community 
member’s unique identity”.27  This view is supported by a passage in “The Broken 
Heraldry” following those quoted above: “A town like Stromness, even 30 years ago, 
used to be alive with ‘characters’, the kind of delightfully surrealistic folk you read about 
in Russian novels.  There are less and less of them now.  It is as if people were ashamed 
to be different from one another.”28  And yet the very language in which Brown couches 
this discussion reveals him to be making a quite contrary point.  Given his previously 
mentioned distrust of prose as a method of revealing truth, his argument that the 
community has been impossible for centuries, the notion of characters who are 
“surrealistic”, even if delightfully so, whose precedents come not from their ancestors but 
from foreign novels, signifies that such individuals are already existing at a remove from 
any ideal communal way of life.  Our “awareness of each community member’s unique 
identity” is not, in fact, an admirable thing, as Schoene presupposes.  It is instead a 
reflection of the impossibility of presenting a whole, functional community in the modern 
age. 
 To hold Calvinism responsible for all that has gone wrong with rural communities 
in the past four hundred years (as well as “the striking incidence of mental trouble in the 
islands”29) initially seems to be an over-localised response to the problem of community 
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in modernity.  Certainly, Calvinism has had little or no impact on the similar failings of 
rural communities in other parts of the world.  However, Brown’s thesis can be expanded 
to reflect the absence of a fundamental metanarrative which has become one of the 
dominant themes of the modern age.  As Strysick writes: 
Our condition now involves a sifting through the debris of community after the 
failures of modernity’s metanarratives and community’s attempt to satisfy all 
desires and affinities.  Rather than resurrect past metanarratives or attempt to 
assemble any new unifying voice or panopticon, another possibility arises: act on 
the assumption that narrative will still exist, but with the understanding that 
narratives are irreducible to each other.30 
 
This “sifting through the debris” is ultimately Brown’s project in Greenvoe.  As even the 
sympathetic Welfare Officer admits, “It was obvious, of course […] that the village was 
moribund in any case, a place given over almost wholly to the elderly, the fatuous, the 
physically inept” (G 244).  Greenvoe has become a community that is not a whole in 
itself, but is only a holding place for those who have nowhere else to go.  If this is 
Brown’s final view of community in the novel, then his project grows far more 
interesting: rather than documenting the ways in which a community operates, as he 
initially appears to be doing, he is instead writing about the desire for community at a 
time when the actuality of community is no longer possible.  This explains the tendency 
towards reading and inwardness exhibited in the characters, their willingness to appear as 
types: all of the inhabitants of Greenvoe are trying to create an imagined community, 
based largely on received notions from outwith the island, in the absence of a real one.  
This also, as in other works, reflects Brown’s role (whether self-willed or outwardly 
imposed) of cultural ambassador: the novel is not ultimately intended for those who live 
in the real-life models for Greenvoe and Hellya, but for a global readership that looks to 
the novel as a model of a community that they themselves do not a possess.  Brown’s 
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goal thus becomes to illustrate the failures of community on a larger scale; it is not only 
the readers in the outside world who are displaced, but those within the works they read.  
The act of displacement from the community that these behaviours create is a necessary 
one, then, because there is finally no possibility in modern life of nondisplacement. 
 Greenvoe begins to make sense as a novel of displacement, rather than one of 
community, when it is read adjacently to Maurice Blanchot’s conceptualisation of the 
disaster.  For Blanchot the disaster is everpresent, unknowable, final and intangible, 
irreducible to anything else.  He is here not interested with a specific, locatable disaster, 
but with a more general imminence. This somewhat abstracted notion of the disaster is 
representative of all that Brown sees to be the difficulties of modernity, of human 
coexistence at large.  Whether the disaster in Greenvoe is read as literacy, Black Star, 
petty individuality, or any of the other markers of a collapsing society Brown inserts into 
the novel, is ultimately irrelevant. For Brown, the idea of community, the ideal 
community, is no longer a possibility; the panoply of voices in the novel is merely a way 
to give the reader different approaches to the same, changing and constant, disaster.  As 
Blanchot writes: 
There is no reaching the disaster. […] We are on the edge of the disaster without 
being able to situate it in the future: it is rather always already past, and yet we are 
on the edge or under the threat, all formulations which would imply the future – 
that which is yet to come – if the disaster were not that which does not come, that 
which has put a stop to every arrival. […] The disaster is its imminence.31 
 
Thus the disaster that is Black Star, the official death of the community insofar as it 
brings about the razing of crofts and the evacuation of the island’s inhabitants, is a 
disaster that has in some sense already happened before the novel begins, and is also, 
even after its linear historical occurrence, still always imminent.  It is for this reason that 
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the end of the novel is present throughout, even when the threat of physical destruction is 
barely apparent, and for this reason, also, that the specific nature of Black Star remains in 
doubt (critics have been firmly split on whether it is a North Sea oil concern, a nuclear 
weapons holding facility, or merely a vague apocalyptic premonition); the arrival of 
Black Star is nothing more than the arrival of a threat which has always been present, and 
which will exist no less after its arrival.  For what is a “Black Star” if not, like Blanchot’s 
conceptualisation of disaster, “the night lacking darkness, but brightened by no light”?32  
Black Star is at once “a piece of magic” and “nothing mysterious” (G 242), it 
“explode[s]” with “mystery and passion” (G 268), and yet is capable of freezing (G 275).  
It is, in short, far more a symbol than a construction operation.  It is a disaster which 
always looms and which can never be permanently installed.  And so the endpoint of the 
novel cannot be seen as “an outraged vision of evil and obscenity”, as Murray and Tait 
argue; nor can Black Star be read as alternately “Satan” or “death”33 or even an 
embodiment of “the mechanical present”.34  It is, instead, disaster as potentiality, as 
constant imminence.  David S. Robb begins to approach this conclusion when he argues 
that Bold and Murray and Tait assume too much clarity of meaning: “A large part of the 
novel’s meaning may simply reside in its treatment of the community in the first five 
chapters”.35  More than that, however, understanding Greenvoe through Blanchot’s 
conceptualisation of disaster reveals that the final chapter, concerning Black Star, is not 
substantially different in what it reveals about the nature of community from the first five 
chapters.  For if, as Robb argues, Black Star “is simply a new guise for an ancient – 
indeed, timeless – feature of island life”,36 then it must be seen as as much a part of the 
community as anything depicted in the preceding chapters. 
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 Blanchot’s conceptualisation of the disaster also goes far towards explaining 
Brown’s distrust of the written word in Greenvoe, which initially strikes the reader as 
necessarily paradoxical: how can one such as Brown, whose life is wrapped up in the 
modern novel, use modernity and the novel as touchpoints for all that is wrong in the 
world?  And yet, for Blanchot, the disaster is revealed in its inability to be written: 
The disaster, unexperienced.  It is what escapes the very possibility of experience 
– it is the limit of writing.  This must be repeated: the disaster de-scribes. Which 
does not mean that the disaster, as a force of writing, is excluded from it, is 
beyond the pale of writing or extratextual.37 
 
Brown’s disaster is the very de-scribing mentioned above.  The writing of the disaster, in 
Blanchot’s conceptualisation, is insufficient, in that the disaster by its nature cannot be 
written, yet Brown perhaps takes the idea further to argue that all writing is the writing of 
the disaster.  Blanchot’s text is an example of impossible writing; Brown’s is 
occasionally more than that, an example of writing the impossible.  If the disaster is 
everpresent, and if it is shown, as in Greenvoe, to be something that exists in writing –
here in the form of the government official’s de-scribing each house and each inhabitant 
before they are destroyed – then the writing of the disaster must be just as everpresent.  If 
the entirety of Greenvoe contains the threat of Black Star, then the formational works 
referenced throughout the novel, Lawrence and Hopkins and the rest, also contain that 
imminent disaster.  All writing is the writing of disaster.  While Bold points to “a 
literature of rural decay behind Greenvoe”,38 which is certainly apparent, the novel is 
concerned not only with rural decay, but with the decay of civilisation itself, or rather 
with the impossibility of an ideal civilisation, conceived by Brown as an amalgamation of 
Catholicism and Nordic practice and ritual.  In condemning the shaping of society for the 
past few centuries, Brown is also in part condemning the written word, not for being 
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misleading so much as for having been worn out, for having exhausted itself without 
coming to a point at which it could influence humanity for the better.  All of the books 
the characters read have not improved their lives, because the life of a community cannot 
be captured in prose.  Instead, as Blanchot argues, “When all is said, what remains to be 
said is the disaster.  Ruin of words, demise writing, faintness faintly murmuring: what 
remains without remains (the fragmentary).”39  In his fragmentary narratives, his 
accounts of lives which are not in themselves whole, Brown is illustrating the ways in 
which all writing becomes disaster writing; the novel can do no more than point towards 
the imminent disaster. 
 Brown’s approach to documenting community is best described as Nancy’s 
concept of the “singular voice of interruption”, which: 
consists in allowing to be said something that no one – no individual, no 
representative – could ever say: a voice that could never be the voice of any 
subject, a speech that could never be the conviction of any understanding and that 
is merely the voice and the thought of community in the interruption of myth.  At 
once an interrupted voice, and the voiceless interruption of every general or 
particular myth.40 
 
Brown’s voice in the novel is the voice of interruption, both in interrupting what could be 
interpreted as the voice of the community and in being interrupted itself.  Or, as Nancy 
defines literary communism, “an articulation according to which there is no singularity 
but that exposed in common, and no community but that offered to the limit of 
singularities”.41  The very structure of the novel, a series of interrupting individual 
narratives which point to a community that cannot ever be reached, described, or made 
whole, indicates the impossibility of constructing a communal metanarrative.  Brown 
cannot write a novel of community in which the whole community is written into one 
rubric, but can only document the interplay of individual voices in a situation, inherent in 
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modernity, in which the ideal community can be desired but neither defined or fulfilled.  
If literature is to a certain extent made redundant, if it is even viewed, as in Greenvoe, as 
harmful to the lives of individual readers, it still can function, in the words of Kate 
Jenckes, to represent “an ongoing questioning of the possibility of such a collectivity: a 
questioning that at the same time implies its impossibility and its necessity”.42  Greenvoe 
is thus fundamentally not a novel of community, but a novel which questions community, 
which seeks in the documentation of individual voices to explore the possibility of 
community, even as it recognises that community itself is impossible.  Brown focuses on 
the way in which community continues to exist even when it is impossible, in the way 
that collective myths still function in people’s lives even when they have been disproved, 
in the way that community cannot function as such in the face of disaster, and yet does. 
 For Nancy, this literary communitarianism is closely linked to the role of myth.  
Myth, in this reading, is absolute community: “myth represents multiple existences as 
immanent to its own unique fiction, which gathers them together and gives them their 
common figure in its speech and as this speech”.43  Myth is collective speech, it is the 
combination of individual voices into a whole.  Myth is the way in which a community 
comes to terms with itself, in which it defines itself and places itself within a nonlinear 
continuity.  It is the way in which the lives of disparate individuals can be voiced as a 
collective whole.  From this standpoint, all of Greenvoe is a conscious attempt at myth-
formation, but Brown most clearly highlights the role of myth in the establishment of 
community when he writes of myth qua myth in his depiction of the Ancient Mystery of 
the Horsemen.  Those who enact this ritual are consciously placing themselves into a 
defining myth: they are enacting something mythic in order that it can provide a 
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comprehensive structure for their individual lives. These miniature playlets make up the 
final word in each chapter, and both chart the village’s recognition of its own imminent 
disaster and the possibility, however contrived, of continual renewal.  Myth and horses 
are closely entwined in Brown’s writing, both widely throughout the poetry and 
especially in stories such as “Seven Poets” from The Sun’s Net and “The Corn and the 
Tares” from The Masked Fisherman, the latter of which explicitly concerns the 
construction of Edwin Muir’s poem “One Foot in Eden”, a significant influence on 
Greenvoe, as several critics have pointed out.   
 
B. The Redemptive Myth 
Muir’s poetry is more explicitly concerned with apocalypse than Greenvoe.  The 
disaster at hand – in “The Horses”, a “seven days’ war that put the world to sleep” – is 
not only imminent but present, yet Muir is also more confident in the possibility of 
renewal through the arrival of wild horses: “Our life is changed; their coming our 
beginning”.44  Muir’s poem is focused on the redemptive power of myth and community 
– entwined here with concepts of sacrifice and an appeal to nature – a redemption most 
critics have seen echoed at the end of Greenvoe, when the ritual of the horsemen, which 
has ended with symbolic death in the fifth chapter, is reinstated by new participants.  For 
Muir, this redemption is inherent in the natural world: only something outside the human 
community (understood both narrowly and broadly) can save it.  The horses act almost as 
a divine intercession, the presence of the other serving to create a unified whole.  This is 
a level of redemption which Brown does not believe possible; in Greenvoe such a 
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redemption is desired, but ultimately is revealed to be a unity which the world cannot 
sustain.   
In the novel, the theme of redemption appears almost as an epilogue.  Ten years 
after the island has been deserted, Mansie Anderson, the Lord of the Harvest in the ritual, 
returns to Hellya with six young men.  The passage begins as a description of landscape, 
filled with anonymous figures:  
The seven men on board [a rowing-boat] seemed anxious to make as little noise as 
possible; they whispered to one another; the oarsman dipped his blades with a 
slow lingering plangency.  The sun has set but still the northern sky was a glow of 
crimson and saffron and jet, and the Atlantic caught the luminous riot with still 
greater brilliance.  The boat smashed soundlessly through the stained glass of the 
sea. (G 275) 
 
This is a conscious attempt at poetic myth-making on Brown’s part.  The language is 
filled with consonance and alliteration, the description of the landscape is at once highly 
specific to a given evening sunset and yet remains general.  The figures in the landscape 
are referred to as “the oarsman”, “a young man”, “another man”, “the old man” and so 
forth: the men are demarcated as individuals, separate from each other, but they could be 
any men, coming to the island of Hellya for any purpose.  There is a brief nod to suspense 
here: the men could be government surveyors returning to the island to carry out more 
studies, or, as in Beside the Ocean of Time, hippies hoping for a new life.  As much as 
they are specific characters in the novel, the men could be absolutely anyone, coming to 
the island for any purpose, and the reader is not meant to know, initially, who, or what, 
they are. 
 When the names of the characters are finally revealed, it becomes apparent that, 
with the exception of Mansie Anderson, who has been a relatively significant character 
throughout, they have all been previously present in the novel only as minor characters, 
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the children of the protagonists.  They are named only in one paragraph, however, before 
Brown refers to them by their roles within the ritual: “the Harvester”, “the Lord of the 
Harvest”, “the Master Horseman”.  Within this five page epilogue, then, Brown examines 
the lives of the (now former) inhabitants of Greenvoe in three different ways: as 
anonymous figures in a landscape, in which far greater attention is paid to the land than 
the figures; as named characters, demarcated as individuals in the way the reader expects 
from realist fiction; and as participants in ancient ritual, in which the role is paramount 
and the life of the individual fulfilling the role is completely subsumed within it.  The 
ordering of these ways of looking at the members of a community fits into Brown’s oft-
remarked belief in the primacy of ritual and myth. In “The Broken Heraldry”, Brown 
argues that pre-Reformation life was superior to modernity because “the temporal and the 
eternal, the story and the fable, were not divorced, as they came to be after Knox: they 
used the same language and imagery, so that the whole of life was illuminated”.45  At the 
end of Greenvoe, Brown marks a return of sorts to this unity of myth and reality: not only 
do the characters exist on multiple planes, but their very language is used to both realist 
and mythic purposes.  Within the ritual, the figure of the Harvester is killed, and as he 
assumes a symbolic death, he speaks four words: “Rain. Share. Yoke. Sun” (G 278).  The 
other participants ascribe this speech to “the wind that moves in the dust”.  Brown thus 
supplies, within the ritual, an echo of the first two planes of interpretation: the 
Harvester’s actual words belong to the reality of daily island life, to named individuals 
and their labour, while the surrounding men see the speech as part of the landscape, as an 
anonymous, unembodied voice.  However, one of the Master Horsemen then offers a 
mythic reinterpretation: “‘You will call it foolishness.  Yet I will say what I heard.  The 
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dust seemed to utter this word, Resurrection’” (G 278).  This final plane of interpretation, 
which in typical Brownian fashion combines the Christian and the pre-Christian, is the 
correct answer, the appropriate way to interpret the scene; as the novel ends: 
The Lord of the Harvest raised his hands. ‘We have brought light and blessing to 
the kingdom of winter,’ he said, ‘however long it endures, that kingdom, a night 
or a season or a thousand ages.  The word has been found.  Now we will eat and 
drink together and be glad.’ 
The sun rose.  The stones were warm.  They broke the bread. (G 279) 
 
This is perhaps the most remarked-on passage in the novel; for Bold, it “brings before the 
reader a world where renewal is always a possibility”;46 for Murray and Murray, it is “the 
settlement and restoration of their faith”;47 for Murray and Tait, it is ”an affirmation of 
man and his relationship to nature, man and his determination in time”.48  It is 
undoubtedly the first appearance in the novel of a successful community; the men speak 
with a unified voice, and are united under this one mythic rubric.  The passage marks the 
emergence of the impossible community.  As Schoene argues: “It is only in the aftermath 
of the disaster of Black Star that ritual and narrative, eternal truths and everyday reality 
[…] come back together to instigate a resurrection of the island and a revival of its 
identity”.49 
 And yet this is an insufficient explanation of what occurs at the end of the novel.  
The everpresentness of disaster remains; the length of this new community’s endurance 
may very well be one night.  This passage, although it is set in a specific time and place –
“ten years after Hellya had been finally evacuated” (G 275) – is also set outside time; it is 
not a response to the disaster of Black Star, but the interruption by the timeless myth into 
a world which cannot sustain it.  If Brown, at the end of the novel, is establishing a myth 
of community, it is a community which comes at the expense of the individual members 
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who constitute it.  Myth is here represented as that which is wholly communal; as Nancy 
writes, paraphrasing Wagner and Levi-Strauss, “Myth arises only from a community and 
for it: they engender one another, infinitely and immediately”.50  And yet, if Greenvoe is 
a novel of the impossibility of community, then it must necessarily also be a novel of the 
impossibility of a naive return to myth.  If the novel ends with a return to myth and the 
promise of the renewal of community that such a return promises, it is ultimately a 
hollow return, a temporary staving-off of disaster, or refusal to accept disaster, which 
changes nothing.  The men who enact the ritual of the Horsemen do so in a spirit not only 
of renewal, but of nostalgia.  The myth does not arise from, nor embody, a living 
community, but is instead enacted to preserve the artificial memory of a community 
which no longer exists.  The passages throughout the novel depicting the ritual have been 
something set apart: they use an elevated language; they are written not as prose but as 
drama.  Most importantly, as the ending point of each chapter, they are followed not with 
a return to the depiction of a living community, but with blank space.  The ritual 
continues, not as an active or representative aspect of the life of the community, but 
rather as a coda to it.  The ritual is one of death, for in every instance a figure is made to 
die symbolically, but until the final passage quoted above renewal is not even mentioned: 
the ritual is weighted to be a series of continual endings.  The death of the community, 
the impossibility of its existence, is represented within this one myth which has sprung 
from it, a systematic rendering of individual death.  Nancy argues that the West “has 
made of community an absolute End, the End”.51  Community, as represented here by 
communitarian ritual, in Brown is not only a teleological end, but an end in the sense of 
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an end of history.  Nothing follows from this myth because nothing can follow the 
impossibility of community: myth is an end both as a desired goal and a finality. 
 For Nancy, myth is now necessarily interrupted from its communitarian meaning: 
“we know that we – our community, if it is one, our modern and postmodern humanity – 
have no relation to the myth of which we are speaking, even as we fulfil it or try to fulfil 
it.  In a sense, for us all that remains of myth is its fulfilment or its will”.52  This is the 
phenomenon that Brown is documenting in his depiction of the ritual of the horsemen; 
the mythic ritual is fulfilled, it is acted out, but not as a part of the community, only as a 
remainder/reminder of the idea of community.  To a certain extent, this recognition of the 
fallacy of myth must retroactively colour the rest of the novel, for in a certain manner all 
of Greenvoe is a conscious mythmaking.  This is indicated primarily through language; a 
passage such as the opening of the second chapter gives an indication of Brown’s 
purpose: 
In the endless bestiary of the weather the unicorns of cloud are littered far west in 
the Atlantic; the sun their sire, the sea their dame.  Swiftly they hatch and flourish.  
They travel eastwards, a grey silent stamping herd.  Their shining hooves beat 
over the Orkneys and on out into the North Sea.  Sometimes it takes days for that 
migration to pass.  But many are torn on the crags and hills, and spill their 
precious ichor on the farm-lands.  Crofters wake to cornfields and pastures 
extravagantly jewelled. (G 37) 
 
A passage such as this is not commonplace in a supposedly realist work, even one by an 
author better known for his poetry than his prose.  Indeed, it repeats almost verbatim the 
lines from Brown’s 1965 poem “Weather Bestiary”, which begins: “RAIN / The unicorn 
melts through his prism.”53 In the early criticism, such passages are alternately mocked or 
excused as poetic licence, yet this latter reading takes into no account Brown’s own verse 
which, while occasionally fanciful, is almost never this gaudy or extravagant.  Such a 
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passage is not present in order to add a poetic tint to a realist novel, but to signify 
something substantially different, that all of what appears to be a work of realist fiction is 
as hyper-poetic, as steeped in the imagination, as a more recognisably elevated passage 
such as this.  Brown here indicates a way to read the novel as conscious mythmaking, as 
something removed from reality by virtue of its being written.  The novel is not then a 
realist fiction with echoes of myth, but a novel of myth grounded in reality; such is the 
impossibility of community that it can only be explored through this sort of myth-
making. 
 
C. The Individual Community 
 Brown’s most interesting depiction of mythmaking, of the reformulation of an 
individual narrative into both a metanarrative that fulfils the demands both of fiction and 
community, comes in the story of Elizabeth McKee, whom Brown himself terms the one 
emergent, assertive character in the novel (FI 174).  Mrs McKee’s story is the one most 
easily read as a separate narrative, in part because she herself imagines her life as a 
readable narrative, one that acquires meaning only as it is judged from the outside.  In 
seven passages, cumulatively making up almost one third of the novel, Mrs McKee is 
retold her life story by a board of (imaginary) inquisitors, and is made by them to answer 
to a series of charges, ranging from unwitting infidelity to unwitting murder.  Mrs McKee 
is an outsider (from Edinburgh, and Brown’s depictions of that city in this novel have 
more that is truly foreign about them than his depictions of the far East in Time in a Red 
Coat), judged by a court of outsiders, befriended in the novel only by an outsider (Johnny 
Singh, previously introduced in “The Seller of Silk Shirts” in A Calendar of Love), and is 
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largely unconcerned with the events of the village around her, yet she is also perhaps the 
central figure of the novel, the one in whom Brown puts the most emphasis in his 
explanation of the relation of the individual to this, and to any, community.  For Murray 
and Tait, Mrs McKee is an example of the ways in which the Reformation has tormented 
the community: her two greatest charges in the assize with which she is occupied are that 
she has been in part responsible for the conversion of her niece Winnie to Catholicism 
and the growing alcoholism of her (Protestant) minister son.   Murray and Tait argue that 
it is Mrs McKee’s very outsider status which plagues her: “Product of city, not country, 
of industrial not agricultural Scotland, of the Reformation, this essentially good and well-
meaning woman is plagued by monsters that attack no other inhabitant of Hellya”.54  
Conversely, Schoene finds that “Some of the parallels between the woman and the island 
are so conspicuous that they eventually render Mrs McKee not only a mere symbol but in 
fact a startling likeness of the Orkney community”.55  Schoene’s key example is that, 
after her increasing dementia and eventual coma, Mrs McKee makes a surprise recovery, 
a recovery he sees mirrored in the reworking of the ritual of the Horsemen at the novel’s 
close.  While this is a somewhat tenuous argument, Schoene makes a valid point in his 
tying of Mrs McKee to the larger community, even as she is something almost wholly 
separate from it.  In his depiction of Mrs McKee, Brown reveals the ways in which 
individuals form their own communities, according to their own concerns, and the 
dangers inherent in that action. 
 Mrs McKee lives a life specifically concerned with memory and ritual.  The 
assize which visits her four times a year to judge her past sins, is as much a ritual as that 
of the Horsemen, with its own particular and secret rules of conduct: “On every bright 
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and dark wind they came, her accusers, four times a year” (G 17).  It is also explicitly a 
community based in individual memory.  Mrs McKee “enjoyed the vivid resurrection of 
the past, however painful.  There was a whole team of accusers, and it gave her pleasure 
to recognize their distinctive turns of phrase and the rhythms of their speaking (though 
some of them no doubt were very unpleasant dangerous persons indeed)” (G 18).   
McKee’s project is thus extremely close to that of The Skarf and of Brown himself; she 
initially, at least, takes pleasure in the appearance of communal memory, in the 
recognition of individuals who have adopted a communal body without diminishing their 
own distinctive voices.  In the absence of an engagement with the physical community 
around her, Mrs McKee has formulated one of her own, a community that is made up of 
individuals but acts as one.  Brown’s focus here is not on an actual community, but one 
that is predominantly literary.  This argument is in line with Nancy, who argues that: 
“literature offers the in-common (its only reason to be) as a completely buried memory, a 
memory also totally, invincibly, present”.56  The complete presence of that which is also 
buried is the purpose of the assize, which is indeed readable as the presence of literature 
in individual life, as much as the other characters’ physical books.  The assize is a way of 
provoking buried memory, of making it surface in ways that the individual memory-
holder does not expect: “The assize lasted for many days and generally covered the same 
ground, though occasionally new material would be led that she had entirely forgotten 
about” (G 17).  Yet Brown is more pessimistic than Nancy in this instance: for Brown, 
the “in-common” has been reduced to such an extent that it can only pertain to the given 
individual.  What is in common in the assize is only so because the memories, the assize, 
the entire community of memory, springs from the mind of one person.  The assize is, 
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along with the ritual of the Horsemen, the one true depiction of community in the novel: 
that it is both imaginary and destructive points significantly to the way in which Brown is 
using the novel to argue the impossibility of community in the present. 
 Mrs McKee’s memory is not accidentally located in the form of a court.  For 
Nancy, the approach of the individual to death, to “our own final horizon”, is imbued 
with legal echoes; what humans do, according to Nancy, is to “compear before the ‘world 
court’”.57  The compearance is a way in which two (or presumably more) individuals may 
answer to the same charge; in Brown, Mrs McKee appears alone, but also compears 
insofar as her selves spread out across time must answer together.58  That appearance, or 
compearance, allows the life of an individual to be understood as a series of actions 
which must be accounted for, as accusations which must be answered.  As Robb ably 
demonstrates, accusation “is one of the leitmotifs of the novel.”59  Mrs McKee, unlike the 
other characters, perhaps by dint of her outsider status, only accuses herself.  The 
adoption of legalistic ritual becomes a form of self-accusation, as well as of renewal.  
Ritual is also present, however, in Johnny’s visit to Mrs McKee, as a form of deliverance: 
“What is required in this room is exorcism.  What is needed is some pure blessed 
deliberate ritual to rid this old woman of her ghosts” (G 94).  And yet what Johnny offers 
her is not a ritual, but an acknowledgement of the outside, natural world, conversation 
about “the wild lupins in the island of Quoylay” and an attempt to prove that “the present 
world is full of such beautiful things” (G 94-5).  Just as at the beginning of the novel, 
Brown is here arguing for a primacy of the natural order over the rituals that humans can 
impose on it.  Mrs McKee is tormented by a community of memories to such an extent 
that she cannot engage in the physical world around her, where she might find a more 
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approving community.  This, for Brown, is not an isolated incident, but the central 
element of individual life in the modern world.  Mrs McKee is a central character, 
perhaps the central character, of the novel because she represents the impossibility of 
individual engagement in community: she turns away from the community which could 
be found on her doorstep in order to devise a community of her own imagining.  And yet 
the community that is outside her is filled with individuals who, to a lesser extent, create 
their own adjudicators as well.  When he is close to death by drowning, Samuel Whaness 
embarks on a pilgrim’s progress (no doubt inspired by his previously-mentioned reading), 
a section which is both a pastiche of Bunyan and a condemnation of Protestant 
spirituality.  He is surrounded not by judges but by shawled women and angel porters, 
and takes comfort in his belief that “by faith alone a man is justified” (G 220), but his 
self-devised torments as he approaches death – like that of Mrs McKee, one he is 
ultimately spared – isolate him from the actual community around him.  Whaness and 
McKee both exist almost solely in their own imagined worlds, communities which are, 
perhaps, far richer, and certainly more familiar to them, than Greenvoe itself, but which 
also separate them out and make it impossible for them to exist as part of the community, 
and thus for the community to exist at all.  These passages are an implicit condemnation 
of the turn towards inwardness which Brown sees as central to the modern world: this 
turn not only deprives the community of its members, but also brings those most inward 
closer to their own deaths.  If community, as represented in the final ritual of the 
Horsemen, symbolises life, then individuality comes to signify death. 
 From these passages, it is easy to see how critics such as Craig develop the notion 
that Greenvoe is “directed not on the drive towards the modern world, but on the 
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transcendence of it [… incorporating a] denial of chronology and progress”.60  And yet 
this interpretation is almost completely contrary to the point Brown is making in his 
treatment of Whaness and McKee: it is in transcending the world (whether ancient or 
modern), and in letting themselves live in a world made of memory, faith, ritual and 
imagination, that they drive themselves to death.  It is in their need to explain themselves 
to a “world court” of their own devising that they separate themselves out from the real 
workings of the community.  What Brown is interested in exploring is, according to 
Elsebet Jegstrup, an originally Kierkegaardian notion: “The elimination of the luminosity 
of singularity had reduced the human person to the abstraction of individuality and had 
reduced the ‘idea of community’ to the negative principle of sociality that rendered the 
question of existence irrelevant”.61  That is to say, Brown is not concerned with the 
transcendence of progress, but with the way in which progress makes it impossible for 
the individual to transcend himself.  This marked change to abstract individuality is what 
drives the novel for Brown: a thriving, ideal community is made up of individuals to be 
sure, but in such a community the focus is on the whole, rather than turned inwards to an 
exploration of their own given individuality.  Progress allows and encourages a focus on 
the abstract which removes the individual from an understanding of existence itself.  For 
Brown, existence as it should be is understood through community, through a pre-
Reformation understanding of the universe in which God, land and community are all 
understood as a totality.   
For Kierkegaard, as interpreted by Jegstrup, progress in this sense perverts the 
“relation between the individual and community [which] is grounded externally in 
constructed justice”.62  Progress brings disorder to justice, which destroys the relationship 
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between the individual and community.  This is the idea at which Brown is hinting in his 
portrayal of Mrs McKee as a slave to the assize; although her life can only be viewed in a 
legal setting, it is a perverse one, offering neither punishment nor forgiveness, unable to 
distinguish between levels of sin, unable to allow Mrs McKee to reintegrate herself 
within the community.  Mrs McKee’s life is validated according to a court of her own 
making, but it is crucially not a just court: the assize is a place of accusation, but not 
justice.  Progress here has destroyed not only community, but a communal notion of 
justice.  And yet, contrary to Craig, Brown does not advocate, or see as possible, a 
transcendence of progress or its effects.  He instead documents these effects in order to 
demonstrate the way in which it is now impossible for an individual to transcend such 
matters; transcendence could have only come through the work of the whole community, 
a community –or an idea of community – which has, in Brown’s understanding, 
necessarily been disrupted for centuries. 
 Greenvoe is thus the furthest thing imaginable from a denial of progress or an 
invitation to transcend it; it is instead a condemnation of progress and a calling to 
attention of the impossibility of the desired community.  Mrs McKee’s madness is 
relieved not in Greenvoe, but in Edinburgh, when she is returned to “her own city” (G 
254).  In Greenvoe she is subjected to “the dust and the raped skyline”, to “the engines of 
destruction” and rejects the attentions of her surrounding neighbours (G 249).  It is 
surprisingly in urban life that “Time built itself up again, not as an ancient storied house, 
but as a drift of butterflies.  A delicate light lay upon her branching quickened veins; she 
was young again” (G 255).  The engagement with time in a world ruled by progress is 
thus a fundamentally different one from that which would exist in a rural community.  In 
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her return to Edinburgh, Mrs McKee moves past narrative into a world in which all 
events become simultaneous.  Edinburgh, in works such as Beside the Ocean of Time, is 
depicted as something of an industrial hell, or at the very least a place which is 
destructive both to the individual and the possibility of community. Here, however, 
Edinburgh stands in for spring, rebirth and forgiveness.  This is clearly not what one 
would expect in a work of true rural pastoral; it is only when the outsider is returned to 
that which is necessarily outside that she can make peace with herself and those around 
her.  Edinburgh can do this work because it is there that the community of individuals can 
exist as such; necessarily a broken community, but nevertheless in some ways a far more 
functional one than that of Greenvoe.  This acceptance of metropolitan communal 
identity has emerged over the past century as urban life becomes continually more 
dominant.  The rural, agricultural community which forms Brown’s ideal has been 
gradually replaced with a conception of community founded in the city.  It is, after all, 
the city that is located as the basis of both community and philosophy in Nancy’s 
conceptualisation: “the city […] is the subject of philosophy, where philosophy is the 
production of their common logos”.63  Mrs McKee, at least, finds peace when she accepts 
progress and urbanity; for Brown, the modern individual is perhaps happiest as such, 
when the will to an ancient, ideally unified community is replaced with the acceptance of 
the plural community modernity demands.  This passage reflects a peacemaking with 
modernity which is not present anywhere else in Brown’s fiction, yet it is no less 
significant for that.  In Greenvoe, the idea of the perfect community has been so 
corrupted that it is almost, but not entirely, no longer worth salvaging. 
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 Mrs McKee is thus almost destroyed by her constructed narrative, by her 
engagement with a form of memory which is not communal but too individual, by her 
determination to examine the past as a series of accusations.  She is given a parallel in the 
character of The Skarf, who is also concerned with constructing an answerable history, in 
this case not of himself but of the whole community.  As is discussed above, The Skarf 
(known always by article and surname – his given name, Jeremias Jonathan, is not 
revealed until the very end of the novel, a revelation which, extending the novel’s biblical 
parallels, shows him to be a sort of prophet) abandons his project at the point at which 
Black Star enters the novel.  This abandonment constitutes an acceptance that the modern 
world will not support linear narratives of origin.  Both The Skarf and Mrs McKee are 
depicted in the construction of (greater and lesser) explanatory metanarratives which are 
unsustainable in Brown’s vision of modernity.  For The Skarf, the purpose of this project 
is explicitly political: his vision of community reflects a greater Marxist paradigm. The 
Skarf’s project is concerned with the anonymous more than the specific; while written by 
an individual, it is presented for the approval of the community at large.  At the start of 
the novel, then, The Skarf’s project is antithetical to Mrs McKee’s: it is a communal 
narrative written for the benefit of the community, rather than an individual narrative 
constructed only for the benefit (or detriment) of the individual constructor.  As the novel 
progresses, however, The Skarf’s narrative becomes concerned with specificity.  In his 
account of Thorvald Gormson (Harvest-Happy), The Skarf realises that “‘We have 
passed beyond the age of anonymity now.  Here at last is a man with a name’” (G 59).  
The narrative grows in specifics; at the appearance of Robert Stewart, the account grows 
more concerned with people of name than with the community, and in the final passage 
 251 
in The Skarf’s narrative, only one man, Mansie Hellyaman, press-ganged in the 
nineteenth century, matters to the narrative, and only because he becomes a capitalist.  It 
is progress itself that disallows The Skarf’s communal narrative; the events that shape the 
island can only be told, after a certain point in history, as individual narratives.  It is at 
this point, in a sense, that Brown takes over from The Skarf; it is worth here noting that 
much of The Skarf’s narrative closely echoes, in tone and content, An Orkney Tapestry. 
The modern world can only be told in a series of individual narratives; the communal 
identity originally invoked can no longer be sustained. 
 The Skarf’s failed narrative is almost directly opposed to Elizabeth Huberman’s 
interpretation of it.  For Huberman: 
although The Skarf does not make the point, these cycles of sowing, harvesting, 
and baking, of living, dying, and giving birth, have been going on too long to be 
more than temporarily interrupted by a project conjured up by a fleshless, soulless 
Number.  The community, as the movement and structure of the novel, as well as 
The Skarf’s history, have testified, is too solidly a whole to be disintegrated 
beyond recall, too timeless to be brought to an end.64 
 
And yet The Skarf is very clearly making a point, which is that these supposedly eternal 
cycles have been disrupted by capitalism and the rise of the individual.  The final figure 
in his narrative, Hellyaman, is an opportunist and a man of violence.  When he leaves the 
soldiering life, he is “caught up in the great dream of agriculture.  New methods of 
farming were being tried out everywhere: enclosures, root crops, the renewal and 
sweetening of the land with clover. […] And every year the banker sent him a statement 
that assured him he had more money than the year before” (G 162).  Hellyaman’s name is 
not accidental: the representative man of Hellya is now an individual who is concerned 
not with farming but with agriculture, not with the community but with personal gain.  
The community, encapsulated in the voice of The Skarf, has long been disintegrated, not 
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by the arrival of Black Star, but by the preceding centuries of the rise of individual 
dominance. The Skarf’s history cannot explain the community, because there is no 
community left to explain, only the assemblage of individuals who form their own 
narratives, as born out most explicitly by Mrs McKee, but to a lesser extent by all of the 
inhabitants of the island.  The historian, the writer of prose, has been made redundant.  
The Skarf’s dream of “the Song of the Children of the Sun” (G 234) that will replace his 
history in the island’s future remains a dream.  For Brown, what is actually on the island 
in the present is nothing more than an assemblage of individuals who cannot be written 
into an overarching story. 
 For Brown, then, Greenvoe is set up to dispute the possibility of the very sort of 
community towards which it points (and which hopeful critics have often found within), a 
community of “a single interwoven identity”.65  His Greenvoe is a place of inwardness 
and accusations, of individual fantasies and collective disputes.  To a certain extent, the 
novel must be read as an account of what has gone wrong with modernity, and how it has 
happened.  The novel begins with a depiction of what appears to be a vibrant, interwoven 
community, only to reveal it as inwardly corrupt, hoping for redemption but not assured 
of it.  For Brown, what a community should be can only be revealed by what it has failed 
to be.  In “The Cinquefoil”, published not long after Greenvoe, Brown explicitly outlines 
the ideal community: 
A community maintains itself, ensures a continuance and an identity, through 
such things as the shop, the kirk, the stories told in smithy and tailor-shop, the 
ploughing match, agricultural show, harvest home, the graveyard where all its 
dead are gathered. (It is the same with all communities – city or island – but the 
working-out of the ethos of a community is best seen in microcosm, as in the 
island of Selskay.)  Most of all the community ensures its continuance by the 
coming together of man and woman. […] The place where the community lives is 
important, of course, in perpetuating its identity.66 
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This prescriptive passage is what is in keeping with the remnants of community displayed 
in Greenvoe, most especially in the first chapter.  The community, as it is initially 
portrayed, comes together in the combination of land and commerce, in conversation and 
silence.  The community is a combination of the man-made (the shop), the divine (the 
kirk) and the landscape.  In their long-standing ties to each other and to the land, the 
inhabitants of Hellya have the outward appearance of community; what they lack is what 
Brown terms “Love”: 
all loves and affections become meaningful only in relation to Love itself.  The 
love of a young man and girl in a small island is cluttered always with jealousy, 
lewdness, gossipings in the village store.  But the mystics insist that Love itself 
‘moves the stars’.  They say that, in spite of the terror and pain inseparable from 
it, ‘all shall be well’ – in the isolate soul, and in the island, and in the universe. 
The meanest one in the community feels this occasionally; he could not suffer the 
awful weight of time and chance and mortality if he didn’t; a sweetness and a 
longing are infused into him, a caring for something or someone outside his 
shuttered self.67 
 
In his appropriation of a Catholic mystical tradition, most especially in this passage the 
works of Julian of Norwich, to explain the secular community, Brown reveals that the 
ultimate failing in Greenvoe, that which dooms the islanders, is not only a lack of love, 
but of faith.  For a notably religious writer, a Catholic convert since 1961, Greenvoe is 
remarkable for the lack of attention paid to religion.  The Whaness family is devout in 
their way, and Mrs McKee’s narrative is in part concerned with the theological training 
of her son Simon, the island’s minister, but, with the exception of Ivan Westray’s oft-
mentioned book of sermons On Love Carnal and Divine, the island appears to exist on a 
largely secular plane: the faith of individuals never leads towards a community of faith.  
The closest Brown comes to a statement of the centrality of religious faith to community 
is in the final ritual of the Horsemen, in which the “resurrection” at hand is explicitly 
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Eucharistic.  As Schoene argues: “In startling imitation of the Incarnation of Christ, the 
Fable of Orkney enters the narrative of the Story here, revealing the entwinement of the 
ordinary with the eternal and divine”.68  But Schoene’s interpretation is here somewhat 
misleading, for while the ritual is everpresent in the novel, it is never “ordinary”, 
especially at the end, where all that is ordinary in the community has departed.  The ritual 
exists to fill the vacuum created by the departure of the community as such.  Even as 
Brown depicts the potential return of the “eternal and divine” to the island, he ensures 
that such a return can only occur in the absence of the ordinary community.  God is the 
central aporia of the text, the absent metanarrative which, in its very absence, ensures the 
failure of all other, smaller metanarratives.  Again returning to the condemnation of the 
Reformation in “The Broken Heraldry”, a disruption of faith which gives rise not only to 
Calvinism, but implicitly to secularism, Brown is depicting in Greenvoe what happens to 
a community in which the central organising principle of a god has been abandoned.  In 
his essay on Rackwick in An Orkney Tapestry, Brown writes of how, through the 
observance of Catholic ritual, “into the crofter’s sackcloth the life of Christ wove richness 
and beauty” (OT 36), while Calvinism is associated with a secular belief in fate (OT 48).  
In giving themselves up to fate – another potential explanation of that for which Black 
Star is a symbol – the islanders abandon the (Catholic) metanarrative which could have 
sustained the community. 
 If, as has been extensively argued above, Greenvoe can be read as essentially a 
novel of despair, it is the despair of the possibility of community after the death of God.  
There is, all the same, a fictive, or impossible, community which is depicted in the novel, 
and it is, perhaps not surprisingly, the very same community which Nancy sees (quite 
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favourably) as arising in the absence of God, a community structured around common 
plurality.  Greenvoe is an example of what Nancy’s terms a “divine [place] without 
gods”.69  For Nancy, the community is centred on the plurality of Being, of the difference 
between the singular which constitutes Being, and which is grounded in a specifically 
non-Christian practice of ‘love’: 
this love is not some possible mode of relation; it designates relation itself at the 
heart of Being – in lieu of and in the place of Being – and designates this relation, 
of one to another, as the infinite relation of the same to the same as originally 
other than itself. […] It is a matter of wondering about the ‘meaning’ (or ‘desire’) 
of a thinking or culture that gives itself a foundation the very expression of which 
denotes impossibility, and of wondering how and to what extent the ‘madness’ of 
this love could expose the incommensurability of the very constitution of the 
‘self’ and the ‘other,’ of the ‘self’ in the ‘other.’70 
 
This is a remarkable paragraph, for Nancy insists that this love, when removed from its 
conceptualised Judeo-Christian history, is the way in which the relation of the self to 
Being, and the relation of the self to the other, is best  understood, and simultaneously 
insists that, so entwined is the concept of love with Judeo-Christian notions, that it can 
only denote an impossibility of relation.  The contradiction here is the same with which 
Brown is struggling, although to opposite ends: through Judeo-Christian history and 
practice, humanity has been given a guideline of what it is a community should be, of 
how it is that a self relates to others, to the Other, to otherness itself, and yet that system 
of relations is necessarily impossible.  It is not enough, as Nancy implicitly admits, 
merely to state that these concepts can be utilised free of their previous significations, and 
yet there is no other language with which to discuss the nature of relation.  For Nancy, 
God, or the gods, or the divine, “formed the common name or place […] of every 
question, every exigency of thought”.71  Given the absence of God (or even, in terms 
which would be more permissible to Brown, the impossibility of recreating the original 
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relationship between humanity and the divine, which was severed at the Reformation), all 
of that which was understood through God, including self, others, community and love, is 
now understood only as fragments.  These fragments cannot be fully understood in 
isolation, but only through Being-with, through co-existence, with other fragmentary 
natures.  And yet it is still impossible to speak of these things without implicitly referring 
back to an earlier, unified, way of looking at the world and at the divine.  This is a key 
concern of Greenvoe: the ritual at the end of the novel can, perhaps, only refer directly to 
the divine because it has been taken out of the world as such, because the concerns of 
self, otherness, community and so on have been forcibly removed by Operation Black 
Star, which here has become a quite literal deus ex machina, a way in which the divine 
can be reinstated perhaps only at the expense of those to whom it would relate.  Brown’s 
community is one which yearns to transcend its own fragmentary nature, and cannot, 
until such a time as all of the fragments themselves have been further fragmented to the 
level of the individual without others. 
 In Nancy’s thought, this fragmentary nature revealed in, or constitutive of, 
community, is the way in which Being can best be understood, not as Dasein but as 
Mitsein. In Nancy’s extrapolation of Heidegger Mitsein becomes absolutely central to any 
understanding of Being: Being is revealed as meaning, and that meaning is in turn 
revealed as the sharing of Being.72  At the level of the human, Being consists in being-in-
common, that is, in the formation, however expressed, of community.  But community in 
this sense cannot be understood as a single entity, as the interwoven whole of Brown’s 
idealised pre-Reformation community would be understood, but as linked, but not 
unified, singulars.  The fragmentation at the heart of any understanding of community is 
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thus a necessary way of understanding Being for Nancy, but crucially, as shown in the 
first passage quoted above, does not yield to a rude collective of egos, but to a 
coexistence of singulars.  While Nancy is explicitly writing on the demise of 
communism, he is, in his own way, here advancing a utopian understanding of 
community: “Because not being able to say ‘we’ is what plunges every ‘I,’ whether 
individual or collective, into the insanity where he cannot say ‘I’ either.  To want to say 
‘we’ is not at all sentimental, not at all familial or ‘communitarian.’  It is existence 
reclaiming its due or its condition: coexistence.”73  This “we”-ness is an essential 
condition of human existence which is fulfilled by community, even when community 
has been rendered impossible.  And it is this notion of an essential coexistential element 
of human life which finally unites Brown and Nancy, as centrally different as their 
overall claims about the nature of community and of the relation of self to others, to the 
divine and to the world, can be.  Both posit that although the community is impossible, 
although it is likely, or at least possible, that the fragmented individuals will move into a 
state of solitary ego, it is only in coexistence that difference can be fully revealed.  This 
begins to explain the bare “types” who populate Greenvoe: they can only be revealed as 
such because they co-exist within a cobbled-together community, one which does not 
reflect the unified whole to which Brown would advocate a return and which Nancy 
would castigate as sentimental, but which nevertheless represents a peculiarly modern 
approach to the question of being within a community. 
 A further unification of perspective can be seen in Nancy’s work with Lacoue-
Labarthe on the literary fragment.  The fragment, in the early German romanticism to 
which they refer, “designates a presentation that does not pretend to be exhaustive and 
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that corresponds to the no doubt properly modern idea that the incomplete can, and even 
must, be published […] the fragment functions simultaneously as a remainder of 
individuality and as individuality”.74  As explained by Blanchot, the fragment does not 
exclude or annul the whole, but instead expands it, surpasses it.75  The fragment in 
literature is, then, a way to explore the whole while remaining at the level of the 
individual.  Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy’s focus here is on fragments clearly identified as 
such, but it is possible to interpret Greenvoe as, to a certain extent, a fragmentary novel.  
Rather than reading the novel as a collection of short stories which have been combined 
to create a novelistic effect, as many of the early reviewers did, it is possible to read it as 
a collection of fragments, a series of passages which focus on the individual, and are to a 
certain extent necessarily incomplete in themselves, but which through their 
juxtaposition, and by the foregrounding of their very fragmentary nature, point towards a 
whole.  The lives Brown portrays cannot be understood in isolation, but simultaneously 
can only be portrayed in isolation.  There is no way to point at the whole except by 
pointing at its constitutive points, and yet those fragments do not necessarily cohere.  
Within Greenvoe, it is in the spaces between the distinct fragments that the community 
appears, in the switch between forms, between narrators.  The whole cannot be 
documented as the whole, but in the documentation of fragments something of the whole 
can perhaps be salvaged. 
 Greenvoe thus points to a radical new understanding of community.  To say that it 
is wholly successful as a novel qua novel is clearly impossible,76 but Brown himself has 
anticipated this failure in his depiction of the lives ruined by the unified worlds presented 
within fiction (and within texts at large).  The novel as a form can no longer be used to 
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depict a community, or even a whole and independent individual, but can only, in 
fragments, both portray what has been lost within modernity and what is still present.  
Indeed, the remainder of Brown’s novels can also be seen as an attempt to assemble 
fragments of individual lives that point towards an impossible whole.  There is, then, a 
tremendous tension in Greenvoe: the fragments that constitute it point both towards 
disaster and towards a new understanding of community, seemingly entirely disparate 
notions of the future.  In his later writings, Brown attempts to find ways to resolve this 
tension: myth, sacrifice and poetry all serve to point beyond a disrupted community and 
towards an eternal unity which, even if it cannot be captured or enacted upon, 
nevertheless exists as promise.  Here, however, the community is left as impossible: the 
disaster as forever imminent and always present.  Greenvoe is best understood not as a 
novel of the Orkneys at all, then, but as an expression of modern despair, a despair which 
in his age Brown would attempt to mollify, but here presents only as crisis.  It is a novel 
which cannot, by virtue of its content, cohere: it is a system of fragments which point 
towards the forever impossible.  Greenvoe represents the novel as fragment, as 
everything and nothing, and as such it also becomes the novel of modern community, 
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Chapter 5 
Conclusion: The Question of Community 
 
As has been demonstrated in the preceding chapters, the tension or relationship 
between individuals and community forms the theoretical core of Brown’s longer works 
of fiction. The nature of community surfaces as a dominant theme in his nonfiction as 
well.  For Brown, community is the medium through which individuals connect with 
their history; it is not only that, as he argues in An Orkney Tapestry, a “community like 
Orkney dare not cut itself off from its roots and sources” (OT 29), but that community is 
the very way in which those roots and sources are maintained.  A community in its ideal 
form is not only a gathering of individuals, but also the way in which those individuals 
can come to a coherent understanding of themselves.  At the same time, Brown uses the 
idea of this ideal community to express not only historical understanding, but also 
geographical situation, racial homogeneity, and religious unification.  Contrary to these 
holistic notions of what community represents, however, Brown also uses the term to 
explore the ways in which a community, both in presence and absence, can be used to 
reveal individual difference.  In his writings on community Brown continually questions 
the divide between the ideal and the actual, between community as a defining concept 
and as a lived experience.   As will be shown below, Brown looks at the idea of 
community in three ways: he examines the geographico-historical or “real” community; 
he posits community as an abstract ideal which exists in the revelation of difference; and 
finally he reveals community, in a Heideggerian sense, as the turning, or the way that 
truth is unconcealed.   
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This first sense of community is the only one which the majority of his critics 
have recognised.  Indeed, Maggie Fergusson’s recent biography of Brown can be seen to 
represent the tone of Brown’s critical appraisal: she situates her account of Brown’s 
childhood and upbringing in the context of the Orkneys as “‘a place of vision’ which 
sustained him in his writing for the rest of his life”.1  From this critical perspective, it is 
not only important that Brown documents a real community, but that to a certain extent 
he himself embodies it.  It is in the latter two senses of community detailed above that the 
extent of Brown’s philosophical engagement with the very idea of community becomes 
apparent, however.  This willingness to explore a concept so fully is what marks Brown 
as a far more self-conscious writer than he is usually understood to be; his attempt to 
think about the limits of community and to examine what remains when the ideal fails is 
in many ways a thoroughly modern trope.  This focus on community, often to the 
exclusion of all other themes, has also been what has prevented Brown from being 
thought of as more than a regional writer; he is often dismissed as focusing on “the 
alleged primal virtues of the unsophisticated peasantry”.2  The contemporary criticism of 
Brown often follows from the early critiques of Robert Burns and James Hogg: his status 
as poet of place allows readers to see his work as pertaining only to that which is local to 
him.  Brown himself occasionally acquiesced in this view, appearing in interviews as a 
man “as rooted in the community as any writer could be”3 or as “the most unassuming of 
Orcadian bards”.4  It is this very engagement with community which ultimately marks 
Brown out as a philosophical writer, however, one who is rigorously critical of the ways 
in which individuals and groups approach self-understanding.  It is through his life-long 
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exploration of community that Brown comes to address not only life as it is lived in the 
contemporary Orkneys, but the nature of Being itself.  
 
A. Community as Difference, as Dwelling and as Myth 
The idea of community has become one of the dominant strands of modern 
philosophical thought, notably for the purposes of this thesis in those works of Nancy and 
Blanchot which in many ways follow on from a Heideggerian ontology.  An 
understanding of community is central to any understanding of contemporary 
metaphysics, for community is perhaps best understood both as Being and as the answer 
to Being.  This is a necessarily bold statement, and in order to understand it we need first 
to examine the relationship between beings and Being as Heidegger, among others, has 
outlined it.5  In his pivotal, and extremely condensed, essay, “The Onto-theo-logical 
Constitution of Metaphysics”, Heidegger argues firstly that “The difference between 
beings and Being is the area within which metaphysics, Western thinking in its entire 
nature, can be what it is”.6  That is to say, following from Hegel, Being is itself, as itself, 
the absolute concept or the essential truth of what it is to which beings pertain.  Being is 
that to which beings belong.  This relation between beings and Being is as old as 
metaphysics itself, and for the purposes of this chapter cannot be extensively explored.  
What is crucial in this quotation, however, is that Heidegger designates not relation but 
difference as the central area of metaphysical exploration with which he is concerned.  
“In order to think of the difference as such,” Heidegger writes, “we do not make it 
disappear; rather, we follow it to its essential origin”.7  Being as being and Being as 
beings must be thought of in regards to an originary difference.  Difference, then, is used 
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to explain, in the phrase of Thomas Sheehan, “the fact that human existence and the 
human world are always nonimmediate and not self-coincident”.8   
Heidegger’s focus here is on the way in which this difference is originary in terms 
of the individual, but recent years have seen a movement to use Heidegger’s starting 
principles as a way of thinking about the collective.  For both Brown and recent French 
theorists from Georges Bataille onwards, community, whether thought of in terms of 
Mitsein or Gemeinschaft – an important distinction which will be addressed below – is 
the way in which this originary difference is revealed.  For Bataille, Being “is never 
simple, and if it has a lasting unity, it only possesses it when imperfect: it is undermined 
by its profound inner division”.9  What Bataille is pointing to here is a certain rupture at 
the heart of Being, an impossibility of wholeness.  Bataille’s solution, as it were, is to 
focus on inner experience which is only permitted through community, an experience, as 
Nancy writes, that “is in no way ‘interior’ or ‘subjective,’ but is indissociable from the 
experience of this relation to an incommensurable outside”.10  What wholeness there is is 
revealed through an understanding of division and difference; the only approach to the 
totality of being is through its divided parts and through the experience of the outside-of-
self which community furnishes. 
Thus although Heidegger sees difference as an explanatory path towards identity, 
rather than to Being as such, within his works there is a pointing towards difference and 
dividedness as constitutive of Being itself.  Nancy, following from Bataille, neatly 
connects this apparent division at the centre of Being to community: 
This rupture (analogous, if not identical, to Heidegger’s distinction between the 
ontical and the ontological) defines a relation to the absolute, imposing on the 
absolute a relation to its own Being instead of making this Being immanent to the 
absolute totality of beings.  And so, Being “itself” comes to be defined as 
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relational, as non-absoluteness, and, if you will – in any case this is what I am 
trying to argue – as community.11 
 
This shift from Being to community is the key move in all of Nancy’s work.  It is 
predicated on Heidegger’s use of Mitsein, or being-with, Heidegger’s “answer to the 
question of the ‘who’ of everyday Dasein”.12  Being-with is a way for Dasein to 
understand itself in terms of what is already present (“ready-to-hand”) within the world.  
This provokes the question of community: it would initially appear that Mitsein is 
fulfilled through a literal gathering of others.  Yet this is not the case for Heidegger: 
“even if the particular factical Dasein does not turn to Others, and supposes that it has no 
need of them or manages to get along without them, it is in the way of Being-with”.13  
Thus in Being and Time Being-with is not presented as community, but as an essential 
statement of what Dasein is: Being-with is not ultimately predicated on the presence of 
others, but is one of the ways in which Dasein is revealed.  Specifically, Heidegger is 
here focusing on the way in which Dasein is revealed as everydayness, yet this 
everydayness is outside of nature and thus not social, nor, perhaps, communitarian.  As 
Michael Haar writes: “[Everydayness] is founded upon a Being-with-others which 
existentially determines Dasein, even if no Other is in fact present-at-hand”.14  This 
Mitsein, insofar as it reveals Dasein, does not require something to exist in relation to its 
“with”: being-with requires no object, only the possibility of an object.  Heidegger is 
using being-with to explain the individual Dasein, yet as Christopher Fynsk points out, 
this being-with is not autonomous.  Being-with an Other is not the same as Being-with 
(or towards) oneself, but they exist in necessary relation.  “Dasein’s relation to itself and 
its relation to the Other are not the same relation (or a relation of sameness), but nor can 
they be kept separate from one another – otherwise there could be no communication of 
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difference.”15  Heidegger thus begins to invent a new language of community, and the 
ways in which community can simultaneously reveal both the self and others, pointing 
towards the sort of self-realisation pointed to by Bataille as “inner experience”, but draws 
short at the last moment in order to focus only on the individual Dasein.  As Simon 
Critchley argues, Nancy’s task is thus to rewrite Being and Time in such a way that 
Mitsein is the essential originary concept: the pre-eminent focus of the work is on 
Heidegger’s “phenomenology of everyday life, the sheer banality of our contact 
(cotoîment) with the world and with others”.16  In order to accomplish this, Nancy 
proposes a reading of Mitsein in which Being-with is revealed as community. 
 Nancy begins his analysis with a questioning of “the breakdown in community 
that supposedly engendered the modern era”.17  This is a theme with which Brown, 
alongside a great many other writers typically labelled “rural” or “parochial”, is 
consistently involved, simultaneously looking back to “a time, 150 years ago, when life 
was dangerous and the language rich, and the community was invested with a kind of 
ceremony” (FI 166-7), and examining a vision of the present which is predicated on a 
necessary lack of such a community.  Nancy sees this sort of reflection on the lost 
community as a constant in human life, whether the lost community at hand be Greek, 
Roman or Christian: “always it is a matter of a lost age in which community was woven 
of tight, harmonious, and infrangible bonds and in which above all it played back to 
itself, through its institutions, its rituals, and its symbols, the representation, indeed the 
living offering, of its own immanent unity, intimacy and autonomy”.18  The community, 
viewed as something already lost, is thus both the collective whole of a given group of 
people, encompassing all elements of their lives, and also the way in which they come to 
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self-realisation.  For a writer like Brown, this form of community is already mythic, and 
the task of the individual writer is to relate the mythic to the actual:  
it was under these ordinary skies that the hunt, the battle, the voyage, the 
settlement, the triumph and defeat and reconciliation, take place; and the men and 
women and children of the islands (and everywhere) are the eternal actors.  It is 
the writer’s task to relate the legend (what Edwin Muir called ‘the fable’) to this 
age of television, uranium, and planet-flight.19 
 
In an autobiographical essay such as this, ostensibly designed to reveal his own origins as 
an individual writer, Brown makes explicit what Nancy calls an essentially Christian 
trope: ideal community once existed, but now can only be remembered.  Tracing the 
history of this trope back through the history of the West, Nancy argues that there has 
never been an age in which humans were not looking back to a more ideal community, 
rather than celebrating that in which they lived.  Nancy goes on to argue that “the thought 
of community or the desire of it might well be nothing other than a belated invention that 
tried to respond to the harsh reality of modern experience”, in this case, for Nancy, the 
absence of the divine.20   
For many contemporary theorists, these notions of community are necessarily 
Nietzschean.  As Derrida writes: “These thoughts invent themselves by countersigning 
[…] to the event signed ‘Nietzsche’. […T]hey belong without belonging to the untimely 
time of Nietzsche.”21  The contradictions in this citation make clear the paradoxes which 
Nancy is attempting to explicate: community itself must be understood as belonging 
without belonging and as existing in time while remaining untimely.  If one is not to posit 
“community” as part of a possibly mythic past, then its paradoxical nature must be made 
explicit.  Derrida points to the way that Nietzsche “sometimes says ‘I’ and sometimes 
‘we’. The signatory of the precursory discourses addressed to you is sometimes me, 
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sometimes us.”22  What interests Derrida in this reading of Nietzsche is the way in which 
the impossible community refers to both the solitary individual and the collective at the 
same time: it is always both inclusive and exclusive.  Tracing this idea back as far as 
Nietzsche reveals that the idea of the impossible community is closely tied both to 
modernity and to the death of God, as Nancy also attests. As Fynsk writes, Nancy’s 
argument is built on both Bataille and Nietzsche, insofar as he argues that: “part of the 
devastation wrought by the technical organization of advanced capitalist societies […] 
lies in the isolation of the individual in its very death”.23  The dissolution of community 
must in part be understood as an effect of modern conceptions of self and society.  
However, as Nancy adds, we must also be suspicious of this idea of a “lost” community 
which modernity has eradicated: “at every moment in its history, the Occident has given 
itself over to the nostalgia for a more archaic community that has disappeared”.24  The 
impossibility of community must thus be understood as both an effect of modernity and 
as a constant uniquely outside of time. 
 If the desire for a “lost’” community is revealed as a constant in human 
experience, then such nostalgic idealism is necessarily called into question.  For Nancy 
(again, virtually paraphrasing Bataille), community must be understood as something 
else, something active in the present, specifically as the way in which the individual’s 
existence outside himself is revealed.  “Community means […] that there is no singular 
being without another singular being.”25  Community is thus the way in which the self 
relates to both others and itself.  This initially appears to be the farthest possible point 
from Brown’s conceptualisation of community, in which the whole relates to itself as a 
whole.  And yet, in a rather surprising passage in his autobiography, Brown introduces 
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the community as the way in which individual difference is necessarily revealed: “We put 
on masks when we go out of our houses into the community.  Communal life is complex: 
we have a different mask for everyone we encounter” (FI 17).  This is a very different 
conceptualisation of community from those passages of Brown cited above: here Brown 
argues that community not only reveals individual difference, but also creates it.  A 
singular being, through communication with another singular being, creates itself anew.  
Community, in this image of Brown’s, is certainly the way in which the self is revealed to 
itself, but this revealing is not one of some sort of inner truth, but instead reveals the self 
only insofar as the self relates to others.  There is a certain circularity at work here, then, 
for in Brown’s conception community creates or reveals that which can only be seen 
within a community.  The way an individual perceives herself and the way that individual 
is perceived by others are both functions of community.  Along similar lines to Bataille 
and Nancy, then, Brown’s conception of individual being is predicated on its revealing 
through community.  Community thus cannot be thought of as a past moment, but as 
something at the very heart of modern life and any modern understanding of self. 
 This notion of “masks” and, above, of “actors” raises a troubling question: in 
Brown’s conceptualisation of community, how much communal behaviour can be said to 
be organic or originary, and how much is artificially created?   Brown’s Letters from 
Hamnavoe, a collection of early Orcadian columns centred on community news, is filled 
with injunctions against transistor radios and “The Menace of Cars”; his dominant theme 
in the column is a mourning of all that modernity (as expressed through physical 
emblems) has stripped from the community and the ways in which technology has taken 
from the community that which was essential to its survival.   The community Brown 
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reveals is one which is in part predicated on its physical nature: he writes with dismay, 
for instance, on the replacement of flagstones with concrete, in hopes that “the Stromness 
members of the Heritage Society will keep an eye firmly on the situation”.26  The 
columns initially appear to support the widespread view of Brown as a somewhat 
curmudgeonly preserver of past ways of living, a view Brown himself supports in his 
introduction: “There is a great deal of reminiscence [in these columns]; not only shreds of 
my own childhood, ‘the vision splendid’, but for the simpler and more meaningful 
community that Orkney used to be.  The outer world has intruded successfully into our 
silences and secrets.”27  The conflation of simplicity and meaning here is notable: in 
essays such as this Brown treats the modern world as a system of complexity which 
erodes a primal simplicity that was necessary to allow community.  Iain Crichton Smith’s 
assessment of the columns, that “they reveal a real person in a real place”,28 is here 
particularly apt.  The columns focus on a placed community, and point towards a 
harmony of location and community to which Brown most often advocates a return, or at 
least approaches with nostalgic longing.  Here there is no sign of “masks” and “actors”, 
but only of real people in real places. 
Brown occasionally reflects, however, on the impossibility of returning to a 
proper community: “most of us have come so far away from that poor earth-rooted 
beautiful way of life that to go back would be more painful than to struggle on into the 
age of the Atom”.29  There is something perhaps intentionally disingenuous in such a 
statement, the beginnings of a recognition that this “beautiful way of life” has not been 
accidentally lost, but intentionally left behind.  In his reflections on the types who “have 
disappeared from our streets and roads”30 – fiddlers, tinkers, lamplighters, postmen – 
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Brown fluctuates between a purely nostalgic vision of past community and a recognition 
that the roles filled by the members of that community are no longer needed.  Even as he 
laments the passing of the ideal community, Brown recognises that such a community 
came about, if it ever existed, not in order to fulfil an ideal but out of the demands of a 
particular time and place, demands which are themselves now irrelevant.  From these 
passages, it appears that a community is not, and perhaps has never been, the unified 
whole Brown imagines, but instead serves as a systematic approach towards 
individuality.  There are, indeed, two types of community to which Brown 
simultaneously refers: there is the actual community, a function of geography and history, 
that provides a context for his writing – “It was a very depressed little community that I 
was born into” (FI 15) – and there is this second community, one which is based on the 
confluence of individuals.  The former is most often his concern in Letters from 
Hamnavoe, but he does not write of such a community entirely naively, expecting a full 
return to a glorious past.  It is this latter form of community to which Nancy most often 
refers: “The unity of the world is not one: it is made of a diversity, and even disparity and 
opposition”.31  It is this latter form, too, to which Brown refers when he talks of the 
masks needed to enter a community.  The difficulty in reading Brown’s work as a 
statement on community, however, comes about from his conflation of the two senses, a 
willingness to see the geographico-historical community and the community which exists 
in the revelation of difference as essentially inseparable and co-existant, tied together by 
an undefined “community spirit”.32 
 The latter sense of community has already been explored extensively in the 
preceding chapters.  Brown’s interest in the geographico-historical basis of community, 
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however, is noteworthy in itself, not least because it is the view of community with which 
he is most closely associated.  This notion of community is of the sort found in many 
rural texts, and made most explicit in the later works of Heidegger, where he writes:  
The way in which you are and I am, the manner in which we humans are on the 
earth, is Buan, dwelling. […] The old word bauen, which says that man is insofar 
as he dwells, this word bauen however also means at the same time to cherish and 
protect, to preserve and care for, specifically to till the soil, to cultivate the vine.33 
 
The second half of this famous quotation most immediately illuminates Brown’s idea of a 
community founded in agricultural labour: “I came, as the years passed, to see the 
farmers and fishing-folk, and their work, as the most important in any community” (FI 
33).  Throughout Brown’s writings there is a clear sense that geographical community is 
not an accident as such, but is predicated on the working of a specific area of land and an 
opening up of awareness about the relation between land and people.  This sense mirrors 
at heart the Heideggerian notion of dwelling: dwelling is not only inhabiting the land, but 
entering into a relationship with it.  This sense forms the basis for all interpretations of 
Brown’s work as pastoral; his community is entirely dependent on agriculture not only 
for subsistence, but also for identity.  In pure opposition to Nancy, for whom “community 
cannot arise from the domain of work”,34 in these writings of Brown and Heidegger it is 
labour itself which forms the basis for community, specifically as that labour relates to 
the land in which the community exists.  For the purposes of this chapter, however, what 
is far more interesting in relation to Brown is the first half of this citation.  Heidegger 
establishes a connected chain of being in order to explicate this notion of dwelling: you 
are, I am, we humans are.  Although he does not make it explicit in his later writings, this 
is Heidegger’s final notion of being-with, so apparently simple as to require no 
explanation.  Dwelling cannot occur in isolation, but only in the co-presence of 
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individuals understood as a “we”.  What you are and I am is ultimately “we”.  Being-with 
does not only reveal difference, but sameness, or unity, as well; when being-with 
becomes co-dwelling, it establishes community.  Heidegger writes that, in dwelling, 
mortals save the earth, not only in terms of snatching it from danger, but as a way of 
“setting something free into its own presencing.”35  Surely it is not only the presencing of 
the earth to which Heidegger refers here, but the presencing of the community as well, 
the way in which the community serves to reveal individuals as what they are through 
being-with.  It is here that Mitsein implicitly begins to be read as Gemeinschaft; being-
with, in these later writings of Heidegger, cannot be understood solely as the way in 
which individuals are, but also becomes the way in which communities are.  Even 
Heidegger’s focus on the physicality of the community in this essay points towards a 
changed conception of being-with, one which is quite literally grounded in both place and 
others. 
 Brown also writes of this notion, in which the geographical situation in which a 
community dwells is essential, but at the same time not the complete expression of a 
given community:  
The spirit of a town is in the people.  Beauty and vitality flow through 
generations, however a town might change from a garden to a maze of sooty 
stone.  Environment must be important, but the ever-renewing spring, brimming 
over in a community (laughter and lore) is not easily defiled, though factory 
chimneys rise. (FI 101) 
 
Both Brown and Heidegger use a heightened, wilfully poetic language in these citations 
in order to signify the very strangeness of their notion of community: this holistic 
community has become the property of art, and is expressed through art, in a way which 
is not readily apparent through simple observation of a given actual community.  Here 
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Brown comes dangerously close to what Jerome McGann calls “the grand illusion of 
every Romantic poet”: the idea that poetry can supersede the actualities of history and 
culture.36   Brown uses this notion of the revealing power of art, however, in order to 
show not how art can bypass reality, but how it can show the truth of community.  This 
explains Brown’s continual focus on the physical basis of his work, its similarity to 
farming or fishing.  Art only has the revealing power Brown claims for it if it is based on 
the actual physical presencing of a real community.  For Brown and Heidegger, art 
reveals community to be being-with, predicated on a being-in of an environment, but 
more specifically related to the way in which people co-exist.  Both the citations from 
Brown and Heidegger come from works written relatively late in their authors’ careers, at 
such a point when the impossibility of community presented in Greenvoe, or the use of 
being-with only to reveal Dasein revealed in Being and Time, are apparently no longer of 
great concern.  Here, for both authors, dwelling is revealed as “both caring for and being 
cared for”.37  Dwelling is thus the combination of, or the relationship between, the actual 
physical community and a more abstracted human community, both of which are 
necessary to provide this dual care-function.  The community of “laughter and lore” is 
one of care, and one which to a certain extent overcomes the essential nihilism which 
underlies human existence.  Within the language Brown and Heidegger use, this latter 
form of whole community is revealed as continual possibility: for Brown, community is 
“an ever-renewing spring”, while in Heidegger, the problem and solution to 
communitarian existence lies in the way in which humans “must ever learn to dwell”.38  
The impossibility of community is thus recognised but presented as a solvable problem: 
humans will learn to dwell; the spring will renew.  There is still, however, something 
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dissatisfying in these explanations, in the way the impossibility of community as unity 
has been disregarded in favour of a communal unity which is at heart poetic and which 
perhaps ignores a stringent metaphysical approach to the nature of being. 
 As Julian Young argues, a Heideggerian notion of dwelling “requires an art that 
has overcome metaphysics”.39  Community, when it is approached through this artistic 
sensibility, initially appears to be presented in these later works as a solution to the 
problems of metaphysics.  In Being and Time, the fundamental nature of life in the world 
is presented as anxiety: “Being-in-the-world itself is that in the face of which anxiety is 
anxious”.40  Anxiety is, in the early Heidegger, that which reveals the world to be what, 
and how, it is.  If dwelling provides security in the form of caring for and being cared for, 
then to a certain extent it necessarily overturns metaphysics.  This cannot only be a 
question of art: if metaphysics, as shown above, is the way in which the relation between 
Being and beings is understood, and that relational difference is the core of community, 
then a community which is understood as caring or dwelling is not only distinct from, but 
entirely opposed to, a community of difference.  It would be easy to mark this shift from 
a community of difference to a community of dwelling, seen to a certain extent in both 
Brown and Heidegger, as a function of age or of changing notions of metaphysics across 
time, but this fails to explain the extent to which in Brown’s work these two oppositional 
notions of community co-exist.  It is not enough to look at the years which passed 
between the writing of Greenvoe, in which individual difference is revealed as central to 
community at the same time that it undermines it, and Beside the Ocean of Time, in 
which the individual life is able to encapsulate all that was valued in community, and thus 
provide renewal, as sufficient to explain the difference in Brown’s understanding of 
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community in the two works.  In the citations from his autobiography above, it is clear 
that Brown uses the term “community” to refer, in Heideggerian terms, to both anxiety 
and care, often simultaneously.  In Brown’s work community is both impossible and 
ever-renewing, tied primarily to the land and primarily to the people, revealing of 
difference and best understood as unity, all at the same time.  He writes of the world as a 
“blighted wholeness”41 in which both the blight and the wholeness are given equal 
attention and are presented as irreconcilable but simultaneously present.  What makes 
Brown’s work challenging is that his community can never be straightforwardly read as 
either anxiety or care, neither as nostalgic unity nor modern dysfunction, but must always 
be read as both simultaneously.  Community is not a solution to anxiety, and does not 
overcome metaphysics, but instead merely exists concurrently. 
 In this paradoxical understanding of community, Brown creates a paradigm 
similar to that of Blanchot who, writing in response to Nancy, formulates a “negative 
community”: 
if the relation of man with man ceases to be that of the Same with the Same, but 
rather introduces the Other as irreducible and – given the equality between them – 
always in a situation of dissymmetry in relation to the one looking at that Other, 
then a completely different relationship imposes itself and imposes another form 
of society which one would hardly dare call a ‘community.’  Or else one accepts 
the idea of naming it thus, while asking oneself what is at stake in the concept of a 
community and whether the community, no matter if it has existed or not, does 
not in the end always posit the absence of community.42 
 
There is thus a perpetual dual understanding of community: community is still thought of 
as the relation of “the Same with the Same”, the unified community which a writer such 
as Brown situates within a verifiable geographico-historical continuum, but “community” 
is also the term used to express the questioning of this first form.  If this unified 
community has perhaps never existed, if communities have never been formed around 
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unity but only around difference, then ‘community’ becomes a way of exploring the 
absence of what is already defined as community.  Community, in the revealing of 
Otherness, is what is revealed in the absence of a community that functions through a 
revealing of sameness.  While Brown certainly writes with the belief that this unified 
community did exist, and may perhaps be recapturable, he also uses the word to refer to 
the dissolution of that ideal community and to its revealing in impossibility.  His work is 
thus balanced between a depiction of community as it should be, and as it perhaps may 
have been, and community as it is now revealed only though its absence.   
This paradox, as made explicit by Blanchot, begins to explain the way in which 
Brown’s writing of community functions both as a eulogy for something which is past 
and a prescription for the way in which humans should live. Communal life, for Brown, 
is the way in which the “complex interweavings” of human intercourse are best made 
clear, even when the community as it is is not complete or unified (FI 17).  Individuals 
always exist both as themselves and in relation to a community, even a mythic one: “real 
Orkney country folk […] can be encountered any day on a road or a seashore; but too, 
they are a part of the fable, as though they had always been, and always will be”.43  
Elsewhere he writes that: “the townsfolk are part of [a] web of legend”.44  The “fable” or 
“legend” in this instance is that of community; even in its absence it is the way through 
which people are best understood.  Community is a fabular metanarrative, no less 
convincing or necessary for its impossibility.  As Schoene has shown, Brown brings forth 
the notion of a “community with a singular, self-constant identity” through the creation of 
“historical myth”: “a real-life discovery and a construction of the mind”.45  This focus on 
community as fable permits Brown to maintain a notion of anxiety or negativity as 
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central to human existence while also proposing a desired unity.  As in the writings of 
Blanchot, humans cannot come to understand themselves without recourse to this fable of 
community, for it is only in the otherness revealed by community that understanding can 
take place: “If human existence is an existence that puts itself radically and constantly 
into question, it cannot of itself alone have that possibility which always goes beyond 
it”.46  For Brown and Blanchot both, community is that which goes beyond bare human 
existence, and thus even in its absence is absolutely necessary. 
 
B. Death and the Turn 
 The parallels between Brown’s complex views of community and those of Nancy 
and Blanchot (both here explicitly interpreting and reworking Bataille) also serve to 
explain Brown’s focus on individual death.  In the fiction, this focus is best illustrated in 
Magnus, in which the sacrifice of an individual serves to create and sustain community, 
but echoes can be seen in all of Brown’s writing, notably in the degree to which his 
nonfiction is concerned with the remembrance of individual lives.  A lengthy section of 
his uncollected writings, Northern Lights, is dedicated to his obituaries, eulogies, 
remembrances and other works of mourning.  In each, the death of the individual is 
presented not only as an individual loss, but as it is relevant to the community.  Of his 
father, for instance, Brown writes:  
A quintessence of dust, he lies in a field above Hoy Sound among all the rich 
storied dust of Stromness.  The postman had left the last door, he had quenched 
the flame in his lantern.  The tailor had folded the finished coat and laid it aside.  




Brown’s father is thus portrayed, or even explained, both through the communitarian 
roles he had in life (postman, tailor) and the community he joins in death.  Both in life 
and death, the individual is defined in terms of the community of which he has been a 
part.  In neither case is this a chosen or intentional community, but instead community 
becomes the way in which the life of the individual is understood and valued.  Whether in 
revealing sameness or otherness, the individual is who he is by virtue of the community 
within which he lives (and dies).  More importantly, however, the death of the individual 
also comes to define the community.  When a man (in this instance, Ernest Marwick) 
dies, he leaves remnants of himself within the community: “we knew that a great and a 
good man had gone from this generation of Orcadians; but had left treasures behind still 
to be estimated, and a most fragrant memory”.48  Implicit in such a statement is the notion 
that the treasures left behind are not only found in remembrance and nostalgia, but 
continue to create the community after the individual death.  The life and death of the 
given individual serve to make the community what it is.  Another man is said to “take 
his place among the shining dead of local legend”.49  The community’s sense of itself and 
the way in which community is revealed to itself, come from the observation of the death 
of the individual.  As such, this community is predicated on the events of linear time (the 
birth and death of the individual), but also to a certain extent exists outside of linear time, 
as the death of the individual is always anticipated and always present.  As Blanchot 
writes, “There could not be a community without the sharing of that first and last even 
which in everyone ceases to be able to be just that (birth, death)”.50  Or in Nancy: 
“Community is revealed in the death of others; hence it is always revealed to others. […] 
The genuine community of mortal beings, or death as community, establishes their 
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impossible community.”51  The way in which the individual is able to be revealed to 
himself is through his revelation to others, and this revelation, for both Brown and those 
theorists following Bataille, comes through the presence of death.  Departing from a 
Heideggerian being-towards-death, however, the death of the individual gains 
significance and is fully revealed not in terms of Dasein but as a function of community.  
The death of the individual reveals the community to itself.   For Brown, community 
itself becomes an act of remembrance, a unity which is impossible because it is only 
revealed as the disparate individuals who constitute it die.  As in Bataille, “Each one of us 
is then driven out of the confines of his person and loses himself as much as possible in 
the community of his fellow creatures.  It is for this reason that it is necessary for 
communal life to maintain itself at a level equal to death.”52 
 As has been shown in his novels, however, Brown is not content to show the way 
in which community reveals itself to itself only through the death of the individual, but 
through the death of the community as a whole.  With the exception of Vinland, all of 
Brown’s novels revolve around imminent disaster, whether it comes in the form of the 
clearance of the islands or a more general apocalypse.  In stories such as “The Wireless 
Set” (A Time to Keep) or “The Paraffin Lamp” (Winter Tales), technological invention 
itself is introduced as a force against which individual members must buttress 
themselves.  In this recurrent theme of a man-made force or invention which threatens to 
destroy the community, Brown echoes Heidegger, who sees “modern technology as a 
means towards an end”.53  And yet Heidegger takes this further to argue that this view of 
technology as means is artificial, created by the disguising that is the basis of Enframing. 
By “Enframing”, which can be read as the essence of technology, Heidegger refers not to 
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the exhibits or artefacts of technology, but to an underlying comportment which, while 
revealed most clearly through these physical constructions, is in fact a larger approach to 
Being itself.  Technology for Heidegger is not “technological”: it is not based on physical 
science or the machine, although these manifestations are not wholly distinct from it.  
Technology is the way in which Being is now known.   It is a way, or rather the way, of 
revealing the truth. Technology is thus a pervasive, inescapable mode of understanding; it 
is a way of understanding in which everything is determined in advance.  Yet for 
Heidegger it can still be questioned, for within its potential complacency exists great 
danger.   “Enframing comes to presence as the danger”,54 he writes, by which he means 
that the danger is not present only in nuclear apocalypse or, in the sort of example Brown 
favours, the wireless, but in the cultural mind-set of which these innovations are a 
manifestation.  Enframing is the way in which humans objectify the world, and yet is not, 
for instance, a development of the Enlightenment or the modern era, but something which 
is both everpresent and always a danger.   
This notional enframing is also, perhaps, the underlying structure behind Brown’s 
condemnation of the artefacts of technology, and the manner in which he depicts the 
coming of a wireless set or a newspaper to the Orkneys to be as destructive as nuclear 
war; it is not the thing itself which presents imminent danger, but the way in which the 
conception of technology and Being are intertwined.  For Brown, too, the artefacts of 
technology are those things which most clearly reveal the danger of enframing, and to a 
certain extent allow imminent danger to be overlooked because it has been recognised.  
This use of technology, in a Heideggerian sense as well as a practical one, to represent 
the end of the community begins to point towards a third conceptualisation of community 
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in Brown’s writing: community here becomes that which cannot be objectified, that 
which is unconcealed, that which has recognised the danger which was always present 
within itself.  In Heideggerian terms, Brown’s ideal community is that of the “turning”, 
the way in which a community or an individual comes to recognise “that truth is 
disclosive concealment and the world merely the intelligible ‘side’ of the unfathomable 
‘mystery’”.55  Turning, in Brown’s terms, is the discovery that community is fabular or 
mythic but cannot be renounced.  For Heidegger, turning is that which occurs when 
Enframing is recognised as danger; one could almost argue that the recognition of danger 
placates it.  “[T]he turning of the oblivion of Being into the safekeeping belonging to the 
coming to presence of Being – will finally come to pass only when the danger […] first 
comes expressly to light as the danger that it is.”56  Enframing and technology initially 
seem to be the markers of the fallenness from grace and of the separation from an ideal or 
whole way of living which creates the nostalgia pointed to by writers such as Brown.  For 
Heidegger, however, when they are recognised as what they are, they can bring about a 
turn towards an attending to Being.  “When the danger is as the danger, there the saving 
power is already thriving also.”57  When danger is recognised as itself – which constitutes 
the turn – it reveals itself to already embody its own saving.  Thus the solution to the 
problems which arise from enframing already exist within that enframing; the recognition 
of the imminent danger in that enframing brings about a new “insight into that which is” 
and reveals the truth of Being.58  
Enframing and community are, insofar as they form the basis for understanding 
the way in which Being is revealed for Heidegger and Brown respectively, not at all 
dissimilar.  For Heidegger, Enframing is not wholly unrelated to community, for it is “the 
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gathering together that belongs to that setting-upon which sets upon man and puts him in 
position to reveal the real, in the mode of ordering, as standing-reserve”.59  From this 
notion of gathering, it would appear that Enframing is, in a sense, the community which 
exists in order to allow the singular individual to reveal truth as it is.  If we understand 
community to be the mode of understanding that reveals individual difference, then 
Enframing is that which performs this function.  Yet Enframing is far more ambiguous 
than that, for it is only in the turn that Enframing, or technology, shifts from being the 
oblivion of Being to its safekeeping.  Similarly, the use of community and its saving are 
revealed only when community is itself revealed to be impossible and mythic.  Only in 
looking at community as something impossible can it be revealed to show a truth about 
the nature of Being, specifically Being-together.  Brown focuses on community as myth 
or nostalgia in order to allow a turning: the dangers of such a perspective also incorporate 
their own saving.  Much like Brown’s notion of community, in which community is that 
which reveals the individual to be what she is, but which also requires masks and acting 
to be entered, Heidegger advises caution when approaching Enframing, for it both 
disguises and reveals.    
Brown’s focus in his later work is on the revealing potential of community: truth 
is revealed, or unconcealed, through gathering. This unconcealing, for Brown, takes place 
in part through storytelling and through art:  
Much of the old story-telling has withered before the basilisk stare of newsprint, 
radio, television. Maybe, the people reckoned, after 1873, it was better to forget 
the ancient sorrows and joys.  There had been too much hardship.  The promised 
land lay all before them. […] Every community on earth is being deprived of an 
ancient necessary nourishment.  We cannot live fully without the treasury our 
ancestors have left to us.60 
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This passage reveals a basic understanding of the place of community in modernity: 
community, as a repository of stories, exists not despite modernity, or the technological 
mind-set, but in direct opposition to it.  Brown’s community is one which is always 
turning: one in which the truth, whatever it may be, has been revealed before and will be 
revealed again, but in which oblivion is always imminent and concealedness is always 
present.  In order for the community to exist in this potential unconcealedness, in 
opposition to the disguise of technology, it must occupy a liminal space between life and 
death, between “too much hardship” and “the promised land”, between “ancient sorrows 
and joys”.  The community in Brown’s work is always portrayed as being on the brink of 
the disaster because, in this third understanding of community, that is the only place it 
could possibly exist.  It is only when the community as a whole dies that it gains life, 
only when the community ends that its renewal is possible.  The unconcealedness of 
community thus rests upon both the imminence of the death of the individual and the 
death of the community as a whole, and further on the recognition within that community 
of this imminent death.  It is notable, however, that for Brown this unconcealedness is 
revealed only through art, specifically through storytelling.  History is itself “a mask […]; 
it is impressive and reassuring, it flatters us to wear it” (OT 11).  Storytelling, however, 
marks a return to a “kind of celebration”.61  For Brown, it is within this celebration, in 
defiance of history, that truth can be revealed. 
This celebratory art is the sort that Heidegger would call anti-metaphysical.  As 
Young interprets Heidegger: “the world-historical take-over by ‘enframing’, the fact that 
it has become the disclosure of Being which defines the modern epoch is […] only made 
possibly by the completion of a long and gradual, historical process in terms of which 
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Western humanity has lost […] the ‘festive’ mode of disclosure”.62  This festive mode 
marked a separation from everydayness, as is currently the case, but moreover, in 
reference to Hölderlin, “the meeting of gods and men”.63  Young is of course referring to 
the unturned sense of enframing here, in which it disguises truth.  Brown irregularly 
envisions (for it must be remembered that the tone of many of his works, from Greenvoe 
on, is one of despair) a work of art which performs the turn of enframing, which 
reintegrates the festive mode into everyday life.  The work of art which belies this loss is 
one which is both created and received in community.64  This sort of work of art takes the 
heritage of community and forms it into “the outline ‘shape’ of [the community’s] proper 
future, its ‘destiny’”.65  In this transition we can see the way in which Brown uses 
historically-based, but fundamentally ahistorical, narratives in order to create and 
remember the turned community.  This in part arises because for Brown art, especially 
literature, is a communal activity: “the poem, song, or painting, is not the work of one 
man labouring in isolation, but it is a whole community expressing its fears, hopes, joys.  
The artist is merely the instrument through which the whole tribe speaks”.66  Narrative art 
is closely tied to the life of the community, because it is itself an expression of 
community.  For Young too, this view of art is closely related to being-with, because it is 
art which allows a community to be possible at all.  Art is fundamentally preservational: 
it preserves and creates both truth and community. “Art lets truth originate. Art, founding 
preserving, is the spring that leaps to the truth of what is, in the work.”67  This initially 
seems contradictory: how can art possibly preserve that which it at the same time 
originates?  For Young, it does this through connecting the world and “people”, not 
people in general but more specifically an originary community: art “also preserves its 
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living existence and with it the ‘people’ it has brought into being”.68  It is this way in 
which art is simultaneously a creation of, and from, the community, and yet creates the 
community from outside itself in order to preserve it, that allows us to reconcile the 
seeming unity of community portrayed in so much of Brown’s writings with the 
despairing belief that community is ultimately impossible at the same time that it is 
equally present.   
Art, in this late Heideggerian sense, is the way in which truth is revealed; more 
centrally, the work of art “lets the earth be an earth”,69 it lets the world world.  That is to 
say, it is through the work of art, not as an artefact but as an event, that things reveal 
themselves to be as they are.  “If there occurs in the work a disclosure of a particular 
being, disclosing what and how it is, then there is here an occurring, a happening of truth 
at work.”70  The artwork is thus at once experienced in time, but is essentially timeless.  
The work of art is a happening of disclosure and unconcealing; it is not in 
phenomenological experience that the truth of human existence can be revealed, but in 
the happening of art.  This comes about because, as Heidegger points out, the work of art 
does not depict things as they are or as they could be experienced or manipulated by a 
subject, but in their general essence.71  Art exists outside of the sphere of individual 
experience in order to point towards a truth which cannot be recognised from within that 
experience.  The work of art, as portrayed in Heidegger, is thus perceived in the same 
way as community is perceived in Brown: it is at once predicated on the historico-
geographical reality of a time and place, but also essentially outside of time.  
Community’s existence in this dual sphere is the only way in which it can approach the 
truth: it is only because community to a certain extent, as an idea(l), exists outside of time 
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that it can reveal the truth of human life and can become a guarantor of unconcealedness.  
The impossibility of community in actual everyday life is thus less important than it 
initially appears, because through art, community can be revealed to be that which is, in a 
fundamental sense, true.   
In Brown’s autobiographical writings, he treats “legendary and historical sources” 
(FI 9) similarly: they are both approaches to an existing community, a way of revealing 
the truth of the perceived moment through that which is outside that moment.  In doing 
so, he self-consciously puts himself in a continuum of modern writing, naming Joyce, 
Eliot, Beckett, Mann and Chekhov as predecessors, as writers who revealed that “it is the 
common man who holds the rarest treasures.  There, lost, is the ‘immortal diamond’” (FI 
27).  What Brown attests to in his citation of these authors is the degree to which they 
map something outside of time onto the individual grounded in time.  The work of art, 
specifically twentieth-century literary art, is that which allows the individual (and, 
implicitly, the community as well), to be revealed to himself:  “It is a word, blossoming 
as legend, poem, story, secret, that holds a community together and gives meaning to its 
life” (OT 29).  The work of art creates, preserves, originates and unconceals the 
community in a way nothing intrinsic to the everyday life of the community could ever 
do. 
Indeed, for Brown it is only from outside, either through art or through death, that 
the truth of things can be understood.  Reflecting on the burial practices of primitive 
Orcadians, Brown writes:  
So it seems they lavished far more care on their ‘houses of the dead’ than on the 
huts and hovels they passed their days in.  The dead had gone, not into 
nothingness, but ‘into another intensity’ (as T.S. Eliot put it.) 
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There perhaps, the meaning of their miserable few years on earth was made plain 
to them.  There, perhaps, they existed in a timeless beauty, nobility, heroism.72 
 
This is a remarkable passage for several reasons.  First, it is notable that Brown’s 
language for describing the awareness of life that takes place after death is markedly 
similar to the language he uses elsewhere to describe the effects of poetry.  Speaking of 
significantly more recent inhabitants, Brown writes that: “The people lived close to the 
springs of poetry and drama, and were not aware of it” (FI 167).  Poetry and death both 
serve to reveal that which is concealed in everyday life; they are, again, Brown’s 
representation of a Heideggerian turning.  It is in an essay on Edwin Muir, indeed that 
Brown most clearly states that “Death is not a negation of life but a completion and a 
celebration”.73   Death itself is tied to the festive mode of life, and of poetry, of which 
Heidegger saw echoes in Hölderlin.  The passage is also notable for the way in which it 
makes Brown’s despair of contemporary life clear.   It is not only twentieth-century life 
which demonstrates that “There will never be a good society, there are too many flaws in 
human nature” (FI 183), but it is the human perception of life in its everydayness, in its 
nontranscendence, which is a constant barrier to unconcealedness or truth.  Those within 
a community, whether it be a local one or the global community of all those alive at a 
given moment, cannot recognise what good there may be in their lives.  It is only from 
the outside, either through death or through art, that revealing begins.  Finally, Brown’s 
citation of Eliot is worth mentioning.  Eliot is a surprisingly constant muse in Brown’s 
work; combined with the mentions of Joyce and Beckett above, it begins to be clear that 
Brown sees his project as falling in line with that of the modernists; he is not involved in 
recreating a past community so much as rethinking a present one. 
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C. Critical Reactions 
 And yet, for all of Brown’s subtle working of communitarian theory and for all of 
the ways in which he gestures to his contemporaries in both literature and philosophy, in 
short for all of the ways in which he repeatedly demonstrates himself not to be a dewy-
eyed Romantic, he remains cloistered in a nationalistic, ruralist ghetto.  Contemporary 
reviews of his work, and especially the surveys written at the time of his death, 
continually focus on the way in which he inhabited a real community, and make him a 
spokesperson for an impossible rural idyll.74  A typical review of Beside the Ocean of 
Time begins:  
George Mackay Brown is totally removed from the fashionable literary scenes of 
Edinburgh or Glasgow, let alone London. He lives simply in the Orkney mainland 
in a small house off the main street in Stromness. He rarely travels ("I don't like 
travelling; I don't need to travel; I just take voyages of the imagination.")75 
 
Popular criticism of Brown’s works almost invariably opens in such a fashion, as if it 
were impossible to read his fiction without citing the lived experience theoretically at its 
root.  He is repeatedly described as “umbilically attached to Orkney”,76 writing of “the 
timeless simplicity of the islands”,77 sharing with all rural and island writers “an 
enhanced sensitivity to the rhythms of [his] environment”.78  Scores of reviews and 
appreciations share this tone, content to read Brown as an exemplar of island life and 
rural communities in general. As a recent review of the Collected Poems noted: “One of 
the most common complaints about Mackay Brown's work – that it remains 
circumscribed by his narrow island experience and so is largely irrelevant to the wider 
modern world – is precisely the reason that many people love it”.79  The majority of 
Brown’s obituaries place him as a character within his own texts, distrustful of progress 
and somehow in touch with a different way of life: “Famous for his nostalgic grasp of a 
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simpler way of life in a world increasingly dominated by modern machinery, he 
continued to write his works in pen at his kitchen table”.80  Even Douglas Dunn, one of 
his more sympathetic critics, calls Brown “a modern poet of the pre-Modern”.81  It would 
be possible to quote sentiments of this nature at even greater length, but it should suffice 
to note that there are two primary sentiments that recur in the popular criticism.  The first 
is that Brown was able to write of the Orkneys in a way that reduced or expanded them to 
archetypal status: 
Virtually everything he has written has presented Orkney life, past and present, as 
archetypal, an elemental expression of the meaning of life itself, conveyed through 
a consistent and overwhelming symbolism of land and sea, of seasonal change and 
the rites of passage of birth, fruition and death.82 
 
The second, more strident claim is that: “In many ways, Brown created the myth of 
Orkney. A fabulist, he wrote of an Orkney that never was, and yet always was”.83 
 No author should be judged solely by his or her contemporary popular criticism, of 
course.  It is remarkable, however, how consistent this criticism has been over the past 
thirty years: whether Brown is viewed either as a fabulist who has created a mythic 
Orkney or a realist who writes only of the island life around him, he is always viewed as 
a provincial writer, one whose main, perhaps only, concern is the life of the Orkneys.84  
In another recent appraisal, James Campbell locates the archetypal quality of his 
characterisations in his status as a “popular poet”:85 his very accessibility is taken as 
revealing a certain “timeless” truth about the material with which he deals, insofar as it is 
drawn both from reality and myth.  Brown himself perpetuates this view of his work as 
firmly rooted in a non-academic, populist world-view: “I drew much of my inspiration (if 
such a thing exists) from the tillers of earth and sea that the whole engine of education 
had been devised to lift the worthy ones and the hard studiers clear of” (FI 33).  At the 
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same time that he attempts to separate himself from education, he writes elsewhere of the 
symbolic use of labour: “Without the rich imagery that flows from the labour of sailor, 
farmer, fisherman, I would hardly string two lines together.  Those earth-workers and 
sea-workers stand at the very sources of life, very powerful symbols, and it is there that 
literature and all the arts have their beginning.”86  Brown’s apparent desire to see himself 
within a tradition of physical labour and yet at the same time to treat those who labour as 
symbols is distressing and perhaps patronising.  Yet many critics have taken him at his 
paradoxical word.  There are dozens of personal recollections, as well as interviews, 
which supplement this notion of Brown as a writer firmly enmeshed in a living 
community, but drawing upon mythic and symbolic sources to explicate it.  Indeed, one 
critic has argued that, without the influence of Muir’s symbolism: “Brown’s work would 
have remained parochial and of little interest to readers outside of Scotland”.87  There is 
an implicit argument here that Brown’s work is in fact parochial, but has achieved its 
popularity by dressing up that parochialism in mythical and symbolic narratives.  Other 
critics merely state that for Brown both the local and the universal are always present.  In 
an interview published shortly after his death, Gavin Bell imagines Brown as a ghost:  
Mackay Brown has gone off on his travels again. Eventually somebody might fix a 
commemorative plaque to the grey wall of his house by the bay, and one day you 
might see an old man with white hair regarding it with a bemused smile. Don't be 
alarmed if he disappears – it will just have been George paying a visit from the 
place he calls the Ocean of Time.88 
 
This view of Brown as both ultimate insider and perpetual outsider is representative of 
much of the criticism that has been written in the past decade: Brown is seen as entirely 
of the community, but also somehow outside of it.  It is no doubt a perspective of which 
Brown would have approved.  Yet there is a great danger in such sentiments: such 
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thinking eradicates what subtlety there may be in Brown’s writing.   
 In order to read Brown as a chronicler of community, it is necessary to see such a 
community as a pre-existing whole, a concept that, as has been shown elsewhere, Brown 
does not accept.  These views of Brown’s life and work as the culmination of life in an 
actual community pay little heed to the warning Murray and Murray see at the heart of 
his early work: “the artist in Orkney can find no proper place in the community.”89 At the 
end of his autobiography he writes of the need for a varied perspective on community 
life: “any small community is a microcosm.  It is not necessary to stray very far from 
your back yard.  The whole world gathers about the parish pump.  But stories from under 
the horizon ought always to be welcome” (FI 180).  It is this sense of a necessary 
multiplicity of perspectives which Brown welcomes and which the vast majority of 
popular critics have ignored.  Dunn, in the recent article cited above, is almost alone in 
his recognition that Brown was far more interested in writing of an Orcadian myth than in 
documenting a particular reality: “Despite his myth of rootedness and his encyclopaedic 
experience of his native place, there were islands of which he wrote but never visited”.90  
Brown himself, in a late interview, makes this sentiment explicit: “I write my best things 
about experience that I’ve never had and things that I have never seen.”91  To read Brown 
as writing only of, and from, the Orkneys is to limit his value as a thinker of community, 
as an observer of enlightenment and as a writer engaged with the world as it is, not only 
as it should be. 
 Academic criticism has often taken a similar tone to the popular criticism cited 
above.  In her early reappraisal of Greenvoe, Elizabeth Huberman, while arguing that 
Brown is “not a regional writer”, still grounds the initial value of his work in its regional 
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veracity:  
Since George Mackay Brown is himself a native of the Orkneys, where he has lived 
all his life, and since he writes exclusively about the people of these remote green 
islands off the northern coast of Scotland, he is able to present the image of this 
distant region with consummate authority and skill.92 
 
Even as Huberman attempts to advance an argument that “the universal is only too visible 
in this regional disaster”,93 she continually uses language which points to the reducibility 
of Brown’s work to the regional.  There is a foreignness in Brown’s vision upon which 
Huberman continually focuses: its focus on community “sets it apart from other novels”.  
Huberman’s argument that Brown  “employs the local [to show] the universal” is 
unsupported in her argument, because she fails in any way to indicate what this universal 
might be.  “Greenvoe’s plight really moves us more than our own”,94 she argues, but by 
clearly separating the fate of the Orkneys from that of the rest of the world, she fails to 
connect fully the regionally specific with her vague conceptualisation of the universal.  
An argument such as this ultimately undermines itself: in pointing almost exclusively to 
what is unique in Brown’s work – its Orkney setting, its communal focus, even its 
apparently reclusive author – Huberman implicitly convinces the reader that the work 
does not need to be taken seriously as anything other than regional fiction.  This 
argument is pitched closely to that of Alan Bold who, at the end of his monograph, argues 
that Brown is a writer “who has so completely mapped out his own artistic territory that 
he competes with no one”.95  While Bold intends this as the highest compliment, such an 
assertion implies that Brown does not need to be taken seriously as a modern world 
writer, but only as an Orcadian, or even Brownian, one.  Again, the language in which 
Bold makes his arguments is more revealing than the arguments themselves: “Brown’s 
work […] is like a vast ocean over which shine starlike images and symbols.  He takes us 
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on a timeless voyage on the ocean and makes us aware of the profound depths beneath 
the glittering surface”.96  The language and imagery Bold uses in his criticism of Brown 
are identical to those of Brown himself: for Bold, Brown exists in a world unto himself, 
and can thus only be examined individually.  Clearly this is a problematic approach to a 
body of work: not only does it not allow Brown’s work to be compared, whether 
stylistically or ideologically, with contemporary or historical works, but it refuses to 
acknowledge any aspects of Brown’s writing which may not fit into this pre-defined 
model of what his writing should be.  Whether Brown is being thought of as a Scottish 
writer, an Orcadian writer, or a writer who can only be compared with himself, the end 
result is clear: Brown’s work cannot be said to engage with the world as a whole, or to 
have anything to offer more than is superficially present. 
 Cairns Craig, in an brief discussion of Greenvoe, repeats these dismissive notions 
more stridently: “it is at one with a landscape which may be a site through which history 
passes, but which can never be incorporated to the trajectories of humanity’s historical 
meanings”.97  For Craig, Huberman, and many other writers,98 Brown is first and 
foremost a writer of local identity, and for those readers who do not share that identity, 
the works are to a certain extent escapist.  The problems of the Orkneys remain limited to 
one small area of the world, and are always distinct.  For Craig, this is symptomatic of a 
larger Scottish inability to come to terms with history: “Scotland is quite simply a world 
to which narrative, and therefore history, is alien”.99  Accordingly, Craig in his readings 
of Brown focuses on the mythic elements, as well as the regional, as a way of 
demonstrating that the works are symptomatic of a cultural inability to approach a grand 
historical narrative.  For a critic such as Craig, then, Brown’s work is best understood as 
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being explanatory of a larger Scottish cultural paradigm, an inability to think past 
national or geographico-historical borders: “be Scottish and your achievement is 
necessarily local”.100  Craig’s larger purpose is to explore how a culture can move past an 
imposed or adopted parochialism, but in doing so he writes the books he studies into a 
decidedly parochial paradigm.  For Craig, Scottish fiction of the twentieth century cannot 
be seen as anything other than regional – and as such necessarily limited – without 
disrupting his larger thesis on the nature of Scottish identity.  
 Berthold Schoene’s response to claims of this nature is to praise Brown’s 
regionalism:  
One wonders what is the great danger in becoming known as ‘the Orkney poet’.  
Why should Brown’s Orkney be less interesting than James Joyce’s Dublin, 
Thomas Hardy’s Wessex, William Faulkner’s imaginary country of 
Yoknapatawpha or the Mearns of Lewis Grassic Gibbon’s A Scots Quair?101 
 
For Schoene, criticism of Brown’s work on the basis that it is too regional is located in 
“Scotland’s cultural inferiority complex” which must be rethought.  He here echoes 
Craig, and would seem to be pointing towards a reading of Brown’s work which both 
allows its regionalism and simultaneously places it in a more global context.  And yet the 
lasting value of these texts, according to Schoene, remains local: “The gradual 
establishment of Brown as Orkney’s literary spokesman over the past four decades has 
instigated a revival of the Orcadian tradition in literature and strengthened the islanders’ 
sense of a distinct identity”.102  Brown’s work thus gains significance as it reveals the 
identity of those people about whom he writes to themselves.  This idea ultimately 
enforces the understanding of Brown’s value as being finally regional.  Certainly there 
are Dubliners or Mississippians who have come to understand themselves through Joyce 
or Faulkner, but very few would argue that this is the great achievement of those writers.   
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Instead, what makes these texts remarkable is the way in which they appeal to the 
universal, not in Huberman’s vague conception, but as explicit explorations of the nature 
of human interaction and of the ways in which communal and individual identities 
support and disturb each other.  The underlying project of virtually all the major writers 
of the twentieth century who are to some extent labelled “regional”, from Faulkner to 
Laxness, has been to show the dissolution of community and the rise of individual 
identity.  Any reading of Brown’s work which focuses only on his Orcadian, or even 
Scottish, identity disallows a comparison with such works, and also excludes any reading 
of Brown as not only a chronicler, but a thinker of community.  Schoene’s final 
conceptualisation of an “identity-bearing mythic authenticity”103 ultimately echoes 
Craig’s claim that the “mythic content […] denies the forward trajectory of the furrow of 
history”.104  While what exactly it is Craig means by “history” has not been explored in 
this thesis, such statements confirm Brown’s status as a parochial writer.  The regional, 
the mythic, the simplistic narratives may have their place, but they are always understood 
in such arguments as necessarily limited.   
These various critical perspectives can be best understood as making use of the 
unconscious ideology marked by Jerome McGann: in them, as in the critics of 
Romanticism on whom McGann focuses, the “scholarship is weakened only to the degree 
that its point of view does not (perhaps it cannot) account for all the available data”.105   
McGann’s argument is not that it is possible, or even advisable, to have a critical 
argument which is objective and free from ideology, but that the basis of that ideology 
must be examined, for “no critical polemic will succeed, or will help to advance its total 
view, when it allows its discourse to operate at a relatively casual level”.106  For all the 
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great value of these readings, many of the critics above focus on the ways in which 
Brown illuminates a specific regional literature to such an extent that they occasionally 
obfuscate the philosophical subtlety of his work.  As shown throughout this thesis, the 
lasting value of Brown’s work comes not through the conclusions he reaches about the 
nature of community, but in the varied ways in which he explores such ideas.  As easy as 
it would be to read Brown’s fiction as a paean to the ideal community, his work is 
significant because he undermines such a reading within the work itself. 
 Intriguingly, in his insistence on a mythic reading of Brown, Schoene begins to 
point to a more philosophically relevant conceptualisation of his work: “What draws 
Brown back to modernism is his belief in myth.  His quest for identity and meaning is no 
random search but informed by the notion that the truth of a universally applicable value 
system exists and can be found.”107  For Schoene, as for Brown himself, this larger value 
system is explicitly Christian, a “shaping divinity [that] takes over from our rough-
hewings” (FI 186).  And yet Brown’s lasting value is not as a Christian apologist, but as a 
chronicler of everyday existence, an existence, in the words of Heidegger, that is 
“‘poetical’ in its fundamental aspect”.108  For Heidegger, poetry is that which shores 
existence against disaster: 
Poetry is the act of establishing by the word and in the word.  What is established 
in this manner?  The permanent.  But can the permanent be established then?  Is it 
not that which has always been present? No! Even the permanent must be fixed so 
that it will not be carried away, the simple must be wrested from confusion, 
proportion must be set before what lacks proportion.109 
 
This is in part, and perhaps the greater part, Brown’s goal in all of his work.  He uses his 
fiction to place before the reader an opening out of Being, a way of unconcealing, which 
fixes, or at least echoes, the permanent, or the truth.  And yet there is much in Brown of 
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Blanchot’s disaster.  There is always within his writing the sense that the permanent may 
be carried away at any minute and that the simple is entwined with confusion.  Disaster is 
imminent, and poetry can only stave it off insofar as it recognises that imminence.  
Brown’s great contribution to literature, and philosophy, is to think of art and community 
as occupying the middle ground between the unconcealing fixity of Heidegger and the 
disaster of Blanchot.  By restricting his theme to that of the individual and community, 
Brown is able to explore how a community is actually lived, how it is revealed, and how, 
perhaps, it has been and should be.  This thesis has only been able to examine his novels, 
a small portion of his work, and the short stories and poetry are ripe for similar 
exploration.  And yet, even in this limited survey of his work, it is clear that Brown 
tackles the issue of community and individual life more fully than many of his 
contemporaries, and that he cannot be thought of as solely a regional writer, but as a 
writer of modern life as a necessarily disjointed whole.  In his praise of Tolstoy, Brown 
writes that the artworks created by an individual “are not theirs only but have come from 
the community in which they live” (FI 39).  Brown’s work also occupies this liminal 
space, at once the artistic creations of an individual and of a community, not only the 
physical community of the Orkneys, but the larger intellectual community of all those 
who are willing to think through what it means to exist on this earth.  His work is 
thoroughly of the past, but also thoroughly modern, and cannot be seriously appraised as 
anything other than a reconsideration of modern life.  In his emphasis on community, and 
his subtle reworkings of that notion across the body of his work, Brown asks the question 
of how it is that individuals come to live with each other, define each other and be 
defined by each other: there is perhaps no more important question to address.  For all its 
 301 
trappings of intellectual and ideological primitivism, Brown’s fiction is rare in its 
commitment to rethinking communitarian life and, as such, must be considered alongside 
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